Novel professions: interested disinterest and the making of the professional in the Victorian novel by Ruth, Jennifer
VICTORIAN CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS
Donald E. Hall, Series Editor
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page i
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page ii
Novel Professions
Interested Disinterest and the Making of the
Professional in the Victorian Novel
JENNIFER RUTH
The Ohio State University Press
Columbus, Ohio
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/19/2005  11:43 AM  Page iii
Copyright © 2006 by The Ohio State University.
All rights reserved.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ruth, Jennifer.
Novel professions : interested disinterest and the making of the profes-
sional in the Victorian novel / Jennifer Ruth.
p. cm.—(Victorian critical interventions)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–8142–1016–3 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0–8142–5152–8 (pbk. : alk.
paper)—ISBN 0–8142–9092–2 (cd-rom) 1. English fiction—19th
century—History and criticism. 2. Professions in literature. 3. Dickens,
Charles, 1812–1870. David Copperfield. 4. Trollope, Anthony, 1815–1882.
Three clerks. 5. Brontë, Charlotte, 1816–1855. Professor. 6. Criticism—
History—21st century. I. Title. II. Series.
PR878.P726R88 2006
823.’809352—dc22
2005024810
Type set in Adobe Garamond.
Cover design by Dan O’Dair.
Printed by Thomson-Shore, Inc.
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials. ANSI Z39.48–1992.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page iv
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Between Labor and Capital: Charlotte Brontë’s The Professor 33
Chapter 2 Becoming Professional: Time in David Copperfield 53
Chapter 3 The Professional Paradox: Competitive Examinations and 
Anthony Trollope’s The Three Clerks 83
Chapter 4 Deprofessionalized Critics in the Twenty-First Century 105
Notes 123
Works Cited 135
Index 147
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page v
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page vi
Acknowledgments
Studying the professional did not make me one: Nancy Armstrong deserves
the credit for that. I feel enormously lucky to have worked with her and to
still have the benefit of her wisdom whenever the need arises. Ellen Rooney
and Tamar Katz read this book in its very earliest stage, and I thank them for
their thorough, thoughtful readings. Sarah Winter and Elaine Hadley gra-
ciously included me in the “Locating the Victorians” Conference in London
in 2001, at which I delivered a part of chapter 3, and I’ve been grateful for
their support ever since. Cathy Shuman and Anita Levy inspired some of this
work and kindly read some of it as well. Nicholas Daly, Caroline Reitz, and
Danny Hack make me glad I joined this profession. Thanks also to Bruce
Robbins and Jim English for generously commenting on chapters when I
approached them out of the blue.
I am grateful to David Goslee for inviting me to speak in the “New Voices”
Lecture Series at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in 2003. The UT
English department proved an engaged and engaging audience for the book’s
introduction, and the book benefited from their response. In particular,
thanks to Allen Dunn for his brain-teaser of a question and for our dialogue
about Bourdieu.
At Portland State, Peter Carafiol has served as my advisor-in-residence,
helping me in ways too numerous to recount. I’d also like to give particular
thanks to Elisabeth Ceppi, Lorraine Mercer, Maria Depriest, Tracy Dillon,
Leerom Medovoi, Marcia Klotz, Amy Greenstadt, Maude Hines, Sue
Danielson, Ann Marie Fallon, Katya Amato, John Smyth, and Greg
Goekjian. Of the many PSU students to whom I’m grateful, I’d like to single
out Chris Hall, Alex Davis, Steve Sherman, and Brian Jennings for giving me
their time as researchers or readers.
I want to thank Donald Hall for the grace with which he serves as editor
of the Victorian Critical Interventions Series and the first-rate staff of The
Ohio State University Press: Heather Lee Miller, Sandy Crooms, and Maggie
Diehl. Chapter 1 originally appeared as “Between Labor and Capital:
Charlotte Brontë’s Professional Professor” in Victorian Studies (Winter 2003).
It won the INCS 2003 Essay Prize. The second section of chapter 2 appeared
vii
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page vii
as “Mental Capital, Industrial Time, and the Professional in David
Copperfield” in Novel: A Forum on Fiction (Summer 1999).
Countless things personal and professional were likely pressing for John
Plotz’s attention—for one, his second baby was due in days—and yet he
wrote the most brilliant and encouraging reader’s report imaginable. I have
not managed to do all that you envisioned for Novel Professions, John, but
that vision has made the book much better even so. Thanks also are owed
that other fantastic Victorianist, my fellow Brown alumnus and dear friend
Ivan Kreilkamp. Finally, thank you to those people who make life worth-
while: Sara Levine and Chris Gaggero, my parents John and Charlotte Ruth,
and my favorite little person, Charlotte Cowan-Ruth. This book is for my
favorite big person, Scott Cowan.
viii Acknowledgments
Ruth_FM_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:57 AM  Page viii
Introduction
The problem with this final avatar of bourgeois privilege, the meritocrat-
ic system—the problem, that is, from the point of view of the
bourgeoisie—is that it is the least (not the most) defensible, because its
basis is the thinnest. The oppressed may swallow being ruled by and giv-
ing reward to those who are to the manner born. But being ruled by and
giving reward to people whose only asserted claim (and that a dubious
one) is that they are smarter, that is too much to swallow.
—Immanuel Wallerstein
“Smart Kids” is the special topic of a recent issue of the minnesota review.
Guest-editor Renny Christopher begins by confessing, “I was a smart kid. I
was officially identified as a smart kid by the IQ test I took in the fourth
grade” (111). Ashamed at having fallen for this magical conferral of identity,
she writes, “Now I wish I could go back and kick my nine-year old self in the
butt and say, ‘don’t fall for that crap!’” She discusses a friend who, when the
subject of the special issue arose, explained how she had been a “dumb kid”
and had proudly acted out all the behaviors associated with that label just as
Christopher had performed the good-girl attributes associated with hers. This
friend “told a story,” continues Christopher, “about how she, as a working-
class kid, won the respect of other working-class kids in her school—by
rebelling and sassing the teachers. Once, a teacher literally picked her up by
the arms, carried her out into the hall, and slammed her against the lockers.
. . . I was thinking, wow, that’s so cool and envying Barbara for having had
the balls to defy authority like that, to be a bad kid, rather than the disgust-
ing little conformist that I was, respecting teachers’ authority . . . playing by
the rules, wanting approval from those authorities, being the perfect little fas-
cist subject, not the brave defiant little revolutionary that Barbara was”
1
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(111–12). If the IQ test “officially” decreed her smartness, then “I now offi-
cially and publicly renounce [it],” Christopher writes, “and declare my readi-
ness to do penance for having so enthusiastically and unthinkingly (and
dumbly?) accepted the smart kid mantle” (112). In Christopher’s piece, the
dumb kids turn out to be smart and the smart kids turn out to be dupes.1
Having “swallowed hook, line, sinker, and fishing pole” the notion of her
own innate ability, Christopher surfaces only to find she’s drowning in bour-
geois conformity (111). Her unique individuality, her “special” IQ, was sim-
ply the professional-managerial class molding her in its own image (111).
The easy response to Christopher’s self-flagellation is “poor little smart
kid” but her distress is genuine—“kick my . . . self,” “disgusting little con-
formist,” “perfect little fascist,” “do penance”—and her honesty admirable.
She only says in personal terms what numerous literary critics say in more
disguised form. Rather, I begin with “Smart Kids” to pose the question: Why
do we literary critics say, with so much passion and so much resentment
against our recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are
no better—that we are, in fact, worse—than everyone else?
Christopher takes it for granted that her academic success (now redefined
as conformist failure) in contrast to her less-educated brother can be traced
to that fateful fourth-grade IQ test, but one could imagine the trajectories of
brother and sister playing out quite differently (and, indeed, within the
implicit terms of her essay, how to account for her friend whose defiant
dumb-kid past did not stop her from growing up to be Christopher’s col-
league?). Recent research in the psychology of motivation suggests that affir-
mations of innate intelligence often have counterintuitive effects, with those
told they possess superior ability less likely to pursue challenging tasks and
more likely to abandon tasks once they prove difficult.2 After all, if you try
and fail, you might lose the “smart” mantle altogether, whereas if you never
try, you just did not “apply” yourself. What drops out of Christopher’s
account—and becomes dangerous for the individual anxious about his or her
smart identity—is effort, labor, work. Presumably, Christopher worked fair-
ly hard to get her PhD, but this effort is summarily discounted. By ignoring
all that came between the IQ test and her current post as a professor, does she
not run the risk of reproducing the illusion she is at pains to dispel, the illu-
sion upon which the IQ test rests? That ability can be abstracted from effort?
By its end, the Victorian period gave us not only Sigmund Freud but the
Simon-Binet test, the prototype of the IQ test first introduced in 1905.3 The
idea that there was something called inherent intelligence that might be
objectively measured allowed the educational system to sort students into
vocational or professional tracks. Where Freud made us a mystery to our-
2 Introduction
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selves, the IQ test stamped us with objective value—a seemingly straightfor-
ward, allegedly irrefutable measure of our cognitive worth. Am I smart or
must I rely on effort? But how did the two—ability and effort—become sep-
arable categories in the first place? Apparently, the line between them had
been drawn at least by 1875, when James Cotter Morison devoted an essay
in the Fortnightly Review to complaining about it. He said with exasperation,
“There is something offensive and even harmful in the antithesis set up
between genius and learning, as if the one almost necessarily excluded the
other, and as if the man of learning were, by nature of the case, a hard-
working dunce who strove, by accumulating knowledge, not only to make up
for his deficiency in talent, but to acquire an unfounded claim to some of its
honours” (537). Terms like “effort” and “intelligence” get separated and rei-
fied and then muddled again in the middle decades of the nineteenth centu-
ry, the exchange between cousins Sir Francis Galton and Charles Darwin
being a condensed case in point. After reading Galton’s book Hereditary
Genius (1869), Darwin wrote him: “You have made a convert of an opponent
in one sense, for I have always maintained that, excepting fools, men did not
differ much in intellect, only in zeal and hard work.” Galton replied:
“Character, including the aptitude for hard work, is inheritable like every
other faculty” (Memories 290). Congratulated for abstracting a capacity from
effort, Galton extended his nominalizing grasp to “effort,” which then itself
becomes a kind of capacity—“being” disentangled from “doing,” “doing”
morphs into another kind of “being.”4
Novel Professions: Interested Disinterest and the Making of the Professional in
the Victorian Novel studies the way the Victorians conceived professional iden-
tity by drawing and then worrying distinctions between ability and effort,
intelligence and merit, and being and doing. “The professions as we know
them are very much a Victorian creation,” wrote W. J. Reader (2). At the heart
of this creation, I argue, lay a tension between being and doing: a tension
between the fact that people discover themselves to be suited for a certain line
of work (via competitive examination, for example) and the fact that they
must also over the course of time do that work, and thus come to fulfill the
promise of their initial discovery. This tension developed over the course of the
nineteenth century, but was at its most taut at mid-century, when Victorians
begin to conceptualize an emergent professional class. The late 1840s and the
1850s, the period from which I draw my archive, established the cultural con-
ditions for the class’s explosion in both numbers and power in the 1860s,
1870s, and 1880s. At the start of the nineteenth century, such careers as law,
medicine, and the church drew on both the gentry and upper middle classes
but did not produce men who clearly identified themselves as a distinct class.
3Introduction
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By the end of the 1850s, however, professionals were an identifiable commu-
nity gaining in political and social importance, such that ambitious young
men required a handbook to aid them in the momentous task of choosing a
profession—H. Byerley Thomson’s 1857 The Choice of a Profession: A Concise
Account and Comparative Review of the English Professions. “The importance of
the professions can hardly be overrated,” Thomson wrote; “They form the
head of the great English middle class, maintain its tone of independence,
keep up to the mark its standard of morality, and direct its intelligence” (5). A
glance at the numbers confirms the mid-century’s significance: “Between
1841 and 1881,” writes historian Harold Perkin, “professional occupations
trebled in number, compared with a two-thirds increase in general population,
and came to constitute a substantial element in the middle class” (Origins
428–29). By the 1860s, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse report,
“What had seemed a subordinate sector of the middle class made up of man-
agers, professionals, experts of various kinds was running England” (120).
Galton’s choice of the professions as the ruling principle by which Hereditary
Genius organizes its statistics on eminent men—beginning, appropriately
enough, with judges—is telling evidence for Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s
claim.
As various disciplines, including fiction-writing, began to
professionalize—by defining objective standards of knowledge, developing
processes of evaluation and accreditation, and organizing into communities
in the form of chapters, associations, and societies—the novel attempted to
“theorize” the professional, trying to do what nonfiction failed to do. Political
economy could not make sense of this new figure whose stock-in-trade con-
sisted of intangible services. Adam Smith, as well as those after him like
David Ricardo and Karl Marx, identified three groups that constituted sepa-
rate classes: owners of land, owners of capital, and owners of labor. How,
then, to account for professionals who perform labor but also possess a kind
of capital (mental capital in the form of measurable talent and the stored
labor of knowledge acquisition)? The nascent professional also confounded
assumptions about the relationship between economic and social class: if he
did not look or act like a wage laborer, he nevertheless relied upon a wage or
a salary; if he did not possess financial capital (though he had to have some to
embark on a professional career), he claimed what we would now call cultur-
al capital.5 In short, much of what has made this class notoriously difficult to
theorize both then and now is what Erik Olin Wright calls its “contradictory
class locations” (quoted in Clarke 67).
If the professional suffers from contradictory class locations—neither in the
capitalist nor the laborer’s camp and yet both a (mental) capitalist and an
4 Introduction
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(intellectual) laborer—then he is also subject to ambiguous, even perhaps
ambivalent, temporalities—neither born a professional, as the gentry is born
gentry, nor self-made, like the Smilesian businessman, and yet both born
(with certain aptitudes) and made (through mental effort). With a simulta-
neously pregnant and collapsed relationship to time, the professional puta-
tively boasts mental “gifts” that anticipate his future (pregnant) but he sim-
ply becomes what he was always meant to be (collapsed). Phrenology and
then, later, the competitive examination were central to the development of
this professionalizing logic. Because they took a static measure of a person
that allegedly could predict future success or failure, they provided a way to
identify the future professional, the figure with professional promise.
Precursors of the IQ test, phrenology and the exam also appeared to act as
objective gatekeepers to the professions, counterpoints to patronage and job-
bery. By converting “doing” into “being”—not what you learned but what
you are capable of learning—they served useful credentialing functions for
the modern professional and assured him a place higher in the social hierar-
chy than the businessman or manual laborer. “Agents are increasingly defined
in terms only of what they do, by the technically defined skills or tasks that
fall under their title or job, the further one descends in the hierarchy,” Pierre
Bourdieu has written, “and conversely, by what they are as one moves up”
(State Nobility 119). But in this act of social magic, phrenology and the com-
petitive examination seemed to bypass the actual work necessary to earn an
identity and, thus, raised thorny epistemological questions for conceptualiz-
ing the professional. In all three novels I analyze, this tension between doing
and being structures the text’s production of a credible (and credentialed)
professional, as I show with regard to phrenology in chapter 1 and competi-
tive examination in chapters 2 and 3.
The Victorian novel put phrenology and the competitive examination at
the center of the Victorian fantasy of professional identity. Many scholars have
explored the way phrenology saturates Victorian novels, but almost none have
studied the role of the examination in Victorian fiction. Yet it is hard to imag-
ine certain Dickens novels and virtually any of Anthony Trollope’s without the
Oxbridge or civil service examinations.6 Even George Eliot, who generally
relied less on shorthand in her elaboration of characters, made sure to intro-
duce Fred Vincy as “the plucked Fred” and to have Fred begin his reformation
by finally passing his examinations (158). “The poor young men,” commiser-
ates Miss Ilex of Gryll Grange (1861) in a conversation about competitive
examinations, “are not held qualified for a profession unless they have over-
loaded their understanding with things of no use in it” (185). “Well, Jackson!”
says one fellow in a Punch cartoon from 1852 (see figure 1), “You see they’ve
5Introduction
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plucked me again.” “I did intend going into the Church, and being an
Ornament to the Profession—but as they won’t let me through—I think—I
shall cut the whole concern,” he ends, absurdly trying to save face. “My dear
Henry,” begins one faux letter-writing sister of a more fortunate fellow in
6 Introduction
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another issue of Punch, “Mamma and Pappa desire me to say that they were
very much gratified at reading that you acquitted yourself so well at the exam-
ination, and Pappa has given me a cheque to enclose” (25). Indeed, if we are
to trust Pip’s account, the competitive examination was the preferred “mental
exercise” of even the ragged schools, where the “pupils entered among them-
selves upon a competitive examination on the subject of Boots, with the view
of ascertaining who could tread hardest upon whose toes” (84).
In a culture as mesmerized by sorting and categorization as the Victorians’,
nobody should be surprised to find the examination playing this central role
and yet it has received attention within literary criticism only very recently. In
Pedagogical Economies (2000), Cathy Shuman analyzes different Victorian
authors’ use of the exam as a structure to negotiate and legitimize their own
labor as readers and writers. In doing so, she articulates economies particular to
intellectual labor—pedagogical economies of evaluation and assessment reliant
for many of their terms and maneuvers upon those economies that govern the
state, the market, or the home but nonetheless distinguishable from them.
Although I discovered Shuman’s work after completing my own research on
competitive examinations, PE has greatly enriched Novel Professions, deepening
my own understanding of the paradoxes of professional identity.
In my study of Victorian fiction’s formation of professional identity, I am
also indebted to a number of other works that have addressed the nineteenth-
century professional and/or the category of intellectual labor. Important
touchstones are Bruce Robbins’s Secular Vocations (1993), Thomas Pfau’s
Wordsworth’s Profession (1997), Jonathan Freedman’s Professions of Taste
(1990), Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse’s chapter “The
Vanishing Intellectual” in The Imaginary Puritan (1992), Lawrence
Rothfield’s Vital Signs (1992), and Clifford Siskin’s The Work of Writing
(1998). Alan Mintz’s thorough discussion of Middlemarch’s portrayal of the
rise of the professions in George Eliot and the Novel of Vocation saved me from
writing a chapter on Eliot while also motivating me to look at novels written
when professional identity occupied an earlier stage of manufacture.
Published in 1978, Mintz’s book offers an interesting glimpse of what stud-
ies of the professional looked like before criticism grew suspicious of this
world-historical figure. James Eli Adams’s analysis in Dandies and Desert
Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity (1995) of the precarious gendering of
masculine intellectual labor, and the consequent need for an ascetic rhetoric
of self-discipline, also informed my work here, particularly the chapter on
David Copperfield.
More recently, Daniel Hack’s fascinating work on the Royal Literary Fund
and “begging writers” and Clare Pettitt’s Patent Inventions (2004) has assured
7Introduction
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me that I am pursuing an important thesis. Opening up and carefully devel-
oping lines of inquiry that my book does not consider, Hack demonstrates
that the Victorian writer’s “rejection of the marketplace as the sole or ultimate
index of value neither constitutes nor implies a fully professionalistic dis-
avowal of market competition and payment, let alone a modernist embrace
of market failure as a source of artistic legitimacy” (“Literary Paupers” 694).
Patent Inventions appeared as I was preparing Novel Professions for press, but
in many respects it, too, might be seen to complement and historicize the
readings I offer. Patent Inventions, Pettitt writes, “takes the current critical dis-
cussion of copyright law and the construction of the artist in the Victorian
period out of its literary-critical isolation and restores it to the wider debate
in the period about labour and value” (2). Literary criticism has typically
viewed the Victorian artist within the Kantian and Romantic tradition
opposing art to mechanical invention, but Pettitt unearths a widespread dis-
course in which the artist and the manufacturer functioned as analogues for
one another. “By the end of the 1830s,” she writes, “analogies between
mechanical inventors and literary inventors were commonplace” (5). It is
impossible to overstate the value of these contributions as correctives to our
current critical tendencies. Once we see that the Victorian artist, and I would
add professional, encouraged a metaphoric link between himself and the
mechanical inventor, our mode of “exposing” the artist-professional’s auton-
omy as self-serving illusion—a critical routine discussed in greater detail
below—loses a great deal of its impetus. In Pettitt and Hack’s rigorously his-
toricized scenarios, the Victorian artist-professional underscored his position
as market agent as often as he obscured it.7
While I see Novel Professions following the lead of Shuman, Hack, and
Pettitt, I also view it as part of the growing body of work committed to think-
ing through Foucault’s legacy to Victorian studies, work like Lauren
Goodlad’s Victorian Culture and the Victorian State (2003) and David Wayne
Thomas’s Cultivating Victorians (2004). Critics of my generation inherited a
set of profoundly influential Foucauldian works that revised the way we read
the Victorian novel. The Novel and the Police (1988), Desire and Domestic
Fiction (1987), Uneven Developments (1988), and Epistemology of the Closet
(1990) made up our diet and, as has been widely noted, we have found it dif-
ficult to do more than regurgitate their insights. “The watershed years of the
late 1970s and 1980s,” Erin O’Connor contends, for example, “have left a
long and ugly drought in their wake. There has been no comparably major
study of nineteenth-century fiction for the past ten years and the bulk of the
work being done is patently derivative, devoted to recapitulating and extend-
ing ideas laid down over a decade ago, rather than continuing its tradition of
8 Introduction
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innovation” (par. 6). A few exceptions stand out, such as Christopher Lane’s
Burdens of Intimacy (1999), which refuses to let Foucault upstage Freud, but
by and large Victorianists keep to the script of what Adams has called the
“Foucauldian melodrama” (“Recent Studies in the Nineteenth Century”
858).8 Before I outline the book’s chapters in the final section of this intro-
duction, “Mundane Bookkeeping Matters,” I hypothesize about why this
might be. Why have we found Foucault so exceedingly compelling that, even
as “our broadly Foucauldian preoccupation with power verges on reduction
to an utterly banal formula,” we seem paralyzed to transcend him? (Adams,
“Recent Studies in the Nineteenth Century” 878) And what does this have
to do with the question with which I began? The question that borrowed
Foucault’s own words on the modern infatuation with repression to ask about
our strangely liberating self-loathing: why do we say with so much passion
and so much resentment against our recent past, against our present, and
against ourselves, that we are no better—are, in fact, worse—than everyone
else?9
SACRIFICING THE PROFESSIONAL IN VICTORIAN STUDIES
“It is a comfort to think what a rising profession I belong to.”
—Henry Sidgwick, 1874, quoted in Lubenow
“I would not want to be a Victorian scholar these days.”
—Literature professor quoted in Chronicle of Higher Education, 2002
The Foucauldian essay that did the most to shape Victorian studies’ approach
to the figure of the professional is without question Mary Poovey’s “The
Man-of-Letters Hero: David Copperfield and the Professional Writer.” This
brilliant chapter from Uneven Developments argues that David Copperfield
distracts readers from David’s implication in the vulgar market by appropri-
ating the disinterest associated with the self-sacrificing wife and mother.
According to this view, David needs Agnes not because her selflessness com-
plements his disinterestedness but because it throws a mystifying veil over his
mercenary motives. We have been operating ever since under the assumption
that the nineteenth-century professional fostered the illusion that he tran-
scended the market upon which he exchanged his services. We charge our-
selves with exposing this fraudulent claim, laying bare the rhetorical machi-
nations behind the professional’s apparent transcendence. But can it be only
coincidence that demystifying the professional became an irresistible thesis at
9Introduction
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the same time a shrinking academic market put critics under unprecedented
pressure to professionalize? If literary works are allegories of their own pro-
duction, as some have claimed, could not literary criticism also harbor self-
referential allegories? Might twinned impulses of resentment (over profes-
sionalization’s acceleration) and self-abnegation (for critics’ own participa-
tion) play a role in the sacrifice of the professional?
In the mid-nineteenth century, the novelist viewed herself or himself as
part of the professional class s/he was helping to usher forth. In the late twen-
tieth and early twenty-first centuries, literary critics have only begun to think
of themselves as members of, as one scholar writes, “what we now call a ‘pro-
fession’” (Harpham, “End of Theory” 194). “Where the word ‘professional’
seemed a bit off in 1950,” George Levine comments, “now it would be mere-
ly absurd to deny that humanities departments are in the business of profes-
sional training” (“Aesthetics and Ideology Revisited” 4). Sociologically classi-
fied as professionals for the whole of the twentieth century, we never referred
to ourselves as such but rather as “intellectuals” or “scholars” or, more recent-
ly, “teachers of critical thinking.” Now we are professional academics, our col-
leagues are more or less “professionalized,” and our graduate students are
“preprofessional” or, what is more of the same thing, “hyperprofessional.”10
Adopting this identity has been fraught from the start, as is clear in the slide
from the anodyne “professional” to the pathological “hyperprofessional” as
well as in Levine’s brutally crisp formulation, “the business of professional
training.”
Anxiety about “the state of the profession” has gone hand-in-hand with
thinking of ourselves as professionals, and the term “profession” seems both
a defense against and a metonym for crisis. That is, to identify oneself with
“the profession” is to feel at once nested in an institution with a respected his-
tory and wildly swung among the cumulative crises threatening the profes-
sion with incoherence since the 1980s—crises ranging from, to quote one
critic, “the political demonization of the NEA and the NEH, the media man-
ufacture of a 90s red scare . . . incessant carping in the media and among
humanities scholars about the fashions of cultural studies and canon revision,
and any number of more local skirmishes about the value of language disci-
plines in general . . . to say nothing of the more pressing and troubling cor-
porate reorganization of our universities” (Gregory, par. 1). When one
invokes “the profession,” one both quells anxiety and incites it.
To some scholars, the ubiquity of the term indicates our fall from the sta-
tus of intellectual into reified specialist.11 Recently Geoffrey Galt Harpham
has argued that the rise of a narrow professionalism marks the end of the
heady, speculative era of theory. “Fields of cultural endeavor, once heroic,
10 Introduction
Ruth_Intro_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:58 AM  Page 10
now consider themselves ‘Professions,’” he writes; “The rise of professional-
ism made literary study available not just to aesthetically responsive scholars
but to ambitious people who understood the structure and ethos of a post-
theoretical professionalism” (“End of Theory” 194). A whiff of blame-the-
victim clings to this essay, which nowhere mentions the altered academic
market forcing young literary critics to put their ambitions on hyperbolic dis-
play. Indeed, aspiring critics—graduate students—are the ones predisposed
to feel the most ambivalent about professionalization. On the one hand, if
professionalization is taken to mean an aggressive self-marketing achieved
primarily through research productivity, one might view it as intellectual
quantity at the price of quality, and this view might provide a tempting com-
pensatory buffer when the young scholar as yet lacks quantity. On the other
hand, non-productivity is not an alternative that will land the student a job
and so she perforce must produce and “professionalize.” A colleague who
earned her PhD at Duke in the 1990s reports, “We were ironic about the pro-
fessionalization of graduate programs even as we were anxious about our own
professionalization. We were defensively ironic.”
While the rise of the profession spells the end of theory for Harpham, the
rise of theory coincides with—in fact, constitutes—criticism’s professional-
ization for John Guillory. In his influential book Cultural Capital and in a
series of equally influential essays since, Guillory argues that literary study,
once an important form of cultural capital, is increasingly marginalized in a
post-1970s economy favoring a new technical-professional class over the tra-
ditional middle class. One need not be familiar with Shakespeare to join the
ranks of this new class but rather must possess certain skills. Theory’s “rigor,”
he suggests, can be viewed as an unconscious response to this new economy,
a misrecognized attempt to “model the intellectual work of the theorist on
the new social form of intellectual work, the technobureaucratic labor of the
new professional-managerial class” (183). In fact, Guillory’s argument that
new economic conditions have sidelined literature allows him to read any
number of the profession’s moments—from the theory explosion in the
1970s to the canon debate in the 1980s to the emergence of cultural studies
and the “preprofessionalism” of graduate students in the 1990s—as symp-
toms of “a larger, protracted crisis in the decline of the relevance of the
humanities” (“Bourdieu’s Refusal” 128).
Guillory’s sociological approach connecting the profession’s internal
changes to larger, structural changes in its social status is more promising than
one that accounts for change in terms of generational temperaments. It also
usefully redirects our attention from local skirmishes over, say, cultural studies
to the ugly reality of our downsizing. But Guillory’s fatalism is disabling.
11Introduction
Ruth_Intro_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:58 AM  Page 11
Training our gaze on the real threat to literary study, Guillory then tells us that
all we can do is sit back and watch the death throes of our cultural capital.
About the global conditions determining our local circumstances in the acad-
emy, he writes, “there is nothing that members of our profession can do”
(“Preprofessionalism” 5).12 A number of critics echo Guillory.13 Levine, for
example, offers a set of recommendations to English departments in a recent
article, cites Guillory, and then concludes on the following dispirited note: “In
the end, what happens to the profession and to the teaching we are supposed
to be doing in it is likely to be largely decided by forces well beyond the con-
trol of even the strongest energies inside higher education” (“Two Nations”
16).
Guillory’s argument rests on two premises that come together to make the
end of literary study as we know it a foregone conclusion. Guillory assumes
that the economy has qualitatively changed since around 1970, and he is no
doubt right about that (see Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity). In today’s
post-Fordist economy, intellectual labor is much more valuable but far less
secure. However, Guillory’s corollary assumption that literary study is irrel-
evant to this new economy is less obviously the case. He points to declining
enrollment in literature classes since 1970 as evidence of our increasing futil-
ity, but, looking at the data on enrollment from a different angle, the ques-
tion becomes not why did enrollment drop in the 1970s, but rather why has
there been, as Michael Bérubé writes, “a resurgence of undergraduate inter-
est in the English major in the 1980s and 1990s?” (Employment of English
21). The new economy, Bérubé persuasively argues, creates a context in
which “a general liberal arts degree might be seen by prospective employers
as more attractive than a degree that signified a college career of technical-
vocational training” (22). “Whatever the status of ‘literature’ as an index of
cultivation and class status,” he continues, “degrees in English may still be
convertible into gainful employment—not because they mark their recipi-
ents as literate, well-rounded young men and women who can allude to
Shakespeare in business memos, but because they mark their recipients as
people who can potentially negotiate a wide range of intellectual tasks and
handle (in various ways) disparate kinds of ‘textual’ material” (23). Looked
at this way, the conflict of interest is not between literature professors and
the students who no longer need them, but between humanities faculty and
a new administrative culture deploying the cost-cutting techniques of the
new economy.14 In other words, it is a labor relations issue—an issue for the
profession as a profession, as a body that insists on defining for itself the
terms and organization of its practice. “The historical shaping of the knowl-
edge class,” John Frow explains, “took place around a process of legal and
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industrial struggle over the conditions for autonomy of work practices”
(125).
Ironically, then, we have begun to refer to “the profession” at precisely the
moment we face deprofessionalization. Having conceded our modest identi-
ty as professionals, we find we are, again, out of step with reality—that, to
borrow Bill Readings’s now-famous line, “the professoriat is being proletari-
anized” (1). Charles B. Harris elaborates, “What we thought was the con-
tested terrain—such issues as the literary canon, multiculturalism, the
humanities curriculum—turns out to have been merely a beachhead. Now
we understand that the real targets of this escalating assault are tenure and
shared governance, the twin bulwarks of our professional identity” (25).15
Although our autonomy was always relative, the institutions of shared gover-
nance and tenure ensured that it was not simply chimerical. Increasingly, uni-
versities and colleges replace retiring tenured faculty in literature departments
not with tenure-line hires but with adjunct labor without the job security or
work conditions that make relative autonomy possible.16 The pre- and hyper-
professionalization of junior scholars is best understood, therefore, not as the
profession’s invasion by careerist critics but as the consequence of heightened
competition stemming from a catch-22: dwindling demand for fresh (or
stale) PhDs, as tenure lines evaporate, and an oversupply of PhDs, as depart-
ments expand graduate programs in misguided and often hapless bids to hold
onto tenure lines.17 If “disavowal” is understood psychoanalytically as the
simultaneous recognition and denial of a disturbing reality, perhaps our now-
incessant invocation of “the profession” is one way we disavow our
deprofessionalization.
“It is only with reference to the articulations and hierarchy of a profes-
sional bureaucracy that a sense of the self and its worth—its merit—emerges
and becomes measurable,” Stanley Fish writes, underscoring the way the pro-
fessional’s sense of his unique merit is paradoxically contingent upon the col-
lective apparatus of educational institutions and professional associations.
“Everyone wants to believe,” Fish continues, “that his rewards have been
earned rather than bestowed, and conversely, everyone wants to believe that
his ill fortune is a comment not on his abilities, but on the perversity of a cor-
rupt and blinkered system” (“Authors-Readers” 27). During periods of pro-
fessional instability and contraction, when whole armies of undeniably qual-
ified professionals collect at the bottom of the ladder, the successful and the
unsuccessful alike find it hard to believe that “rewards have been earned
rather than bestowed” and that the system is not “corrupt and blinkered.” “I
don’t believe in meritorious competition anymore,” one assistant professor
writes in the Chronicle of Higher Education; “There’s so little difference
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between [struggling adjuncts] and me that claiming superiority would be an
exercise in silliness” (Coleman C3). Self-consciousness about the mechanisms
of the profession spreads, and the fact that “the self of the professional is con-
stituted and legitimized by the very structures—social and institutional—
from which it is supposedly aloof” looms into view, seeming to expose pro-
fessionalism itself as inherently and irredeemably compromised (Fish,
“Authors-Readers” 27). As a result, the idealistic individualizing rhetoric of
“calling” is replaced with the cynical, deindividualizing rhetoric of bureau-
cracy—“the spirit [now] is bureaucratic rather than charismatic,” Harpham
writes (“End of Theory” 194)—and the only way one can conceive of escap-
ing bureaucracy is by betraying how thoroughly one is determined by it. At
such a juncture, a Foucauldianism unmasking the meritocratic ideology of
liberal individualism as a disciplinary regime necessarily carries the ring of
truth.
Certainly, it is the case that, as Jeff Nunokawa writes, Foucault inspired
“the strain of literary criticism that has told the most on the Victorian novel
over the course of the last two decades” (843). Perhaps the most exemplary
of the work exploring the Victorian novel’s participation in the ruses of lib-
eral individualism remains D. A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police. According
to Miller, the Victorian novel inscribes a disciplinary double bind whereby
the bourgeois individual’s belief in her autonomy only conscripts her in her
own incarceration. What is the relationship between a Foucauldian vision of
self-defeating agency and the critic’s experience of professional disequilibri-
um, when the critic’s compensatory hyperprofessionalization accompanies
the structural devaluation of the profession itself? Speaking of David
Copperfield’s ragtag cast of characters, Miller describes a “spectacle of . . .
pathetically reduced beings, maimed by their own defense mechanisms, and
whose undoubtedly immense energy can only be expended to fix them all the
more irremovably in a total social system” (207). Is this point particularly
persuasive under conditions when the “undoubtedly immense energy” of the
critic only invests her further in a rapidly depreciating discipline, a field
devalued by the university and, as Guillory at least argues, the culture as a
whole? However unconscious and mediated the connection, it can be no
accident that it is precisely when we are experiencing a very real shrinking of
our professional autonomy that we come to “realize” that autonomy itself is
illusory.
Miller does not finger the professional per se, but that figure exemplifies
liberal individualism. Putatively succeeding on the basis of his own merits
and considered “the proprietor of his own person and capacities,” the profes-
sional is the hero in the liberal fantasy of individual autonomy and, conse-
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quently, the scapegoat in the Foucauldian unmasking of liberalism (Larson
222). As if to bring this subtext to the surface, Mary Poovey’s “The Man-of-
Letters Hero: David Copperfield and the Professional Writer” appeared soon
after Miller’s essay on the same novel. Whereas Miller’s exposé of liberalism
is arguably also an implicit or displaced scandal of professionalism, Poovey’s
masterful piece explicitly indicts the professional. In her hands, the profes-
sional becomes both a synecdoche for and the agent of a liberalism that
champions freedom but secretly defers to the market and/or disciplinary soci-
ety. The professional, she writes, “reinforced and disguised” the lie of liberal
individualism (107).18
A hermeneutics of suspicion governs Poovey’s reading: David is “self-
serving” (118), “manipulat[ive] (117), and “complicitous” (120), while the
novel itself “collude[s]” (122), cover[s] over” (123), “distracts” (119), and
“disguise[s]” (122).19 Positing a zero-sum game wherein one ascends social
and economic heights only by pushing others down, Poovey argues that the
professional appears meritorious only insofar as others are understood to be
undeserving.20 The novel papers over the fact that others might be equally
worthy by translating class differences into variations of moral character. This
argument rides on Poovey’s ability to persuade us that no qualitative differ-
ence separates David from Uriah Heep. David and Uriah “manipulate others
for their self-serving ends,” she writes, “[but] whereas Heep’s connivances are
eventually clearly revealed, David’s manipulations remain obscure. Only
when the reader reads against the narrator’s disarming claims do certain
actions appear as what they are: self-aggrandizing attempts to better himself
at someone else’s expense” (117).
Poovey’s approach dismantles professional identity by conflating the pro-
fessional with other classed identities, alternately conflating him with the
capitalist and the manual laborer. When she focuses on David’s hidden greed,
she wants to demonstrate that the professional and the capitalist are essen-
tially identical—both equally acquisitive and exploitative of others. And, as I
argue below, when she drops the professional’s dissimulated motives to con-
sider the organization and conditions of professional work, she wishes to
show that the professional and the factory hand are one and the same—both
equally alienated. In sum, for Poovey, professional services are just like other
commodities on the market. If we believe they are different, it is simply
because Victorian novels like David Copperfield have convinced us so. Or did
they? “The extent of symbolic work necessary to deploy these figures (liter-
ary man and domestic woman) revealed that they were not really outside the
market economy or class society,” writes Poovey (123). The fictive act sug-
gesting that professional and domestic work is something other than self-
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interested labor has been too assiduously performed or, rather, the profes-
sional protests too much—his declarations of innate and earned merit betray
his anxiety that he depends on the class system he allegedly transcends. But
then it might just as reasonably be claimed that Poovey has had to expend a
great deal of energy herself. Without Poovey, would we have believed that the
literary man and the housewife were in fact qualitatively different from the
market-oriented capitalist and laborer? And would we have been simply
wrong?
Perhaps symbolic performances like David Copperfield did go some way
toward placing professional and domestic careers in another realm and gen-
erating another logic to regulate their practice. Perhaps the experience of
being a professional or housewife was different precisely because it was
believed to be different by those having the experience. For help conceptual-
izing this here, and throughout Novel Professions, I rely on Barbara Herrnstein
Smith’s formulation of the “double discourse of value.” “On the one hand,”
Smith writes, “there is the discourse of economic theory: money, commerce,
technology, industry, production and consumption, workers and consumers;
on the other hand, there is the aesthetic axiology: culture, art, genius, cre-
ation and appreciation, artists and connoisseurs” (127). Work conducted in
the world of economics is self-interested and profit-oriented, exchanged as
commodities, while the work of aesthetics is not work at all but “play.”
Poovey wishes to demonstrate that while literature claimed to belong to the
latter, it actually inhabited the former discourse. Presenting himself as exempt
from “the alienation endemic to all kinds of labor under capitalism” (13) and,
thereby, promoting the false notion that “there was some boundary to the
alienation of market relations” (118), the literary professional pretended to be
engaged in aesthetics when in fact he was driven by economics. To underscore
this point, Poovey details the myriad ways Victorian writing resembled
Taylorized labor, discussing serialization’s “factorylike conditions of produc-
tion” and “standardization of form” (124). Conversely, she effaces the way
belief in literature’s status as artistic creation influenced the relationship the
writer had to his or her writing. She also ignores the more material ways the
scene of writing contrasted with the managed monotony of the assembly line,
such as the ability to work at home with one’s own “tools,” to set one’s own
hours despite being on a schedule, to see what one conceives in one’s head
materialized through one’s effort, and the like. In sum, in order to prove that
literature belongs to the first discourse, a hermeneutics of suspicion denies all
the ways in which it also belongs to the second. More to the point, it denies
the very existence of the second discourse as anything but mere ideology.
What is gained by refusing professional labor its specificity is obvious:
16 Introduction
Ruth_Intro_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:58 AM  Page 16
sharp insight into the ways liberal individualism covers over the constitutive
inequities of capitalist society. But something is lost, and not just for the stu-
dent of Victorian culture. The hermeneutics of suspicion pervades literary
criticism as a whole, shaping our approach to the professional and also to
what we do as professionals—aesthetics. “Marxists, cultural materialists,
poststructuralists, and deconstructive psychoanalysts, have . . . shared a
hermeneutics of suspicion,” Isobel Armstrong writes in The Radical Aesthetic,
and consequently, “the concept of the aesthetic has been steadily emptied of
content” (2). Like the professional, the thinking goes, aesthetics is not what
it purports to be. This parallel makes perfect sense once one considers the sig-
nificant overlap between discourses of aesthetics and professionalism, both of
which define practitioners by their distance from economic determination.21
In fact, the critical pillorying of the professional is best considered a subset of
the last two decades’ deconstruction of aesthetic autonomy—the discovery
that “disinterested assessment” and “autonomy” are ideological
mystifications.
While Armstrong is surely right about the general tenor of contemporary
criticism, she too hastily assimilates the “Marxists” and “cultural materialists”
into the group she names, forgetting that a certain strain of Marxist thinking
always bore art’s position within both discourses in mind.22 Peter Bürger
wrote in The Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984):
Conceiving of art’s apartness from society as its ‘nature,’ means involuntar-
ily adopting the l’art pour l’art concept of art and simultaneously making it
impossible to explain this apartness as the product of a historical and social
development. If, on the other hand, one puts forward the view that art’s
independence from society exists only in the artist’s imagination . . . the
correct insight that autonomy is a historically conditioned phenomenon
turns into its denial; what remains is a mere illusion. Both approaches miss
the complexity of autonomy, whose characteristic is that it describes some-
thing real (the detachment of art as a special sphere from the nexus of the
praxis of life) but simultaneously expresses this real phenomenon in con-
cepts that block recognition of the social determinacy of the process. (36)
The aesthetic discourse in the double discourse of value cannot be reduced to
“mere illusion.” Certainly, this discourse fetishizes art by obscuring all the
labor producing the art object that cannot be attributed to the artist’s effort-
less “genius,” but one is not at liberty to dismiss it from one’s analysis on that
basis alone. Art has an autonomy despite its being only “apparent” or, rather,
precisely because it appears to.23
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The appearance of art’s autonomy is an impression built up over time, as
neo-Marxist Pierre Bourdieu painstakingly illustrates in his 1996 Rules of Art.
I will return to Poovey below, but I want to pause on Bourdieu for a moment
because the logic of cultural production he outlines informs much of Novel
Professions. It might seem strange that a book critical of the “prevailing
hermeneutics of suspicion” would mobilize Bourdieu, considering that
Anglo-American critics view him as an economic determinist who cynically
reduces intellectual and aesthetic disinterest to self-interest (Thomas ix).24
“The constitution of relatively autonomous areas of practice,” Bourdieu
writes, “is accompanied by a process through which symbolic interests (often
described as ‘spiritual’ or ‘cultural’) come to be set up in opposition to strict-
ly economic interests as defined in the field of economic transactions by the
fundamental tautology ‘business is business’; strictly ‘cultural’ or ‘aesthetic’
interest, disinterested interest, is the paradoxical product of the ideological
labor in which writers and artists, those most directly interested, become
autonomous by being opposed to material interests, i.e., by being symboli-
cally nullified as interests” (“Structures” 172). Those persons most directly
interested represent themselves as disinterested, he says, and this might be
taken to imply that the artist or writer is hypocritical, or, at best, obtusely
unaware of her own unconscious motivations. Bourdieu means to suggest
neither. His word is “paradox”—the principle of aesthetic autonomy is the
“paradoxical product” of “ideological labor.” “The fundamental law of this
paradoxical game,” Bourdieu repeats in Rules of Art, “is that there one has an
interest in disinterestedness” (21). If the artist or writer’s work is to enjoy any
abiding value, we must perceive it to have been produced without regard to
exchange value. Disavowing the market, the artist makes one possible
(though not inevitable). This is not semantics but a historically determined
reality produced through the “process of autonomization of the intellectual
and artistic field” that began in reaction to the emergence of market capital-
ism (“Field of Cultural Production” 36).25
This is not to say that critics have simply misread Bourdieu but that his
formulations are better read in light of his larger project. Certainly
Distinction scorns the principle of disinterestedness as inauthentic class ide-
ology by demonstrating that the appreciation of the autotelic art object
requires not an essentially superior capacity of judgment but a kind of elite
training in the snobbish rewards of difficult art. And, similarly, but from the
perspective of art production rather than consumption, Rules of Art shows
how the posture of aesthetic autonomy is disingenuous in at least one sense—
Flaubert could only tout his artistic independence from the commercial mar-
ket, because he possessed economic independence. In Rules of Art, however,
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Bourdieu moves beyond a hermeneutics of suspicion, yielding a dialectical
advance: he argues that the principle of aesthetic and intellectual autonomy
is an element of class mystification and, at the same time, is among the “most
precious collective achievements of intellectuals” (339). Over the course of a
century, intellectuals—Flaubert being the most visible—developed a critical
disposition that was “simultaneously the product and the guarantee of their
autonomy” (339). “Objective structures . . . become mental structures
through a learning process that takes place in a universe organized according
to these same structures and subject to sanctions formulated in a language
also structured according to the same oppositions,” explains Bourdieu (State
Nobility 39). In a chicken-and-egg fashion, proclamations of independence
facilitated the institutionalizations of independence—practices of peer
review, fellowships not tied to special interests, and so on—and vice versa. By
consolidating both the institutional basis for assertions of intellectual inde-
pendence and a mass-cultural audience for those assertions, artists and intel-
lectuals created a position of relative autonomy from which they could then
speak about affairs of state and the market with peculiar authority (Bourdieu
cites the Dreyfus affair as the first major example of this).
Critics have noticed the shift from Distinction to Rules of Art and have
interpreted it as a kind of logical discrepancy or contradiction. Nicholas
Brown and Imre Szeman comment, for example, “Bourdieu’s work . . . seems
increasingly to posit a politics and ethics on an implicit aesthetics that is
apparently at odds with claims he makes at other places in his work” (5). And
Allen Dunn identifies a “gap between Bourdieu’s demystifying account of
various social practices and the various types of value commitment evident in
his calls for reform,” though he acknowledges that “the tensions that shape
[Bourdieu’s] work may be productive as well as problematic” (“Review”
202–3). Guillory, perhaps Bourdieu’s most careful reader in the United
States, has articulated the difference between the texts without reducing it to
contradiction. “In comparing Distinction’s critique of consumption with
Bourdieu’s description elsewhere of restricted production,” he writes, “[we
discover] that the severity of Distinction’s critique of consumption is inverse-
ly related to his idealization of autonomous production” (Cultural Capital
338). To what extent, Guillory implies, can this inconsistency be seen as a
virtue, revealing a truth about the artist-intellectual? How is the autonomy of
the artist-intellectual both an instance of class privilege and an institutional-
ized logic that can act as an indispensable “check” on other institutionalized
forms of power?
“The disavowal [of self-interest],” Bourdieu writes, “is neither a real nega-
tion of the ‘economic’ interest which always haunts the most ‘disinterested’
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practices, nor a simple ‘dissimulation’ of the mercenary aspects of the prac-
tice” (“Production of Belief ” 262). The disavowal of self-interest might be
understood as the result of a fit between “social and mental structures” (State
Nobility 1), a disposition shaped by the professional apparatus and social
world of professionalism (and art). What Bourdieu describes is not so far
from Freud’s understanding of sublimation as a socially valuable form of
repression. Because professions require long periods of apprenticeship or
knowledge acquisition, individuals must “discipline” themselves by repressing
immediate desires, and thus foregoing immediate rewards, in favor of more
immaterial and/or long-term goals. As sociologist Oswald Hall has written,
one begins the process of becoming a professional by first “generating an
ambition” and “one function of an ambition is to discipline present conduct
in the interest of a future goal” (89). “An ambition,” he continues, “is usual-
ly conceived to be a highly subjective matter, generated in private fashion and
internalized as a drive. . . . The fewer the day-to-day rewards in the early
stages of a career and the longer delayed the substantial rewards, the more
ambition is needed” (89). One must become adept at repressing self-interest,
channeling desire into what Eliot in Middlemarch calls “far-reaching investi-
gation” (145) and “far-resonant action” (vii). One must work up an internal
drive by investing “far-reaching inquiry” with its own erotic charge, as Eliot
illustrates when she explains how Lydgate happens upon his vocation:
The page he opened on was under the heading of “Anatomy” and the
first passage that drew his eyes was on the valves of the heart. He was not
much acquainted with valves of any sort, but he knew that valvae were
folding doors, and through this crevice came a sudden light startling
him with his first vivid notion of finely adjusted mechanism in the
human frame. A liberal education had of course left him free to read the
indecent passages in the school classics, but beyond a general sense of
secrecy and obscenity in connexion with his internal structure, had left
his imagination quite unbiased . . . the moment of vocation had come,
and before he got down from his chair the world was made new to him
by a presentiment of endless processes . . . From that hour Lydgate felt
the growth of an intellectual passion. (142–43)
Putting Eliot’s logic in reverse, one could say that the peeping tom is the
failed doctor, the man who could not generate a durable ambition out of his
early excitements. (And, indeed, the first “crisis” to almost derail Lydgate is
one prompted by the voyeurism of theatergoing.) This early excitement must
supply ambition with enough energy to withstand the many temptations and
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aggravations competing for the self ’s attention, particularly during the long
period of credentialing. In Lydgate’s case, as Eliot explains, “scientific inter-
est” must take “the form of professional enthusiasm” that is “not to be stifled
by that initiation in makeshift called his ‘prentice days’ . . . [or] his studies in
London, Edinburgh, and Paris” (143). 
Disavowal is not the same as denial, it is important to remember. Whereas
the latter attempts to refuse a repressed desire wholesale, the former converts
part of it into something that can be admitted into consciousness. Victorian
writers were quite capable of such a distinction and in Victorian fiction “dis-
interest” is a remarkably elaborated term that is not always, or even perhaps
usually, placed in simple opposition to economic self-interest. Instead “disin-
terest” is often predicated upon an acknowledgment of self-interest.
Characters who have trouble admitting to themselves all the ways in which
they are beholden to their own desires are the least “independent” of
Victorian characters—denial being the defense mechanism of the hypocrite,
like Middlemarch’s Mr. Bulstrode. Conversely, Bulstrode’s counterpoint Mr.
Farebrother is perhaps the most magnanimous character in all of Victorian
fiction and one who can freely admit, for example, that he covets a particu-
lar post not for the souls he can save but because he “should be glad of the
forty pounds” (174). Victorian authors already knew, that is to say, what
Bourdieu figures out in Rules of Art—that “disinterest” cannot be pure self-
sacrifice without turning into mere dissimulation but that the options are not
purity versus complicity in the first place.26 “Intellectuals are paradoxical
beings who cannot be thought of as such as long as they are apprehended
through the obligatory alternative between autonomy and commitment,
between pure culture and politics,” he writes (340).27 Rather, autonomy
makes politics possible as anything more than the private opinion of an indi-
vidual. What results from disavowal, then, is neither absolute freedom nor
deferred capitulation to special interests but rather “the freedom of the salon
des refuses, who reject those who reject them and who establish an antitheti-
cal market in symbolic goods,” as Guillory writes of the artists. “The point is
not, then,” he continues, “simply to expose this freedom as unreal, when in
fact the space cleared by the refusal of market demand is precisely the space
in which social determinations can be explored without wholly acceding to
market demand and in which many new possibilities for the development of
art are created” (“Bourdieu’s Refusal” 394). The surprisingly self-scrutinized
Victorian professional might be a model, then, for our own activity as intel-
lectuals. In particular, such a figure might encourage us to recognize that the
“crisis of the profession” is not a crisis of too much professionalization, as it
is often portrayed, but of too little—an erosion of professional control over
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the autonomous work practices that are simultaneously the guarantee of and
the reward for our interested disinterestedness. (The rewards we experience
as professionals are directly tied to our autonomy. In a survey of professors,
Judith Gappa and Shelly MacDermid found that by far “the greatest level of
satisfaction [86 percent] came from faculty autonomy and independence”
[5].)
To return to Poovey, I hope it is now clear that by unmasking aesthetic
“freedom” Poovey unravels the paradox whereby certain kinds of work are not
understood as work but only at the high cost of sacrificing what is unique
about professional labor. Poovey complains that Dickens’s depiction of
David’s writing and Agnes’s housekeeping “convey[s] the twin impressions
that some kinds of work are less ‘degrading’ and less alienating than others
and that some laborers are so selfless and skilled that to them work is simul-
taneously an expression of self and a gift to others” (101). If one agrees with
Poovey that the logic of market relations informs every pursuit in one way or
another, does that necessarily mean all labor is equally alienated? Is writing a
story the same as capping bottles? Can work never gratify the self while also
doubling as a gift to others? “In the experience of vocation,” writes Mintz,
“selfish ambitions for personal distinction and selfless aspirations toward gen-
eral amelioration are parts of a single matrix of desire” (20). Relatively
autonomous cultural production does not rely primarily upon individual
exceptionalism but is built into institutions and dispositions over the course
of a century. And the vocational disposition, in circular fashion, depended on
the development of institutions organized so as to cultivate in its members a
pleasure in holding the market at arm’s length.
All work under capitalism is certainly implicated in capitalism’s logic of
equivalence, but that does not mean all work is equal. Hunting down the
gaps, contradictions, and subterfuges of a text, a hermeneutics of suspicion is
incapable of withholding judgment in order to illuminate the positive as well
as the negative aspects of professionalism. “The dialectic’s first function,”
Fredric Jameson writes, “[is] the suspension of the moralizing judgment, the
transcendence of good and evil, which is to say, the neutralization of some
choice between the positive and the negative judgment” (“Theoretical
Hesitation” 277). Denouncing the professional, Victorianists fail to see that
this figure’s paradoxical position inside and outside the market—at once
complicit and transcendent—is not a counterfeit but a dialectic—that is, a
position that works both ways, enabling but also destabilizing the system
within which it functions. The professions enable capitalism by falsely hold-
ing out the promise of unalienated labor to everyone. Yet they also destabi-
lize it because by holding out the promise of gratifying work, they remind us
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that work should be gratifying. The professions, as Herbert Marcuse wrote in
Negations about art, contain “not only quiescence about what is, but also
remembrance of what could be” (98).
MUNDANE BOOKKEEPING MATTERS
When I think of the future of literary studies, I try to concentrate . . . on
the mundane bookkeeping matters of the profession, out of the convic-
tion that if the profession offers its aspirants good material and intellec-
tual working conditions, the shape and the range of the knowledges pro-
duced in the profession will eventually take care of themselves.
—Michael Bérubé (“Days of Future Past” 20)
“Isn’t there, after all (and risking accusations of naiveté), something pretty
decent and creative in a struggle to get beyond the self?” George Levine asks in
his latest study of the Victorians, Dying to Know (2002), which he characterizes
as “something of a defense of those impossible strivings toward disinterest” (14,
13). “Is it true,” he wonders, “that all disinterest is interested?” (14). However
close my thesis may appear to his, I would argue that any defense of “disinter-
est” must first recognize that it requires the advocacy of one’s self-interest.
Second, it must acknowledge the fact that “disinterest” no longer has the cul-
tural resonance it once enjoyed. Whereas Bourdieu traces the nineteenth-
century construction of the high/mass culture boundary, a boundary intimate-
ly tied up with the disinterest/interest dualism, Paul DiMaggio describes its
contemporary erosion: “Changes in social structure and the rise of an open
market of cultural goods have weakened institutionalized cultural authority, set
off spirals of cultural inflation, and created more differentiated, less hierarchi-
cal, less universal, and less symbolically potent systems of cultural classification
than those in place during the first part of this century” (39). As a result of these
complex changes, the principle of disinterestedness, once critical to the legiti-
mation of professional identity, has lost some of its rhetorical edge. But even if
it were still effective, the ideal of disinterest may actually work against profes-
sionals now, at least those in academia. As Andrew Ross argues, the ideal culti-
vates in scholars a capacity for self-sacrifice that has been used to deprive them
of their work autonomy by “ma[king] it easy for power to shift rapidly to man-
agers and administrators” (“Mental Labor Problem” 23). Faculty must insist
rather on their “autonomy,” a term only a short metonymic distance from “dis-
interest,” but one more likely to resonate with both a professoriate and a pub-
lic suspicious of claims to purity.
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“It’s in vain, Trot, to recall the past, unless it works some influence upon
the present,” Aunt Betsey says to David Copperfield, and this book is moti-
vated in part by concern over the structural declassing of today’s profession-
al (329). As numerous professions devolve into managed labor, it is hard to
remember that historically professions have been defined by “the degree to
which they . . . gained the organized power to control themselves the terms,
conditions and content of their work in the settings where they perform their
work” (Friedson 22). There is a disorienting disconnect between pundits’ rep-
resentation of intellectual labor and its lived experience. We are bombarded
with jingoism about living in the so-called Information Age, “the domination
of intellectual over manual labor” (Aronowitz, “On Intellectuals” 52), the
skyrocketing importance of immaterial labor (Hardt), the need for symbolic
analysts in a global economy (Reich), “expertise call[ing] the tune in today’s
economic order” (Hodges xii), and “the rise of a creative class” (Florida),
while at the same time tremendous job insecurity exists among the well-
credentialed, management places ever-greater pressure on knowledge workers
to produce more surplus value, and a crushing gap exists between the intel-
lectual skills possessed and the formulaic work increasingly required. It has
become more difficult to maintain that professionals “enjoy a semi-autonomy
that gives [them] a freedom in their work afforded no other laborers in
today’s economy” (McGowan 44). Certainly, it is hard to maintain this with
regard to academics when, as Gary Rhoades demonstrates in Managed
Professionals, “the terms and position of faculty’s professional labor are being
renegotiated as managers seek to reform, reinvent, re-engineer, redesign, or
reorganize colleges and universities” (2).
At a time when nonacademic journals like Salon run pieces entitled “From
Ivory Tower to Academic Sweatshop” (Wright), it comes as something of a
shock to stumble across the following sentence in The Political Unconscious:
“It is surely fatuous,” Jameson wrote in 1981, “for intellectuals to seek to
glamorize their tasks—which can for the most part be subsumed under the
rubric of the elaboration, reproduction, or critique of ideology—by assimi-
lating them to real work on the assembly line and to the experience of the
resistance of matter in genuine labor” (45).28 That any professor working
today would think comparing her tasks to a factory job glamorizes them
would be funny if it were not so ironic.29 The factory may have been the vehi-
cle of benign, and even romantic, metaphors as late as 1981, but it is now all
too literal, as new titles on education’s corporate reorganization seek to make
clear—titles such as Stanley Aronowitz’s The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling
the Corporate University and Creating True Higher Learning (2001), David F.
Noble’s Digital Diploma Mills: The Automation of Higher Education (2002),
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and Deborah Herman and Julie Schmid’s Cogs in the Classroom Factory: The
Changing Identity of Academic Labor (2003).
Jameson implies that the key distinction is that which separates brainwork
from handiwork—“writing and thinking” from hammering and hauling.
“One cannot assimilate without intellectual dishonesty the ‘production’ of
texts to the production of goods by factory workers: writing and thinking are
not alienated labor in that sense,” he writes (45). But the key difference
between alienated and unalienated labor, as Harry Braverman argued three
decades ago, is rather the discrepancy between the experience of work that
unites conception and execution and the experience of work that parcels
them out. Prying conception and execution apart has the effect of separating
means from ends and turning the means into what Jameson elsewhere has
called “desacralized technique” (“Vanishing Mediator” 8). Creative work,
however, produces “objects that [figuratively] ‘return’ to their creator, there-
by permitting the entire ‘reappropriation’ of one’s own activity” (Moretti
116).30 Opposed to the monotonously repeated task undertaken without any
conception of the process as a whole, it is the gratifying loop that begins as
an idea in one’s head, becomes a reality through one’s creative efforts, and is
now reflected upon in the outside world.
I propose that we reserve “professional” to designate those efforts per-
formed under the relatively autonomous conditions that foster creativity. My
intent is not to restrict creative labor to the traditionally defined
professions—law, medicine, and so on—but to universalize an idea associat-
ed with the professions. The association of creative labor with the professions
can be found throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When H.
Byerley Thomson attempted to differentiate professional labor from other
gainful employment in his 1857 The Choice of a Profession, he used artistic
labor to characterize professional labor as a whole:
The test by which an operation belongs to intellectual, or to bodily
labour, or to barter is by observing what is the principal object of the exer-
tion. Thus an artist sells to his client a certain quantity of canvas, covered
with a thick coat of paint, the whole surrounded by a gilt frame; but he
is not therefore a merchant, the principal object, and real consideration
of the purchase being the intellectual, and imaginative design expressed
by the picture, to which point canvas, and frame are subordinate acces-
sories. (3)
At the moment Thomson defined professional labor, it was the artist and not
the more predictable lawyer or the doctor that stood as the paradigmatic 
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professional. Over a century later, in 1971, when D.W. Winnicott wanted to
suggest the diversity of the “creative impulse,” he wrote, “[the creative
impulse] is present as much in the moment-by-moment living of a backward
child who is enjoying breathing as it is in the inspiration of an architect who
suddenly knows what it is that he wishes to construct, and who is thinking
in terms of material that can actually be used so that his creative impulse may
take form and shape, and the world may witness” (69). In order to portray
creativity’s range, Winnicott established a continuum between an example
that virtually nobody would recognize as creative—breathing—and an exam-
ple that presumably everybody would recognize as creative—the thought
process of an architect. It is no accident that when Winnicott wanted to
invoke archetypal creative work, the work he chose belonged to the category
“professional.”
Admittedly, the reverse is also true: for the same duration of time, the pro-
fessional has been associated with soul-stultifying bureaucracy. “I scarcely
know a professional man I can like,” wrote the narrator of J. A. Froude’s 1849
The Nemesis of Faith: “You know a lawyer when you see him, or a doctor, or
a professional clergyman. They are not simply men, but men of a particular
sort, and, unfortunately, something not more but less than men—men who
have sacrificed their own selves to become the paid instruments of a system”
(2–3). And when, in 1923, Georg Lukács developed the concept of “reifica-
tion,” it was the professional not the proletariat who exemplified its extreme
case: “The problems of consciousness arising from wage labour were repeat-
ed in the ruling class in a refined and spiritualized, but, for that very reason,
intensified form. . . . The journalist’s lack of conviction, the prostitution of
his experiences and beliefs, is comprehensible only as the apogee of capitalist
reification” (100). The very things that can make a professional career
inspiring—working with ideas and people rather than manufacturing
things—make it horrific when instrumentalized. Reproducing history’s
Jekyll/Hyde oscillation between the self-actualizing and the self-exploiting
expert, Victorian studies cycles between affirmation and denunciation of the
professional.
In Novel Professions, I argue that three mid-nineteenth-century novels—
Charlotte Brontë’s The Professor (1847), Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield
(1849–50), and Anthony Trollope’s The Three Clerks (1857)—offer us an
opportunity to break out of this oscillation and revise our approach to the
professional. They are all narratives of professionalization that dissolved con-
ceptual obstacles to the mid-Victorian formation of a discrete professional
identity. Written during the “mid-century consolidation” of the professional
ethos, they offer a series of blueprints for the professional (Reader 59).
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Furthermore, two of these novels—The Professor and The Three Clerks—
prove particularly resistant to a hermeneutics of suspicion, which explains in
part why critics have studiously ignored them for the last twenty years.
Criticism’s suspicion of the professional needs him to assert a disinterest that
the critic can reveal as self-interest, but neither The Professor nor The Three
Clerks has its protagonist make such a claim: the former does not attempt to
disingenuously distance its protoprofessional from the market but rather
inserts him into it, and the latter prizes not the alleged purity of its hero but
rather his impurity, his very self-interest making him a credible professional.
The third text—David Copperfield—is the ur-object of a hermeneutics of
suspicion but I argue that it produces its professional by a logic quite differ-
ent from the nefarious one ascribed to it. In my view, rather than appropri-
ating the housewife’s disinterest to authorize himself, David combines the
categories of capital and labor to create himself as a trustworthy professional
whose talent follows the reliable routines of clock time. My readings of these
novels show that when we stop scanning texts for the hypocritical gesture of
disinterest we have been trained to expose, we make possible a very different
critical relationship. When we withhold what Jameson called above “our
moralizing judgment,” we do not seize on the gap or contradiction that puta-
tively belies the Victorian novel’s version of professionalism but rather enter
into its struggle to theorize intellectual labor.
Opening up our now-narrow theoretical framework, we also satisfy a his-
toricist desire to recover the novel’s role in the production of a specifically
professional identity. “This book,” begins another study of the Victorians,
Anita Levy’s Reproductive Urges (1999), “is occasioned by an uneasiness,
become more urgent of late, with the interpretive procedures governing
Victorian studies since about 1980” (1). Here, Levy speaks for many
Victorianists, and I wonder if our uneasiness is related in a symptomatic way
to the fact that Victorian studies uncannily, if unwittingly, reproduces the
tendency of today’s economy to evacuate professional identity. The contem-
porary economy converts professionals into knowledge workers, while the
trend in Victorian studies has been to assimilate the professional into the
bourgeois. Victorianists, as Pam Morris writes, “work within a monolithic
model of the middle class” (679), and, thereby, Lauren Goodlad adds,
obscure the “under-recognized sites of contest within mainstream ideologies
of middle-class Englishness” (143). Both Morris and Goodlad blame this on
the dominance of the Foucauldian paradigm. Criticism suffers from “an
insufficiently expansive model of Victorian middle-class identity,” Goodlad
writes, “[for] reasons relating at least partly to the totalizing tendencies of
Foucault’s model of the rise of disciplinary subjectivity” (143).31
27Introduction
Ruth_Intro_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:58 AM  Page 27
It has been so easy to lump the professional in with the middle class more
generally in part because the emergent Victorian professional’s own self-
perception, as mediated by fiction, relied upon categories derived from bour-
geois political economy. The Victorian novel combined the existing terms in
strategic, rhetorical formulations meant to yield something altogether new.
By rewriting the available plots of production with characters’ “capital”
(industrial or financial) and “labor” (factory, rural, or artisanal), the novel
invented formulas for the value of professional services, formulas whose com-
binations also entailed cancellations. For example, David Copperfield invents
professional value by combining capital and labor in such a way that the
magic of capital marries the honesty of labor and, thereby, cancels capital’s
suspicious speculativeness and labor’s machinelike monotony. Thus far, criti-
cism has been preoccupied with how the Victorian novel produced the expert
by appropriating the disinterested personas of the housewife and the aristo-
crat. But when free from the need to uncover disinterest’s inevitable contam-
ination by interest, we see that the novel necessarily produced the profes-
sional by first reconfiguring the market-oriented identities of the capitalist
and the laborer. These novels articulate their professionals’ relationship to the
market by carefully building on already existing market logic.
“These ‘new’ middle classes,” Immanuel Wallerstein has written, “were very
difficult to describe in the nineteenth-century categories of analysis” (141), and
even as the novels in Novel Professions successfully resolve ideological obstacles
to professional identity formation, their attempts to draw on extant plots of
labor and capital generate some telling paradoxes or structural failures: The
Professor offers two definitions of the professional but one undercuts the other,
David Copperfield ushers in the autonomous professional by paradoxically sub-
mitting him to the clock time associated with managed labor, and The Three
Clerks transforms a thoughtless youth into a prosperous professional but has to
give him not one but two professions to do so. Yet when we stop looking for a
disavowal of self-interest—a disavowal we would be hard-pressed to find in at
least two of the three novels—we view these “flaws” less as the contradictions
or missteps that betray professionalism than as the inevitable by-products of
attempts to define an identity that is relatively unique in the modern world—
an identity that cannot be fully explained in either the terms of Adam Smith’s
market or Foucault’s disciplinary society.
Each chapter of Novel Professions reads one mid-nineteenth-century novel
in order to reveal the Victorians’ surprisingly modern conception of an inter-
ested professionalism. Chapter 1 “Between Labor and Capital: Charlotte
Brontë’s The Professor” argues that a tension runs through the novel between
representing the professional in terms of his innate mental capital and repre-
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senting him in terms of his productive labor. Both representations illuminate
the previously invisible—the one by seeming to materialize the immaterial
mind, the other by uncovering hidden mental work—but the depiction of
intellectual capacity as a timeless, natural property threatens to erase the time
required for its display as labor. The final section argues that The Professor
relies on the notion of mental capital because it imagines that such a concept
works as a prophylactic against proletarianization. But mental labor is always
vulnerable to being modeled upon routinized manual labor, as increasing
numbers of humanities PhDs find today when they look for tenure-track
salaries only to encounter a system more willing to pay them piecemeal. The
Professor’s structural failure, then, suggests that the important distinction is
not between mental and manual work but rather between work that unites
conception and execution and work that parcels them out.
David Copperfield solves the problem of The Professor’s conflicting models
of the professional—as mental laborer and as mental capitalist—by inventing
“cultural capital,” a form of capital that combines the merit of effort with the
prestige of innate property. Chapter 2 “Becoming Professional: Time in
David Copperfield” begins by surveying the post-Poovey, post-Miller field of
Copperfield criticism. I then read David Copperfield as a novel authorizing the
new professional class by developing a formula for professional value that
relied on a mystified notion of inherent merit but which also established a
standard of time discipline that required professionals to subordinate their
own interests to the service of others. Broadly put, Dickens combines the
finance capitalist and the factory laborer to form David Copperfield, a pro-
fessional author who possesses mental capital but who, rather than speculat-
ing on it, adheres to the clock time of the patiently earned hourly wage. It is
a commonplace of Dickens studies that Dickens despised factory conditions,
but, as this chapter shows, he can reassure his readers that David is an hon-
est professional only by clinging to factory time.
Like Brontë and Dickens, Trollope builds a professional in The Three
Clerks (1857), but his professional eschews the category of capital altogether,
relying solely on that of labor. Refusing the paradox of the professional estab-
lished by the mid-nineteenth-century debate over competitive examinations,
Trollope argues that only if the professional understands his labor as being
traded for market value, not as invaluable or as removed from the taint of
exchange, will he achieve relative autonomy or independence. In “The
Professional Paradox: Competitive Examinations and Trollope’s The Three
Clerks” (chapter 3), I argue that this only apparently paradoxical logic chimes
remarkably well with Pierre Bourdieu’s thesis that disinterest is a function of
institutional structures, not moral character. The last section of the chapter
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explains how the novel addresses the circumstances of Trollope’s own highly
heteronomous position in the literary marketplace in such a way that his
overt self-interest as an author is “forgiven.” By depicting himself in his
Autobiography and his hero in The Three Clerks as a hack but doing so as if
the term were one he self-reflexively embraced rather than had thrust upon
him, Trollope escapes being reduced to a hack by posterity. Critics have
begun, in fact, to speak of Trollope as a kind of hero. When one considers
that this generation of Victorianists has been trained to read the disavowal of
interest as deeply disingenuous if not downright devious, Trollope’s rejection
of this disavowal makes his sudden rise in critical fortune predictable.
The book’s concluding chapter, “Deprofessionalized Critics in the Twenty-
First Century,” juxtaposes a work representative of 1990s criticism, Martha
Woodmansee’s The Author, Art, and the Market (1994), to an influential new
work that is its mirror opposite, Amanda Anderson’s The Powers of Distance
(2001), in order to show that literary critics cycle predictably between expos-
ing aesthetic value’s “concealed” exchange value and reasserting aesthetic dis-
interest. This circuit inflicts new damage in the current context of academic
deprofessionalization. Specifically, it predisposes critics to uphold a static ide-
ological binary between self-interest and disinterest that was better suited to
an earlier mode of mass production, an opposition that relies on a high/low
aesthetic opposition which is itself unraveling. I argue that Victorian studies
scholars today must grapple with the problems and promises of the profes-
sional not by shuttling between narratives of complicity and transcendence
but rather by attending to the uniqueness of the professional’s structural
position—a position of relative autonomy that was a century in the making
but is in jeopardy today.
A scene from Middlemarch perhaps best illustrates the wide divide sepa-
rating autonomous intellectual labor from other forms of labor under capi-
talism and is, thus, a fitting scene with which to end my introduction. That
archetypal professional Tertius Lydgate studies a book on fever “far into the
smallest hour” by his fireside:
As he threw down his book, stretched his legs towards the embers in the
grate, and clasped his hands at the back of his head, in that agreeable
afterglow of excitement when thought lapses from examination of a spe-
cific object into a suffusive sense of its connexions with the rest of our
existence—seems, as it were, to throw itself on its back after strength—
Lydgate felt a triumphant delight in his studies and something like pity
for those less lucky men who were not of his profession. (163)
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Poovey criticizes the idea that there exists a “sphere to which one can
retreat—a literal or imaginative hearth . . . where one’s motives do not appear
as something other than what they are because self-interest and self-denial
really are the same” (122). Yet in his late-night hunt for the “obscure condi-
tions” causing fever, Lydgate does manage to gratify his amour-propre while
simultaneously serving humanity. Savoring a literal and an imaginative
hearth in the “agreeable afterglow” of his research, Lydgate experiences his
profession as an intellectual adventure, something calling for a kind of self-
denying work that doubles as self-interested play.32 This feeling was in fact
endemic to Victorians who saw themselves as part of emerging professions.
Being a professional in the mid-Victorian period was, W. C. Lubenow writes,
“exhilarating” (6). “It is a comfort to think what a rising profession I belong
to,” Henry Sidgwick wrote in a letter; one “feels at the centre of things” (qtd.
in Lubenow 6).
Lydgate’s transcendent moment—a “suffusive sense” of totality, “[when
thought] seems, as it were, to throw itself on its back after strength”—marks
the difference between, as Habermas puts it, “an objectification of essential
powers and their alienation, between a satisfied praxis that returns to itself
and a praxis that is impeded and fragmented” (64). It is a moment, Eliot’s
narrator implies, we have all felt (not specific to Lydgate, it is rather “that
afterglow”). But while the narrator pulls us within the realm of its possibili-
ty, Lydgate kicks us out: “Lydgate felt . . . something like pity for those less
lucky men who were not of his profession.” Arguably, this sentence seals
Lydgate’s fate. Pitying others their lack of transcendent moments, he will be
made by the novel to forfeit them himself. And yet, if his “something like
pity” looks a little like condescension, is it not also honest? After all, most
tasks do not boast that boomerang whereby thought opens out onto the
world and returns to itself refreshed. For his candor—or, at the very least, for
the complacency with which he assumes that he, if not his profession, will be
different from “the multitude of middle-aged men who go about their voca-
tions in a daily course determined for them much in the same way as the tie
of their cravats”—Eliot condemns Lydgate to a life void of the very thing she
values most—glimpses of the social totality (143). That an author so res-
olutely intellectual herself sacrifices her novel’s intellectual is less hypocritical
of Eliot than it is self-abnegating.
“We are rescued from fragmentation only by consciousness of the whole
and intellectuals specialize in this consciousness,” Durkheim wrote (x). In a
culture in which the intellectual’s very raison d’être is everyone else’s exclusion
from those moments of “consciousness of the whole” she enjoys, her self-
loathing is virtually inevitable. Add to this a situation like the one facing the
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professional critic today, in which not only everyone else but also most of her
colleagues are locked out of such moments, and her self-loathing is overde-
termined.33 Perhaps if we cease hating ourselves for being “professionals,” we
will be better readers of Victorian novels of professionalization. We might
find, then, that the knots in their narratives do not indicate the hypocrisy of
their protagonists but rather the uncanny capacity of professionalism to jam
the otherwise seamless logic of modernity.
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C H A P T E R O N E
Between Labor and Capital: 
Charlotte Brontë’s The Professor
Art works are ideological because they a priori posit a spiritual entity as
though it were independent of any conditions of material production,
hence as though it were intrinsically superior to these conditions. In so
doing art works cover up the age-old culpability that lies in the divorce
of physical from mental labour.
—Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
At once outside the market and within it, the nineteenth-century profession-
al juggled a kind of paradox. Most influential rise-of-the-professional narra-
tives explain how the modern professional transcended the market by taking
on an aura of disinterest. The professional, one version goes, reworked the
aristocrat’s noblesse oblige into the professional ideal of service. In another,
he aligned himself with the unwaged work of the home so that he can draw
on the middle-class angel’s stock of self-sacrificing purity. Explaining how the
professional enacted his distance from the market, both narratives assume
that his proximity to the market requires no interpretation.1 This chapter
reverses that assumption. It considers a moment in the emergence of the pro-
fessional class when it was not the damning presence but the apparent
absence of the market that posed the dilemma. In that case, neither the aris-
tocrat nor the middle-class angel had any rhetorical tips to offer. In the
1840s, when Charlotte Brontë wrote The Professor, the relative invisibility of
certain kinds of work as valuable labor threatened to shut its producers out
of the marketplace. Studying this novel, in which the protagonist wishes to
uncover rather than cover over the price of his intellectual labor, helps correct
the balance of critical studies of professionalism. In so doing, it allows us to
understand these opposing directions (away from, toward the market) not
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only as the contradiction or the paradox of professionalism but also as its
dialectic, its ability simultaneously to enable and critique the economic sys-
tem in which it so ambivalently figures.
“How can a man put a price on his mind?” Silas Wegg asks rhetorically
(and disingenuously) in Our Mutual Friend (1865), a novel that laments the
market’s ever-expanding reach. Written in 1846, almost two decades before
Dickens’s novel, Brontë’s The Professor asks a similar question, but one that
demands an answer, which takes the form of the story that unfolds. “Carry
your intellect and refinement to the market and tell me in a private note what
price is bid for them,” a character taunts the protagonist, thereby setting the
novel in motion (70). Securing a teaching position and succeeding so well
that, by novel’s end, he and his wife have opened their own school, the
eponymous professor does indeed place his intellect on the market and, find-
ing himself well-rewarded, has the last laugh. The Professor, in other words,
does the opposite of what later novels like Our Mutual Friend train us to
expect: rather than bemoan the commodification of minds, it worries about
the mind’s resistance to exchange value.
The difference between the two novels is an index of how far the profes-
sional class had come by 1865. By the time Our Mutual Friend appeared, the
professional class had so clearly differentiated itself from the capitalist class
that Matthew Arnold could write of “a professional class . . . with fine and
governing qualities” and “an immense business class . . . without governing
qualities” (qtd. in Reader 113). “By 1860,” wrote Reader, “the elements of
professional standing were tolerably clear” (71), and the structural contradic-
tion of the professional—simultaneously inside and outside the market—had
been papered over. The Professor, however, was part of an earlier moment. “In
the formative period, most of the markets for professional services had to be
created,” Magali Larson explains, “[and] common standards of what this
unique commodity—intangible services—meant . . . were lacking” (14). The
problem that faced this nascent class marketing intangible services was that it
had to write itself into being at least in part by representing itself in the idiom
of production. It had to make mental labor visible as productive labor.
However, this necessary step threatened to make the class simply another
working class rather than a new kind of middle class. To prevent this possi-
bility, the professional transformed “a service into an income-yielding prop-
erty” (Perkin 7), presenting his skills as a species of innate capital or embod-
ied property. Representing his services as simultaneously intellectual labor
and intellectual capital or property, the professional conferred upon himself
the merit of work and the prestige of ability, but he wrote himself as a kind
of contradiction in terms.2
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After an initial struggle, the novel’s professor finds—or creates—the right
market for his talent. The Professor itself was not so lucky: publishers rejected
it nine times during Brontë’s lifetime. Writing in 1851 to the publisher
George Smith, Brontë joked:
The Professor’s merits, I plainly perceive, will never be owned by anybody
but Mr. Williams and me; very particular and unique must be our pene-
tration, and I think highly of us both accordingly. You may allege that
that merit is not visible to the naked eye. Granted; but the smaller the
commodity the more inestimable its value. (Wise 3: 207)
Brontë slyly summed up the point of The Professor: that which appears to lack
value because it is intangible (“not visible to the naked eye”) is in fact more
valuable. The error lies not with the commodity but with the inadequacy of
conventional standards of measurement.
Reversing her strategy, this time maximizing The Professor’s value not by
paradoxically emphasizing its smallness but by granting it heft, Brontë wrote
in another letter that The Professor “contains . . . more substance . . . than
much of Jane Eyre, [because] it gives, I think, a new view of a grade, an occu-
pation” (Wise 2: 161).3 What Brontë strove to make visible is a class that
defies inherited categories of representation. She did so, first, by representing
that class in terms of intellectual labor, as productive work rather than
leisured play, and, second, by depicting professional expertise in terms of cap-
ital with capital’s appearance of effortlessness or what Fredric Jameson calls
“profit without production” (Cultural Turn 136). The result is an unresolved
tension between labor and capital that is symptomatic of the discourse of
professionalism as a whole (both then and now). Under certain circum-
stances, this tension can be strategic (see chapter 3 on David Copperfield) but
in the case of The Professor it seems to amount, when all is said and done, to
rhetorical failure.
In what follows, I outline the ideological obstacles that faced Brontë—
namely, an aesthetic principle of play that repressed intellectual labor and the
reduction by political economists of labor to its simplest, manual form. On
the one hand, Brontë predicated professional autonomy on a critique of aes-
thetic autonomy that reveals its hidden labor. Resolving the problem politi-
cal economy poses, on the other hand, Brontë distinguished mental work
from manual labor by drawing on a phrenological discourse in which intel-
lectual ability is figured as a form of cerebral capital. The latter strategy, how-
ever, has the effect of undercutting the former; that is to say, the emphasis on
innate capital intended to rescue professional labor from proletarianization
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cuts against the emphasis on labor that drove Brontë’s critique of aesthetics.
Designed to reach the same end—professional value—but by two necessari-
ly different routes, one strategy waylays the other. In a final section, I argue
that Brontë’s need to create a market for intellectual labor led her to produce
a professional who inadvertently makes us reevaluate our own critical suspi-
cion of “disinterest,” a suspicion implicit in those analyses that expose the
professional’s attempts to disassociate himself from the market. By its very
negation in her professional, we come to realize that the ideal of intellectual
and aesthetic disinterest is not merely ideology, for in its desire for a realm
outside the market logic of exchange it keeps alive our most humane desires.
I
To find a market for its protagonist’s skills, Brontë’s novel must counteract
two forces conspiring to efface intellectual labor as labor: aesthetic’s principle
of play and political economy’s definition of labor. In his account of what he
calls the “separation at birth” of political economy and aesthetics, John
Guillory offers two emblematic moments: Adam Smith’s inability to account
for consumption when determining a commodity’s exchange value and
Immanuel Kant’s attempt to distinguish art from the commodity by rewrit-
ing the labor of art as play. While in his earlier writings, Smith argued that
the commodity’s beauty balanced production and consumption, beauty
could not explain exchange value. Guillory writes, “[Commodities’] surplus
of beauty over use failed to yield a formula for the determination of their
price, their exchange value. In order to arrive at a quantum for the latter
value, Smith and his contemporaries were forced to shift their analysis to the
terrain of production, and thus to account for the exchange value of a com-
modity by reference to the quantum of labor it embodied” (Cultural Capital
314). Banished from political economy, the concept of beauty migrated to
aesthetics where that banishment became one of its most salient characteris-
tics. If labor (or, in Smith’s phrase, “the cost of production”) accounts for the
commodity’s value, then the absence of labor defines aesthetic value.
Opposed to work undertaken for compensation, Kant’s “purposiveness with-
out purpose” is purposiveness in play. “The work of art,” Guillory explains,
“never quite loses the stigma of the ‘compulsory,’ and can only efface that
stigma and distinguish itself from the commodity if its production is
‘removed from all constraint, and . . . change[d] from . . . work into mere
play’” (Cultural Capital 318).4 Once the scene of labor is removed, art most
resembles the apparently effortless productions of nature.
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The discrimination of beauty is annexed to aesthetics and along with it
come other forms of discrimination not primarily aesthetic but intellectual.
Discrimination, as Edmund Burke defined it, for example, is comprised of
both differentiation, the ability to distinguish objects from each other on the
basis of their features, and evaluation, the ranking of different objects accord-
ing to some principle.5 Moral and aesthetic judgments become the province
of the disinterested man of arts and letters whom Brontë called the man of
“intellect and refinement”—a figure diametrically opposed to the man coars-
ened by trade. And, as with the work of art, the work of the discriminating
intellect must be seen not as a form of work at all but as a form of play, free
meditation rather than rationalized production. Honed by the Romantics,
reappearing in Matthew Arnold as “disinterestedness” (246), and reaching its
apotheosis in 1890s art for art’s sake and, on the intellectual side, in
Thorstein Veblen’s prescriptive notion of “idle curiosity” (“The Place of
Science in Modern Civilization”), this version of autonomy as possible only
in the realm of non-utility was marshaled to distinguish certain forms of rep-
resentation from the commodity throughout the nineteenth century.
Aesthetics might not have rendered intellectual pursuits “free play” in
quite the way it did had political economy not modeled its concept of labor
on factory labor—on, that is, direct, manual labor. Simple, objectified labor
provided political economy with its needed universal equivalent. At the same
moment, then, as political economy articulated its labor theory of value in
such a way that only certain forms of labor qualified as labor, aesthetics pred-
icated intellectual labor’s value on its not being viewed as labor. Intellectual
labor was doubly barred from the market. But even as economists, including
Marx, developed their labor theory of value by eliding the intellectual work
of judgment and discrimination, a rapidly changing economy was rendering
that theory obsolete.6 As Antonio Negri writes, “in the passage from manu-
facturing to large-scale industry . . . labor—as it became more highly quali-
fied and complex, both individually and collectively—could not be reduced
to simple, calculable quantities” (78). Intellectual labor, in short, had become
a kind of oxymoron at just the moment it began to matter most.
II
In The Professor, Brontë proposed to write a novel in which, as she says in her
preface, a “hero should work his way through life as I had seen real living men
work theirs—that he should never get a shilling he had not earned.” She then
outfits that hero with precisely those qualities—“intellect and refinement”—
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that resist quantification, making them literally invaluable (37). The Professor
is the story of this man’s quest to turn these qualities into marketable prop-
erty. His quest begins as a story about two brothers virtually separated at
birth—William and Edward Crimsworth—a separation that reproduces, in
fact, the separation at birth of political economy and aesthetics. Orphaned
and separated after the second brother’s birth, the brothers have not seen each
other in a decade when the novel opens. Each brother is aligned with one par-
ent, possessing all the attributes that classed alignment suggests: the protago-
nist and narrator William has his aristocratic mother’s physical features, cre-
ative talents, and refined sensibility while Edward looks like his capitalist
father and, by the time the narrative begins, has established himself as a
shrewd entrepreneur. Williams’s repeated artistic metaphors and his refer-
ences to his “love of an excellent or beautiful object, whether in animate or
in inanimate nature” present him, at least at first, as a Romantic artist (39).
At the outset, then, the novel offers an unsurprising opposition between the
businessman and the aristocratic artist (the aristocrat’s independence from
the market reinforcing the artist’s repudiation of it), but it quickly compli-
cates this predictable opposition. William rejects an aristocratic uncle’s offer
to provide him with a livelihood, refusing the kind of familial obligation and
dependence such an arrangement would suggest and determining instead to
join his brother in trade. But just as art liberated itself from aristocratic
patronage in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries only to subject itself to
the impersonal forces of the market, William realizes in retrospect that in
refusing patronage to embrace commerce, he has exchanged one master for
another: “I find that I was quite right to shake off the burden of patronage,
but a fool to offer my shoulders instantly for the reception of another bur-
den” (40).7
Translating foreign business correspondence in the countinghouse of his
brother’s mill, William finds that in the factory logic that organizes political
economy, mental labor looks just like manual labor. “Ninety pounds a year
are good wages, and I expect to have the full value of my money out of you,”
his brother tells him (51). That value is achieved by conditions in which the
creative work of translation comes to look like the mechanical act of copying,
as William describes his day to himself: “Letter-copying till noon, solitary
dinner at your lodgings, letter-copying till evening, solitude” (71). De-graded
to the level of the factory hand, William “endured in silence the rust and
cramp of [his] best faculties” (62). The aesthetic tradition deplored just this
fragmentation of the human in the division of labor, arguing that only intel-
lectual and artistic play in which one drew freely on all one’s faculties could
restore man’s wholeness. In the modern factory, by contrast, play approaches
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the zero degree, and labor becomes abstract labor in which only labor time
has value. As E. P. Thompson explained, money is paid not for a finished
product but for time “spent”: “Not the task but the value of time when
reduced to money is dominant” (359). 
William reflects a version of this antinomy when he berates himself while
pondering the industrial landscape: “You have chosen trade and you shall be
a tradesman! . . . Look at the sooty smoke in that hollow, and know that there
is your post! There you cannot dream, you cannot speculate and theorize—
there you shall out and work!” (48). William opposes intellectual speculation
and theory not to the particular work he performs in the countinghouse but
to a general “work” (“you cannot speculate and theorize—there you shall out
and work!”). They are the very opposite of work, forms of play denied him
in a space ruled by clock time. “Eight o’ clock strikes! your hands are thawed,
get to work!” William tells himself (72). But this very manual form of men-
tal labor—copying something into one’s “hand”—does not simply turn
William into another factory laborer. Insofar as his work is derivative, it actu-
ally places him behind such workers. He merely facilitates distribution, a sym-
bolically secondary component of industrial capitalism, while the laborers
engage in production. Like Marx, for whom knowledge was either constant
capital or stored labor but in either case nonproductive, Brontë depicts intel-
lectual labor, at least under these conditions, as second to physical labor.
Literally. Though he “sprang” from bed the minute the “factory bells rang,”
and though he “hurried down the street,” William tells us, he nonetheless
finds that “the factory workpeople had preceded [him] by nearly an hour, and
the mill was all lighted up and in full operation” (70–71). In a world run
strictly by the clock, William finds himself haunted by the fear that he is in
some sense “behind time”: “I started up imagining that I had overslept myself
and should be behind time at the counting-house” (88).
But if it is a foregone conclusion that William will leave this dehumaniz-
ing place for one in which he can indulge what he calls his “cherished in
secret, Imagination,” the terms of his departure are nonetheless surprising
(62). William’s release from the countinghouse is presented as a rejection of
trade that is also not a rejection. He makes it clear that he would be unhap-
py if he stayed, but he makes it equally clear that he would not have left of
his own accord. “I had got away from Bigden Close without any breach of
resolution; without any injury to my self-respect,” William says after Edward
fires him, wrongly believing that William has insulted him among the towns-
people; “I had not forced circumstances; circumstances had freed me” (76).
A worker who does not cancel a contract on a whim, whose “self-respect”
depends on his behaving always “faithfully, punctually, diligently” (55) and
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on his always exhibiting “punctuality, industry, and accuracy” (63), is as far
removed from the leisured aristocrat as can be. He is in fact a model employ-
ee. “I hate irregular and slovenly habits,” he reports (65). If William implic-
itly rejects trade, he does not reject the attributes trade requires. If he oppos-
es intellectual speculation and theory to work, it is not for fear of work. He
rejects trade, finally, because he fears wasted labor—labor that is less produc-
tive because it is simple. By turning translating into copying, the counting-
house ignores the highly complex labor of which William’s phrenological
“bumps” suggest he is capable. “What good can your bumps of ideality, com-
parison, self-esteem, conscientiousness, do you here?” a friend asks him (60).
“Ideality” and “comparison” denote abilities of creativity and evaluation that
are not being tapped, and while “self-esteem” and “conscientiousness” might
make him a good employee, they cannot be turned to his own profit in the
factory. Boiled down to pure labor, mental labor leaves its producer sub-
servient to capital.
III
“It is no strange thing,” the journal The School and the Teacher claimed at
mid-century, “that men who in education, tastes and habits have all the qual-
ifications of ‘gentlemen’ should regard themselves as worthy of something
very much higher than the treatment of a servant and the wages of a mechan-
ic. What in short the teacher desires is that his ‘calling’ shall rank as a ‘pro-
fession’; that the name of ‘schoolmaster’ shall ring as grandly on the ear as
that of ‘clergyman’ or ‘solicitor’” (qtd. in Altick 240n4).8 When William
Crimsworth starts anew in Belgium, he begins what will be a long and illus-
trious career as a schoolmaster. Crimsworth’s career as an educator begins in
a boys’ boarding school, moves to a girls’ school, and reaches its apex when
he lands a university post while simultaneously opening and operating a
school with his wife Frances.
William Crimsworth’s meteoric rise through the ranks of this protoprofes-
sion is another form of translation: the translation of faces and bodies into
terms of inner worth. Throughout the novel, Crimsworth is uniquely able to
decipher faces, which he correlates with the pages of a book (46). While
William and Edward both, for example, can read French and German busi-
ness correspondence, Edward cannot read a countenance: “He was trying to
read my character,” the protagonist says as his brother watches him work,
“but I felt as secure against his scrutiny as if I had on a casque with the visor
down—or rather I showed him my countenance with the confidence that
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one would show an unlearned man a letter written in Greek; he might see
lines, and trace characters, but he could make nothing of them” (53). The
younger Crimsworth owns a weapon his older brother must do without or,
rather, to follow William’s own self-correction in which he refines the vehicle
of his metaphor from that of the costume of a medieval knight (“casque with
visor”) to that of an internalized language (Greek), he possesses embodied
property his brother lacks. Edward’s capital equips him to run a mill, while
the protagonist’s bumps permit him to run the business of learning itself, to
oversee the classroom where his labor can now be productive, manufacturing
for his students “praise and blame in very small retail parcels” (163).
Unlike reading business correspondence, reading skulls would seem to be
an aesthetic practice, a practice in which one discriminates subtle differences
rather than distilling objects into their objectified exchange value. But the
logic of the factory persists as Brontë rewrites aesthetic play into labor so that
it can possess market value. Overseeing translation rather than performing it,
William Crimsworth schools his Belgian students in Latin and English, while
he himself uses phrenology to translate persons into commensurable values.
Consequently, although the romantic space of a girls’ school replaces the hard
space of the factory, the classroom in which Crimsworth ultimately finds his
calling nonetheless looks strikingly like the mill from which he has fled.
At the girls’ school, Crimsworth finds an unruly mob, “interrupt[ing him]
perpetually with little silly questions and uncalled-for remarks,” but by
quickly reading their characters and establishing a hierarchy among them, he
establishes order (115). “My first business this afternoon,” Crimsworth
relates, “consisted in reading the list of places for the month.” He provides a
student ranking, listing not the relative merits and faults of their papers but
the details of their heads (referred to in the novel as “organs”), ending at “the
bottom of the list” with that pupil whose “organs of benevolence, veneration,
conscientiousness, adhesiveness, were singularly small, those of self-esteem,
firmness, destructiveness, combativeness, preposterously large” (129). “As
much as in the factory interior,” Roger Cooter wrote, “the phrenology head
was an advertisement for a more automated reality in which character itself
reduced to digits on a graph” (112).9 In the classroom, political economy was
reformulated as a pedagogical economy, but rather than being inserted with-
in the division of labor, the professor presided over it. “I felt in myself com-
plete power to manage my pupils,” Crimsworth says (117).
In the detailed accounts of lessons and the descriptions of his strict man-
agement of students, Crimsworth’s classroom takes shape as a Taylorist
utopia, a place Brontë described in the same vocabulary she used to describe
the mill—a place where “a wasteful expense of energy and labour” (160) must
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be avoided and all “vacant moments must be turned to profitable account”
(92). But even as Crimsworth pursues his “system,” rationalizing his educa-
tional efforts by reducing his students to the shapes of their skulls, the novel
attempts to protect Crimsworth himself from the threat of universal equiva-
lence (97). Crimsworth’s mental labor must be seen to be work so that it can
be inserted into the market—and thus demand compensation—but it must
at the same time be differentiated from manual labor by being depicted as
work performed under his own auspices, autonomous rather than supervised
labor. 
One critical passage demonstrates Crimsworth’s professional autonomy. In
doing so, it dissolves both the purity of aesthetic autonomy and the purity of
the middle-class girl in order to disclose the labor embodied in what at first
appear to be effortless productions of nature. In a discussion dedicated to
convincing us of Crimsworth’s disinterested rather than prurient interest in
his female students, allaying “any doubt” the “incredulous reader” might pos-
sess as to Crimsworth’s “conscientious self-denial and self-control,”
Crimsworth says that “a master stands in a somewhat different relation
towards a pretty light-headed . . . girl to that occupied by a partner at a ball,
or a gallant on the promenade” (148). “To the tutor,” he continues, “female
charms are like tapestry hangings of which the wrong side is continually
turned towards him; and even when he sees the smooth, neat, external sur-
face he so well knows what knots, long stitches, and jagged ends are behind
that he has scarce temptation to admire too fondly the seemly forms and
bright colors exposed to general view” (149). Adorno wrote that “it is impos-
sible to conceive of the autonomy of art without covering up work” and it is
just this covering up that The Professor prohibits (qtd. in Bürger 35). The
underside of the beautiful tapestry betrays the cost of its production: in the
long stitches, we see work’s long stretches; in the pressure of knots and the
hurried jagged ends, we see material necessity. It is this side, the side of labor,
that Crimsworth occupies. After all, his objectified labor is embodied in the
finished girl his finishing school produces. Paradoxically, then, Crimsworth’s
exposure of art’s labor and, thus, its lack of autonomy enables him to achieve
the disinterested interest that characterizes professional autonomy. Restoring
labor to aesthetics, the novel pulls intellectual labor into political economy
and makes it value-able. But by depicting intellectual labor as artisanal rather
than industrial, the passage means to reserve for that labor an autonomy not
generally possible under industrial production.10
The Professor displaces economic desire onto sexual desire so that
Crimsworth can illustrate his autonomy without ever disavowing or, for that
matter, even dampening his economic appetites. By presenting Crimsworth
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as outside the sexual or marriage market within which the “partner at a ball”
and the “gallant on the promenade” circulate, the novel signals his profes-
sional autonomy without needing to define him against the commercial mar-
ket it desires for him. This displacement facilitates the novel’s critique of the
principle of aesthetic autonomy with its implicit conceptual reliance on
nature. What appears effortless in the passage—the girl’s beauty—has in fact
a history of effort behind it. The novel uncovers the hidden intellectual
labor—the lessons in elocution, the cultivation of judgment and taste—so
that its costs can be tallied, but while such an accounting enhances the value
of the girl’s instructor, it necessarily subtracts from the girl’s. She no longer
appears beautiful but rather duplicitous, hiding her rough underbelly from
suitors. By exposing the labor of aesthetics, Brontë uncouples aristocratic
independence from disinterest, and she also breaks the tie between disinter-
est and the middle-class angel.11 Defining her modern professional, Brontë
simultaneously disables his two competitors in the market for disinterest.
Brontë’s insistence on labor where aesthetics once played makes concealed
labor visible. As a result, beauty itself must be reevaluated. Describing one
student, Crimsworth says:
Raven-black hair, very dark eyes, absolutely regular features . . . formed
in her that assemblage of points whose union many persons regard as the
perfection of beauty. How, with the tintless pallor of her skin and the
classic straightness of her lineaments, she was able to look sensual, I don’t
know. I think her lips and eyes contrived the affair, and the result left no
uncertainty on the beholder’s mind. She was sensual now, and in ten
years’ time she would be coarse—promise plain was written in her face of
much future folly. (114–15)
Here it is not a past that is unearthed by the professional reader of faces but
a future foretold. In either case, time is restored to what might otherwise
appear to belong not to history but to timeless nature.
If the novel argues that beauty tries to distract our attention from time,
then it makes sense that what first attracts our narrator’s attention to Frances,
the student who becomes his wife, is her overt submission to time:
When I first cast my eyes on her, she sat looking fixedly down, her chin
resting on her hand, and she did not change her attitude till I com-
menced the lesson. None of the Belgian girls would have retained one
position, and that a reflective one, for the same length of time. (151)
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Later in the novel, Crimsworth comments, “I knew she could retain a
thinking attitude for a long time without change” (194). Such an ability sug-
gests the self-discipline required by the modern economy, the ability to sub-
ordinate oneself to time rather than evade it. The other striking feature about
this description of Frances is that we are given very few features at all: “I
know well enough that I have left on your mind’s eye no distinct picture of
her,” Crimsworth says, “I have not painted her complexion, nor her eyes, nor
her hair, nor even drawn the outline of her shape” (152–53). Crimsworth’s
withholding of details is not, he tells us, perversity but ignorance: “It is not
my intention to communicate to you a knowledge I myself gained little by
little” (152). Though he has read every face he encounters instantaneously,
providing us with immediate and elaborate analyses, he claims to be inca-
pable of reading this face at a glance. Instead, what we see as the tale contin-
ues is Frances at work.
As Crimsworth places Frances on a regimen of reading, translating, and
writing (176), the novel’s representation of intellectual labor passes from his
own work as professor to hers as pupil. The “benefits of [Crimsworth’s] sys-
tem” (176) quickly become apparent:
Frances did not become pale or feeble in consequence of her sedentary
employment; perhaps the stimulus it communicated to her mind coun-
terbalanced the inaction it imposed on her body. She changed, indeed she
changed obviously and rapidly; but it was for the better. (175)
Work that does not exercise the body—which, indeed, “impose[s]” “inac-
tion” on the body—has material effects nonetheless: “A clearness of skin
almost bloom, and a plumpness almost embonpoint, softened the decided
lines of her feature. Her figure . . . became rounder” (175). In Crimsworth’s
classroom, translation becomes not copying, not derivative imitation, but
original production. After practicing translation, Frances begins “composi-
tion[s].” “Such occupation,” Crimsworth informs us, “seemed the very
breath of her nostrils, and soon her improved productions wrung from me
the avowal that those qualities in her that I had termed taste and fancy ought
rather to have been denominated judgment and imagination” (174).
Inspiration—“breath”—is tied to the body—“nostrils”—in a metaphorical
formulation, the awkwardness of which might be seen as insisting that even
in the realm of “judgment and imagination,” mental labor is also material.
This sentence is noteworthy, however, primarily for another reason: it under-
mines labor even as it intends to reinforce it.
What Crimsworth “had termed taste and fancy” are not presented to us as
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developing into “judgment and imagination” through steady practice but
rather as “qualities” that exist in her which he had not yet properly appreci-
ated. Generating a rhetorical effect found throughout Brontë’s prose, this
sentence portrays Frances’s hard work not as producing something but as dis-
closing something—in this case, inherent aesthetic ability. Brontë works to
restore labor to intellectual activity and yet the urgency with which she wish-
es to render this immaterial labor material leads her to repeatedly present that
labor less as work after all and more as a form of property or capital. Similarly,
Crimsworth later notices that Frances’s “mental power manifested [itself ]
gradually and steadily” (176). “Mental power” exists a priori; it is just more
or less visible. He, to pluck another example from many, does not depict
Frances as responding to circumstances in particular ways but rather Frances
“display[s]” a faculty when “circumstances . . . forced it out of the depths
where it burned latent” (262). Talent, ability, mental power, and capacity
exist. They are only more or less visible—on display or latent.
Throughout the novel, the prose depicts activities that occur over time as
qualities figured as objects or people. For example, Brontë does not simply
show our hero behaving cautiously and tactfully but rather capitalizes
“Caution” and “Tact” and refers to them as his “faculties” (63). Immaterial
events that happen in time are understood in spatial, quasi-material terms:
Crimsworth does not “think” but rather “thoughts occup[y] [his] mind” (90).
One particularly dizzying passage describes Crimsworth’s love for Frances:
she, we learn, is “my best object of sympathy on earth . . . my ideal of the
shrine in which to seal my stores of love; personification of discretion and
forethought, of diligence and perseverance, of self-denial and self-control—
those guardians, those trusty keepers of the gift I longed to confer on her”
(195–96). Frances moves from being an object, to an ideal, to a personifica-
tion, and then is dropped from the prose as all that she personifies—
discretion, forethought, diligence, and perseverance—is itself personified in
the form of “guardians” and “trusty keepers.” The tangible—the person—
becomes intangible—a set of qualities—and then the intangible is personi-
fied, rendered tangible. Throughout the novel, immaterial qualities take on a
solidity of their own, as if the novel needs to distinguish attributes from the
person who possesses them so that it may more readily assess their worth.
The rhetorical twists in which, in a sense, “verbs” become “nouns” is symp-
tomatic, a measure of the novel’s desire to professionalize intellectual labor.
Even Frances, at first exempted from phrenological assessment, gets “read”
just like every other character, as the novel attempts to confer upon her the
prestige of innate property. Assessing the “calibre of her capacity,”
Crimsworth finds that the place where intelligence is located is highly 
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developed while the space indicating the animal instincts is underdeveloped:
“The shape of her head was different [from the other students’]; the superior
part more developed; the base considerably less so” (156, 151). The novel
replaces aesthetic beauty with something we might call “embodied intelli-
gence,” intelligence that is stored within, and at the same time manifested
upon, the body. Thus, when we do finally hear Crimsworth call someone
(Frances) beautiful, he declares it in the following, strange formulation: “The
intelligence of her face seemed beauty to me” (201). Intelligence has become
a property of the body (“of her face”) and, as such, can now be considered
beautiful—just as, conversely, even those conventionally understood to boast
“personal attractions” look instead disfigured when the expert’s eye notices
upon them the “brand of mental inferiority” (149–50).
In the novel’s logic, what one does becomes rather what one is capable of
doing as indicated by embodied properties. Crimsworth’s student ranking,
for example, does not evaluate what each student has learned or failed to
learn but rather what each student is capable of learning, her “aptitude for
cultivation,” to borrow a phrase from Brontë’s letters about her own students
(Wise 1: 199). Once transformed into innate property or capital, ability can
then act as a prophylactic against proletarianization. The language of “apti-
tude,” “faculties,” or “organs” converts into an asset what would, as mental
labor, be leeched into abstract time. Intellectual assets not only ostensibly
protect intellectual labor from reduction to manual labor, they also render
their owner superior to the industrial capitalist. “I kept the padlock of
silence,” Crimsworth tells us about his conduct at the mill, “on mental wealth
of which [Edward] was no sharer” (63). Crimsworth’s “mental wealth” is
superior, the novel wants us to believe, to his brother’s more conventional
kind, because whereas a capitalist can lose his money capital though bad busi-
ness or bad luck, the professional cannot in the same sense lose mental capi-
tal: it is inseparable from its owner. While it can be abstracted from the pro-
fessional (as ability, aptitude, or IQ, for instance), it cannot be separated from
him. Learning at one point that Edward has lost everything, we are to under-
stand William’s steady rise as intrinsic to his particular vocation, one that
draws on a form of capital immune to the risks endemic to economic capital.
One might argue that this tendency to turn activities into measurable abil-
ities and measurable abilities, in turn, into “wealth” simply reproduces at the
sentence level the book’s larger plan wherein the labor of Crimsworth and
Frances eventually earns them what Brontë calls in her preface “a small com-
petency” but what is in the book enough capital for them to retire in com-
fort and ensure that their son receives an elite education. Brontë, then, sim-
ply lays bare the modus operandi of the professional who, to recall Perkin’s
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words, “transform[s] a service into an income-yielding property” (7).
Somehow, though, the effect here is not one of mutual reinforcement but of
contradiction. The nominalizing tendency of Brontë’s prose in general, and
of the language of phrenology in particular, radically undercuts the novel’s
emphasis on the merit of labor. By showcasing the phrenological work of
reading character, Brontë ironically privileges a form of intellectual labor that
purports to determine the value of someone without needing to evaluate her
labor.12 The professor’s students, for example, do not need to put pen to paper
for him to know their worth: “In less than five minutes,” Crimsworth says
after scanning the girls’ heads on the very first day of class, “[the students]
had revealed to me their characters” (115). Representing work in the form of
natural property (bumps, organs, faculties, gifts, and the like) visible to the
expert’s eye, Brontë does the very thing she forbids of beauty in particular and
aesthetics in general: she erases the time of labor. The mental labor she is at
pains to depict disappears into mental properties that look like nothing more
than the apparently effortless productions of nature.
Like the later IQ test, phrenology assumed that people differed from each
other in their innate abilities, that these innate abilities were open to assess-
ment by educational professionals, and that professional evaluations would
then dictate the proper—or, more to the point, natural—stations for indi-
viduals in society. In place of class struggle, the professional claimed to sub-
stitute a hierarchy with a meritocracy structured around “the vertical career
hierarchy rather than the horizontal connection of class” (Perkin, Rise 9) that
was putatively the by-product not of power or money but of an unmediated
nature. “The meritocratic illusion,” Daniel Cottom writes, “is the belief that
one can isolate merit within a society by means of a neutral rationality and
thus promote a society that stratifies itself according to the laws of nature”
(16). The language that developed to underwrite the expert class, a language
of “natural talents” and “intellectual gifts,” echoed Kant in his use of nature
to underwrite art. In both cases, nature confers authority and prestige by
obscuring material history.
The problem with The Professor, then, is not, as Neville Newman would
have it, that intellectual labor is not real labor. Citing Brontë’s claim in her
preface that “whatever small competency [her hero] might gain should be
won by the sweat of his brow,” Newman says, “The sweat he expends [at a
girls’ boarding school] is metaphorical at best” (11). The Professor pointedly
refuses the assumption that immaterial labor does not count as real work,
that metaphorical sweat cannot convey true effort. The problem is rather that
an unresolved tension runs through the novel. As I’ve argued throughout,
bringing intellect to the market in the first half of the nineteenth century
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required representing it in terms of productive work rather than leisured play,
while ensuring that mental labor did not get reduced on that market to man-
ual labor seemed to require that it be represented in terms of innate capital.
Both forms of representation enabled Brontë to illuminate what was previ-
ously invisible—the one by uncovering hidden labor, the other by material-
izing the immaterial—but the latter representation (innate capital) effective-
ly undoes the time necessary for the former (labor). Reifying intellectual
capacity as timeless, natural property that is simply more or less visible,
Brontë ironically ends up reinforcing a simplistic definition of labor. Labor
becomes, finally, simply pure labor—empty time that does not produce any-
thing although it might disclose something. In short, Brontë markets her
professional by providing two definitions, one of which threatens to cancel
the other. 
Crimsworth’s “mental wealth” (63) becomes actual wealth as he and his
wife accrue “capital to invest” (280) and “realize an independency” (280).
The expectations Brontë raised in the preface do, then, make the ending of
the novel come as something of a surprise. That the “small competency” has
accumulated from teaching rather than physical labor is not surprising but
that it is not teaching alone that earns Crimsworth his independence is unex-
pected. It is earned rather by an uneasy combination of teaching and invest-
ing. In one brief paragraph, we learn that the idyllic pastoral life to which the
Crimsworths retire owes itself as much to economic capital as to mental cap-
ital and labor:
Behold us now at the close of the ten years, and we have realized an inde-
pendency. The rapidity with which we attained this end had its origin in
three reasons:—Firstly, we worked so hard for it; secondly, we had no
incumbrances to delay success; thirdly, as soon as we had capital to invest,
two well-skilled counselors, one in Belgium, one in England . . . gave us
a word each of advice as to the sort of investment to be chosen. The sug-
gestion made was judicious, and being promptly acted on, the result
proved gainful; I communicated details to [the counselors]; nobody else
can be interested in hearing them. (280)
The risky market in which Edward places William’s capital appears to be
secure enough when mediated by experts (“well-skilled counselors”) whose
“judicious” tips are followed by a professional who appreciates the value of
time and “promptly act[s].” Representing investment in the market as if
William were still somehow talking about professional labor does not allow
Brontë to get through the passage smoothly, however. Instead, she has
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Crimsworth blame the reader for the fact that she herself preferred not to
elaborate: “nobody else can be interested.” Still she chose this recipe for inde-
pendence, as if at the last moment she wished to write away the dilemma that
disfigured her text, as if representing labor combining with capital as unre-
markable would make readers less likely to remark on the uneasy combina-
tion of mental labor and mental capital that constitutes her own professional.
IV
“Because political economy and aesthetics were once part of the same dis-
course,” Mary Poovey writes, “and because their separation was never com-
plete, each discourse continued to haunt the other in the form of vestigial
traces” (“Aesthetics” 82). If in many nineteenth-century texts the terms of
political economy and aesthetics “haunt” each other, then in The Professor the
latter is collapsed into the former as the practices of aesthetics are written into
market language and social, extra-economic relations depicted in economic
terms. Marx argued that feudal relations were social relations first and eco-
nomic relations second while capitalism reversed that priority so that the
laborer mistakenly imagines himself to be voluntarily exchanging his labor-
power. In Brontë’s novel, however, it is as if everything involving William, par-
ticularly social relations, has been filtered through the logic of market equiva-
lence so the reader might understand his every judgment to be perfectly free
and autonomous, made under no emotional obligation or affective influence,
no compromise of his professional independence. To take one example, inter-
actions among family members are described as “transaction[s]” in which
“mental power” possesses the capacity to “extort” others (176). When a friend
offers to help him, to take another example, Crimsworth replies with no hint
of irony or whimsy, “I am in your debt already; you did me an important serv-
ice when I was at X . . . that service I have never repaid, and at present I decline
positively adding another item to the account” (227–28). It seems that servic-
es, even between friends, require payment if one is not to be compromised.
Crimsworth’s eccentricity has a logic that makes sense only when the profes-
sional is under particular duress to establish the value of his services. In order
to avoid any appearance of impropriety, in order to appear perfectly impartial,
the professional must refuse any gifts—those items that are offered as if out-
side the logic of exchange but which might demand, nonetheless, a return. Far
from being procured, then, by distance or removal from the market,
Crimsworth’s professional independence is achieved only through the most
thoroughgoing adoption of market logic.13
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In the example above, Crimsworth is careful to refuse what might be per-
ceived as “the interests in disinterestedness,” to borrow Martha
Woodmansee’s phrase (11). Embracing market discourse ironically protects
him from any self-interested motives that might accompany allegedly disin-
terested aid. Crimsworth’s suspicion of disinterest is not unlike the implicit
suspicion evinced in critical arguments that illustrate how the professional or
the artist rhetorically enacts his distance from the market. In such arguments,
distance from the market becomes a kind of credit that then ensures the value
of the professional or artist. Woodmansee’s important The Author, Art, and
the Market, for example, argues that the “momentous shift from an instru-
mentalist theory of art to the modern theory of art as an autonomous object
that is to be contemplated disinterestedly” was a reaction to a fast-growing
bourgeois market for literature (32). As certain poets and writers found
themselves neglected by this new public, they developed a theory that could
rescue aesthetic value from market determination. (See chapter 4 for a more
extensive discussion of Woodmansee’s book.) The articulation of aesthetic
disinterest was itself, then, far from disinterested. Woodmansee’s analysis is
persuasive and, as a kind of elaboration upon Raymond Williams’s observa-
tion that aesthetic ideology contained “elements of compensation,” it is
extremely useful (36). However, it neglects the other side of aesthetic ideolo-
gy, a side Williams was quick to acknowledge: its expression of, as he wrote,
“certain human values, capacities, energies, which the development towards
an industrial civilization was felt to be threatening or even destroying” (36).
And yet, though right to acknowledge the progressive side of aesthetic ideol-
ogy, Williams slightly misstates the case. It is not that aesthetics preserved
older values but rather that aesthetics, born in the same moment as, and in
opposition to, political economy, offers an alternative system of value. With
aesthetics, Peter Bürger writes, “a new way of perceiving that is immune to
the means-ends rationality comes into existence” (41). That aesthetics pro-
duced this new mode by repressing labor indicates that its alternative system
is one side of a coin whose other side is political economy.
Once its professional’s economic interests are secured, The Professor does
finally return to the issue of aesthetic disinterest. In a scene that might be
considered the late counterpart to that early scene in which a friend teases
Crimsworth, “Carry your intellect and refinement to the market and tell me
in a private note what price is bid for them,” the same friend (Hunsden) asks
Frances about the value of “poetical associations”:
“Mademoiselle, what is an association? I never saw one. What is its length,
breadth, weight, value—aye, value? What price will it bring in the market?”
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“Your portrait, to anyone who loved you, would, for the sake of asso-
ciation, be without price.”
That inscrutable Hunsden heard this remark and felt it rather acute-
ly, too, somewhere; for he coloured—a thing not unusual for him, when
hit unawares on a tender point. (261)
Art’s refusal of exchange value (“without price”) is recovered here, but it is,
significantly, by way of Frances not Crimsworth, who places himself clearly
outside the discussion, not participating in it but calmly commenting upon
it. Frances, it is true, has by this point in the novel become a kind of proxy
for Crimsworth. Or, perhaps more accurately, Frances picks up where
Crimsworth leaves off as the novel transfers its energy from the one to the
other. It is Frances whom we follow in the novel’s final chapter as she moves
through her school, displaying her “superior mind” for her students’ benefit
(274). Having given the professional proximity to the market, it is as if
Brontë then wished to give him distance, and realized that the fulfillment of
that wish required beginning a new story with a protagonist who has not so
thoroughly internalized market logic.
If the novel is a failure, as so many critics and readers have charged, then
it is not because Brontë was unable effectively to use a male narrator.14 Nor is
it because Brontë’s “proper gifts were consciously denied full play in [the
novel],” as one critic notes, relying on both the language of intellectual prop-
erty Brontë helped popularize as well as the aesthetic vocabulary of “play” she
tried to pull from circulation (Ward 102). The Professor fails because the
novel’s apparent success at producing a marketable professional leaves its
readers and even perhaps itself deeply dissatisfied, desiring a story quite dif-
ferent from the one that just unfolded. It is not only that the capital-and-
labor theory of value underwriting her prosperous professional is conflicted
at best and self-imploding at worst, but that the novel produces a professional
so market-oriented that it seems, by negation, to trigger a longing for anoth-
er professional, one more disposed to subordinate the market to higher con-
cerns, one for whom service is not first and foremost transformable into an
income-yielding property but is rather service for others without regard for
self. At its most effective, the professional class convinces us that it is “a class
which is necessarily not-for-itself ” but for others (Frow 127). This rhetoric of
service is, of course, self-serving insofar as it furnishes the professional class
with moral authority, cultural prestige, and material income, but it is also an
ideal worth preserving, particularly in an era of widespread deprofessional-
ization. It is an ideal that insists that market logic is not the only logic, an
insistence first expressed in the notion of aesthetic disinterest and one that,
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as Herbert Marcuse once wrote, “keeps alive the best desires of men amidst a
bad reality” (102).
I do not want to conclude this chapter, however, by flourishing the ideal
of disinterestedness. To do so would be to freeze the dialectic between the
regressive and progressive sides of aesthetic ideology, merely championing
one side over the other. Today, as humanities professors are increasingly called
upon to justify what we do in market terms, we are especially likely to find
Brontë’s market-oriented protagonist repugnant. But a better response than
repugnance with its accompanying retreat to the progressive side of the aes-
thetic ideal is to ask whether this narrative of professorial professionalization
offers any clues to our crisis of professorial deprofessionalization, a crisis best
documented by colleges and universities’ growing reliance on adjunct labor.
The Professor suggests that professional labor challenged aesthetics in order to
insert itself into the market but that it did so at an enormous cost—the cost
of condemning itself to a never-ending struggle to distinguish itself from vir-
tually every other form of labor under capital. The novel distinguishes pro-
fessional labor by depicting mental labor as a form of capital—mental
capital—which authorizes the professional’s status as manager rather than
managed. In this way, though, the novel implicates itself in what Adorno
called the “age-old culpability that lies in the divorce of physical from men-
tal labour” (323), erroneously imagining that such a divorce protects mental
labor from proletarianization. But mental labor is never immune to the dan-
ger of being modeled upon routinized physical labor and, thus, subordinat-
ed to capital. This is what Crimsworth finds when he works for his brother
and what scores of humanities PhDs find today when they look for tenure-
track jobs only to find a system increasingly designed to pay them by the
course. The Professor prompts us to ask: Is there a way to fight for intellectu-
al autonomy that foregrounds rather than represses mental labor’s similarities
to other forms of labor? 
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C H A P T E R T W O
Becoming Professional: 
Time in David Copperfield
I. A MOST UNBECOMING PROFESSIONAL:
DAVEY COPPERFIELD
D. A. Miller’s “Secret Subjects, Open Secrets” and Mary Poovey’s “The Man-
of-Letters Hero: David Copperfield and the Professional Writer” have proven
so persuasive that George Levine recently admitted that he cannot “think
about David Copperfield again without a certain embarrassment at what
seems now almost blatant celebration of self-discipline and self-sacrifice in
the interest of bourgeois identity and bourgeois ideology” (Dying to Know 6).1
For both Miller and Poovey, David falls woefully short of his own self-
perception. In Miller, this lack of self-knowledge makes him no different
from any of the novel’s characters, all of whom are liberal subjects trapped by
a putative opposition between freedom and incarceration. In Poovey, as my
introductory chapter discussed, David’s status as a professional makes him
especially culpable and his self-ignorance shields him from knowledge of his
professional hypocrisy. In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation of
Victorian studies’ most unbecoming professional, but since I do not address
Miller or Poovey’s arguments directly in my reading, I first wish to mention
two scholars that do. In their own readings of the same novel, Rachel Ablow
and Matthew Titolo clear the space for arguments like my own.
Ablow and Titolo incorporate Foucauldian arguments, but they mark their
distance from earlier readings by transforming what appeared in those read-
ings as “the inescapable pathos of [liberalism’s] double bind” into the “proper-
ly dialectical exercise of its positive and negative aspects,” to borrow some
phrases from Fredric Jameson (“Theoretical Hesitation” 284). Ablow and
Titolo assume two things. First, they assume that the novelist was aware of the
ideologies at work in his text. Thus, Dickens is Foucault’s peer rather than his
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archive: “The typical Dickens novel,” Titolo writes, “grapples with the same
power asymmetries analyzed in the typical Michel Foucault essay” (186).
Ablow writes, “by contrast with those who have claimed to reveal [David
Copperfield’s] previously-concealed interpellative effects, I argue that the novel
not only calls attention to its disciplinary agenda, it defines it as the principal
source of its literary and ethical value” (24).2 Second, in the work of Titolo and
Ablow, as well as others writing recently, the ideologies themselves are not as
totalizing as previously assumed. Whereas Poovey understood the profession-
al to be thoroughly duplicitous and Miller described liberal subjects as irrevo-
cably “boxed in,” critics who follow the logics of Ablow and Titolo are more
likely to view the professional as an ambivalent figure and to view autonomy
as relative and partial rather than always, already impossible.
Ablow’s argument rests on reading Copperfield’s Agnes as Dickens’s
endorsement of the ideal for ideal’s sake. Feminist critics complain that the
domestic ideal imposed an unreal standard of self-renunciation and that, by
circulating this ideal in fiction, novelists encouraged real women to sacrifice
themselves at the altar of the household gods. Ablow exempts Dickens from
this charge by claiming that Agnes “is never posited as a model for a person”
but is “a kind of fiction that can serve as the object of one’s affections with-
out claiming any empirical accuracy” (33). David requires a series of ideals—
Steerforth, Dora, Agnes—around which to organize his ambition and moti-
vate himself, and Agnes is the final ideal whose unreality makes her no less
important and useful to David’s progress.
Ablow’s essay, in short, argues for the productive power of the ideal. The
suspicious model demystifies the ideal without acknowledging its power to
motivate behavior whereas Ablow’s thesis spotlights precisely that power of
motivation. Poovey demonstrates that the housewife’s “love” is in fact domes-
tic labor that has been rendered invisible by the public/private divide. Ablow,
on the other hand, does not strive to demystify “love” but rather to show that
“David Copperfield seeks to encourage love in its readers” by illustrating how
the idealization of the love object prompts the protagonist to better himself
and the reader’s love for the novel, in turn, “prompts the reader to better her-
self ” (24). Positioning itself against “disciplinary” arguments that expose ide-
alism’s hypocrisy, Ablow’s argument acknowledges what Marcuse, speaking
specifically of the principle of aesthetic disinterest, called “the critical force of
the ideal,” which “keeps alive the best desires of men amidst a bad reality”
(102–3). Ablow, it seems, wishes to hold on to the possibility that one’s
labor—professional or domestic—might sometimes be performed for the
sake of others rather than for oneself (or, more accurately, experienced as per-
formed for others even as it is also undertaken for oneself ).
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While Ablow expresses a dialectical impulse in her insistence on the ideal’s
positive and productive dimension, Titolo is more self-consciously dialectical,
careful to show how positive and negative functions inhere within the same
ideal. Like Ablow, Titolo focuses on the same set of issues that interest
Poovey: professionalism and its negotiation of public/private dualism. On the
one hand, to Poovey, the private sphere of the domestic angel, the hearth
where labor ostensibly is not labor because it is love, offers professionalism an
established ideological resource upon which to draw in order to sanitize itself.
To Titolo, on the other hand, private/public do not have the discreteness
Poovey’s argument takes for granted. “We should view Dickens,” he writes,
“as deeply unsettled about the normative boundaries between public and pri-
vate that we generally assume his novels endorse. For Dickens, public and
private are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually implicated; each pro-
vides the space in which the true meaning of the other can be elaborated”
(174–75). If, as Titolo says later, professionalism does draw ideologically on
the idyllic space of the home, this is not simple mystification. He writes:
Dickens both fears and values individual and collective enterprises that
claimed exemption from the economic reason which he saw as a particu-
larly modern scourge. And Dickens often parodies his own idealizations;
he knows, for example, that the household/office, even if protected from
the worst excesses of the industrial marketplace by a guild ideology,
might be another ruse of economic reason. So although Dickens tends to
idealize David’s various displaced families, his impulse is to call people to
account just at the moment when a noncontractual language of emotion
would seem more suited to his pastoral argument. (180–81)
Titolo goes on to show that David himself “realizes that his idealized, patriar-
chal guild masks its own calculating logic” (181). He takes pains, in fact, to
show us how David (and, thus, Dickens) is cognizant of the ideological under-
pinnings of professionalism, not disingenuous about them. If, in Poovey’s read-
ing, David is “self-serving” (118), “manipulat[ive]” (117), and “complicitous”
(120), then, in Titolo’s, he “threaten[s] to expose” (173), “demystify[ies]” (177),
“realizes” (181), and “self-conscious[ly] debunk[s]” (181).
Dialectical thinking entails grasping the positive and the negative at once:
“Marx powerfully urges us to do the impossible,” writes Jameson, “namely, to
think . . . positively and negatively all at once: to achieve, in other words, a
type of thinking that would be capable of grasping the demonstrably baleful
features of capitalism along with its extraordinary and liberating dynamism
simultaneously within a single thought and without attenuating any of the
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force of either judgment” (Postmodernism xi). Absolving Dickens, David, and
the novel of ideological subterfuge by demonstrating that these entities were
as suspicious of liberal ideology as we are ourselves, Titolo frees us up to grasp
dialectically those “remainders” that find representation in the Victorian
novel, those residual, non-instrumentalized pockets that persist within the
modern discourse of professionalism.
In Titolo’s argument, noncommodified elements survive in professional
practices despite modernity’s iron cage, because the professional office takes
the shape of the “enchanted enclave” of the precapitalist guild. Harkening
back to an archaic model, the professional resists being ruled solely by means-
ends rationality. “For Dickens, as for many nineteenth-century writers, moral-
ly sound authority requires that patron-client bonds survive as ideological
husks of an older, enchanted relationship,” he writes (179). In what follows, I
also offer a post-Foucauldian reading of David Copperfield, but whereas Titolo
finds that only the preindustrial past offers rhetorical resources for withstand-
ing Victorian capitalism’s cash nexus, I argue that it is ironically the most
rationalized aspect of the Victorian present—factory labor—that provides this
novel with the material for “disinterest.” In my view, David’s internalization of
the time-discipline the factory clock exemplifies reassures readers that profes-
sional autonomy is not an empty ideal behind which lies professional indo-
lence. Since the professional must possess mental capital but cannot speculate
on that capital, David is barred from conscious knowledge of what he
possesses—the slow, painful movement from unconscious to conscious self-
knowledge takes place as his internalization of time-discipline or the require-
ment that he work in “real” not future-oriented time. Finally, I suggest that the
novel’s ideal of professionalism is intended to scare up a market for profes-
sional services but that acknowledging this does not prevent us from also rec-
ognizing that the code of behavior constructed by the novel, and presumably
internalized by some of its readers, justifies that market. If we think of the
“truth” of David Copperfield as its discovery of a formula for cultural capital—
a formula that, as I will show, combines the merit of time-disciplined labor
with the prestige of innate talent—we might say, with Bourdieu, that “the dis-
covery that someone who has discovered the truth had an interest in doing so
in no way diminishes his discovery” (Pascalian Meditations 3).
II. MENTAL CAPITAL AND INDUSTRIAL TIME
IN DAVID COPPERFIELD
Though she apparently never wears it, David Copperfield’s first wife Dora
possesses a watch. Or did possess one. We learn about the watch only when
56 Chapter 2
Ruth_CH2_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:58 AM  Page 56
we are told that the couple’s servant has absconded with it. The boy “stole
Dora’s watch,” David tells us, “which, like everything else belonging to us,
had no particular place of its own; and, converting it into money, spent the
produce (he always was a weak-minded boy!) in incessantly riding up and
down between London and Uxbridge outside the coach” (657–58). Dora
loses track of time (the watch has “no particular place”), thereby unleashing
a series of events demonstrating the equivalence of time and money: con-
verting Dora’s lost time into money, the boy then loses time himself. A “weak-
minded boy”—without someone like David’s “resources of intellect” (328),
to borrow a phrase from elsewhere in the novel—he lacks both discipline,
spending the “produce” immediately, and the power of invention, imagining
no more profitable pastime than circling aimlessly. “Moments” are “the ele-
ments of profit” in David Copperfield, and misappropriated moments repre-
sent the potential loss of profit (Marx, Capital 1: 233). The Copperfields for-
feit their property, while the boy, like the watch’s hand traveling equidistant
spaces between numerals, covers the same plot of land over and over.
Attempting to get ahead by stealing rather than putting in time, he goes
nowhere, stuck in empty moments obviously unoccupied by production but
not clearly filled by consumption either (eschewing luxury, the frugal boy sits
outside the coach).
The problem is not that the watch—the emblem of industrial capitalism
and the new time-discipline of the factory, as E. P. Thompson has argued—
structures time unnaturally. Rather, the boy’s attempt to reach ends (“pro-
duce”) without means (work) is itself an insult to measurable time. If one
expects to get anywhere, Dickens remonstrates, one must submit to time and
obey its rules. One must follow the example David has set only a few sen-
tences earlier. Immediately before his discussion of this “unfortunate page,”
David mentions his own, much more promising career: “I laboured hard at
my book, without allowing it to interfere with the punctual discharge of my
newspaper duties” (656). The latter clause appears almost as an
afterthought—the emphasis ostensibly on the book not the newspaper
duties—but it is in fact central to our understanding of the writer David has
become. Unlike Dora, David never loses track of time, never falls behind on
his newspaper deadlines. Unlike the boy, David respects time; the use of the
article “the” rather than the more likely possessive pronoun “my” (“the punc-
tual discharge” as opposed to “my punctual discharge”) bespeaks time’s objec-
tive status and importance to David. Far from espousing the personal, spon-
taneous writing the Romantics privileged, David’s writing proceeds, we
might say, like clockwork.3 Like the factory hand monitoring a machine,
David’s “hand” appears exchangeable, the style or quality of his particular
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writing/labor less important than its productive repetition. Yet crucially, if
somewhat paradoxically, the first clause of the sentence indicates that David
is more than a factory hand: just as we need to hear that the thieving servant
possesses a weak mind in addition to (or as the cause of ) an inability to man-
age time, we must hear that David works hard at his own book, his work of
imagination, even while discharging his more perfunctory newspaper duties.
That is, we must see the power of invention sitting smack up against a
mechanical submission to abstract rather than subjective time—mental cap-
ital meets industrial labor.
“Each distinctive mode of production or social formation will embody a
distinctive bundle of time and space practices and concepts,” David Harvey
wrote in The Condition of Postmodernity (204). Like Dombey and Son, David
Copperfield is obsessed with time, representing a number of time practices in
order, finally, to fix on the one most appropriate to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury’s emergent professional.4 Critics commenting on Dickens’s fascination
with time have tended to do so within generic or psychologizing terms
(focusing on his novels as bildungsromans or on the status of individual mem-
ory), overlooking the larger premise in his novels regarding what might be
called, borrowing from Fredric Jameson, “the new rhythms of measurable
time” (Political Unconscious 152). Such a fundamental project eludes
twentieth-century critics for two reasons: 1) The new mode of time—a mode
conveniently if reductively grasped in the ubiquitous phrase “time is
money”—has become the medium of modern life, something assumed and
not analyzed; and 2) at its center, Dickens criticism has placed the author’s
childhood experience in the blacking warehouse factory and has limited,
thereby, the shape of inquiries into Dickens’s fictional representations of
industrial capitalism. The very last thing we are now prepared to find in a
Dickens novel is an endorsement of some aspect of the factory model. Yet
that is exactly what we do find. In its attempt to fashion a writing profes-
sional, David Copperfield presents us with a surprisingly un-Dickensian argu-
ment for the temporality of industrial capitalism, differentiating that tempo-
rality from other possible modes. The novel refuses in particular, I argue, the
temporality of a booming speculative economy—a time contingent on the
predictability of a radically unpredictable future or, in Jameson’s formulation,
“time [as] a new relationship to the future as a space of necessary expectation
of revenue and capital accumulation” (Cultural Turn 185)—but it also rejects
the subjective time of residual Romantic and piecework economies. In short,
despite Dickens’s well-known objections to factory life, David Copperfield
articulates factory time—the organization of labor with regard not to the
“ends” but to the regular and predictable use of “objective” time—as the
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appropriate tempo for the new breed of professional who must not anticipate
“ends” (payment for services rendered, professional acclaim, or social success)
but rather devote himself to the task at hand.
In an essay on the expanding role played by the “knowledge-producing
occupations” in the West, John Frow complains that most accounts of this
expansion “offer no theory of the historical change in the composition of cap-
ital, and indeed of how it might be possible to understand knowledge as a
form of capital.” “The starting point for such a theory,” he suggests, “might
be an understanding that knowledge is a moment of both capital and labour,
and can be translated into each of these categories” (95). Seeking to resolve
or neutralize the apparent contradictions of the new professional by strategi-
cally moving between the culturally available vocabularies of finance capital
and industrial labor, David Copperfield wants to provide us with just such an
understanding. Dickens wanted readers to imagine a writing professional
whose intelligence resembles capital but whose work habits reproduce the
measurable rhythms of labor. In making this argument, I follow Stuart
Sherman, whose study of eighteenth-century prose “entails a shift of focus up
the social scale,” retraining our gaze from “[E. P.] Thompson’s laborers [and]
Foucault’s prisoners” to those for whom time-discipline does not enslave
them to others but paradoxically authorizes their autonomy (21).
Examination Nation
In an oft-quoted passage from the novel, the adult David reflects on his child-
hood stint in a factory:
It is a matter of some surprise to me, even now, that I can have been so
easily thrown away at such an age. A child of excellent abilities, and with
strong powers of observation, quick, eager, delicate, and soon hurt bodi-
ly and mentally, it seems wonderful to me that nobody should have made
any sign on my behalf. But none was made; and I became, at ten years
old, a little labouring hind in the service of Murdstone and Grinby. (146)
No critic has pointed out that this is the first passage to explicitly comment
on David’s “abilities.” Before this moment, the adult David, our narrator, has
provided very little self-assessment of this objective, empirical type (“excellent
abilities, strong powers of observation”), though numerous occasions to do so
have presented themselves. When David repeatedly fails at his lessons in the
presence of the Murdstones (his very mother begging, “don’t be stupid” [51]),
for example, we might have been told by the adult David that his childhood
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self in fact possessed superior faculties. Though he does mention that he had
been “apt enough to learn” (50) before the Murdstones, and while he clearly
blames their harsh teaching style rather than any personal inadequacy, it is
nonetheless striking that only when his childhood self is on the brink of
becoming a manual laborer is the adult David compelled to list his qualifica-
tions for mental labor.
“Every kind of work includes ‘mental activity,’” Nicos Poulantzas wrote,
“but not every kind of work is located on the mental labour side in the
politico-ideological division between mental and manual labour” (237).
Beginning with Marx, critics have long argued that the early nineteenth cen-
tury drains the mind from certain kinds of work and embeds it solely in other
forms.5 More recently, scholars, such as historian of science Simon Schaffer,
have demonstrated that the political economy of the 1830s relocates intelli-
gence from the person who manually constructs an object, making it up as
he goes, to a mental professional who designs it. In Charles Babbage’s sce-
nario, for example, there is a person who does the “real” work, the work of
knowledge and invention, and the person who merely physically executes the
product of that work. But if we know that the opposition between mental
and manual labor was firmly established by the mid-nineteenth century, we
know less about the “meritocratic” structure that followed on its heels, the
structure by which individuals were allotted to one or the other side of the
opposition. During the period in which Dickens wrote David Copperfield,
the question of education’s role in evaluating individuals’ mental versus man-
ual qualifications occupied a central space in public debate. (Of course, in the
new educational system, one did not qualify for manual labor so much as dis-
qualify for mental labor.) Far more than any other, the instrument by which
this new system of qualification both conducted and justified itself was the
examination.6 According to historian John Roach, “the examining method
was making converts very rapidly in the late [eighteen] forties” (56).
To Roach, the idea of using examinations to qualify (or, as the case may
be, disqualify) candidates for professions stemmed from the prestige of the
honors examinations of Oxbridge. Yet, as he also pointed out, the status of
the Cambridge Tripos and the Oxford Schools was well-established by 1825.
Why, then, he asks, “should it have taken another quarter of a century for the
idea of competition and assessment to spread from the universities into pub-
lic life generally?” (15) The idea awaited, Roach concluded, a shift in the
“cultural ethos,” a shift “towards free market and open competition of goods
and, then, by association, minds”:
The triumph of free competition in all these fields [business, government
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service, and education] took place between 1850 and 1870. In education and
administration it started more slowly than in commerce and manufacture,
but once the changes gathered impetus, they bit so deeply into the intellec-
tual and cultural structure that their hold has never been shaken. (17)7
Even in 1850, one man, John Keble, could complain that “a notion of exam-
inations and talents are everything,” alongside “another notion . . . that nat-
ural preferences for home and kindred are not to be allowed.” “I think,”
Keble continued, “it is indicative of a certain hard priggishness which is get-
ting to be characteristic of this generation” (qtd. in Roach 21–22). Keble
appealed in a sense to biology to argue that “preferences for home and kin-
dred” are “natural”; one naturally prefers blood relations to the strangers
thrown up by the modern system of “examinations and talents.”
That Dickens placed himself on the reforming side against the likes of
Keble should come as no surprise. In the novel at hand, for example, Dickens
reverses Keble’s accusation that an emphasis on “examinations and talents”
indicates “priggishness” by placing the preference for “blood” over brains into
the mouths of what is certainly a “priggish” party of petty officials and their
wives (ironically, the very class standing to gain the most from the new sys-
tem). Soliciting a general murmur of approval, the most affected woman at a
dinner party exclaims:
“There are some low minds (not many, I am happy to believe, but there
are some) that would prefer to do what I should call bow down before
idols. Positively idols! Before services, intellect, and so on. But these are
intangible points. Blood is not so. We see Blood in a nose, and we know
it. We meet with it in a chin, and we say, ‘There it is! That’s blood!’ It is
an actual matter of fact. We point it out. It admits no doubt.” (354)
Dickens’s humor resides here in the woman’s shortsighted confusion of sur-
face and depth. She impugns “services” and “intellect” for being idols, images
without substance, even while she understands “blood” in one-dimensional
terms. “Blood” is worthy here for little other reason than that it is visible,
confirmed (“matter of fact’) in the image of the body, while the worth of serv-
ices and intellect are repudiated precisely because they have no apparent sur-
face. “Intangible,” they admit doubt, eluding one’s grasp. It is precisely this
desire for immediate confirmation/gratification that the novel will disallow,
preferring means instead of ends; and it is exactly this problem of the public’s
inability to conceptualize the professional—the figure who combines servic-
es and intellect—that the novel intends to solve.
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“The triumph of the examination system is a major historical landmark,”
wrote W. J. Reader (116), firmly anchored in the mid-nineteenth century. As
the setting of David Copperfield is the novelist’s present of 1850, the adult
narrator describes a childhood presumably of the 1820s or early 1830s, a
period before the institution of regular and nationwide school examinations.
Indeed, little academic competition of any kind existed at that time. This did
not stop Dickens, however, from placing the ethos of “competitive examina-
tion” and of “intellect” characterizing his own present at the center of David’s
education.8 When David arrives at his first school, the disreputable Salem
House, Dickens promptly substitutes “intellect” for “blood” by replacing the
signs worn on the body (“we see blood in a nose,” the dinner-party lady says)
for the gradual revelation of intellectual superiority. Having bitten Mr.
Murdstone before he left for school, David is forced by the head of Salem
House (Mr. Creakle, a man “who knew nothing himself, but the art of slash-
ing” [82]) to wear a sign on his back that reads, “Take care of him. He bites”
(74). If depicted as someone who draws blood rather than embodies it,
David’s situation nonetheless dramatizes the visual economy of physical
power endorsed by the type of school in which patronage trumps merit. The
boy marked out for distinction and awarded privileges, is not, as he will be
later at Dr. Strong’s school, the smartest boy but the boy with old wealth
(Steerforth). Yet despite this, David gradually distinguishes himself as “an
exception to [the ignorance of ] the general body” (90) of students, replacing
the visual economy with a latent economy of mental power—if not in the
school itself, at least in the minds of the novel’s readers.
Dr. Strong’s school, on the other hand, is a “school as different from Mr.
Creakle’s as good is from evil” (225) and thus conducts itself upon “a sound
system” (225) of open examination rather than covert patronage. In contrast
to David’s first day at Salem House on which he is made to wear a kind of
false advertisement, his first day at Dr. Strong’s consists of an examination
designed to honestly access and assess his interior. Although David’s knowl-
edge “had so slipped away . . . that now, when [he] is examined,” he is “put
in the lowest form of the school” (217), he soon begins a meteoric rise
through the ranks:
I am not the last boy in the school [anymore]. I have risen, in a few
months, over several heads. But the first boy seems to me a mighty crea-
ture, dwelling afar off, whose giddy height is unattainable . . . I chiefly
wonder what he’ll be when he leaves Dr. Strong’s. (252)
The position of “first boy” provides what one Victorian called the “spur of
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emulation” (qtd. in Roach 4) crucial to the open competition that would pro-
duce a generation of capable professionals for England. Here, the awe the
“first boy” inspires leads inevitably to daydreams about “what he’ll be,” what
profession he will choose. David rapidly follows in this preprofessional’s foot-
steps. After he has “grow[n] great at Latin verses” (253), has been “refer[red]
to . . . in public as a promising scholar” (253), and has “brought new hon-
ours home from school” (350), David declares, “I am the head boy, now!”
(254).
Intelligence as Capital
Perhaps the greatest proponent of the new system of “examinations and tal-
ents” was T. B. Macaulay. Macaulay began arguing for civil service examina-
tions as early as 1833, though it is only in the 1840s that he began selling
parliament on the concept. In making his case, Macaulay repeatedly distin-
guished between “ability” and “mere learning,” emphasizing that the object
of the test should be to assess the candidate’s quality of mind rather than to
measure the quantity of his “cramming.” According to historian Keith Hope,
Macaulay was the first to argue that it is possible to identify a person’s “gen-
eral intelligence,” his or her innate mental capacity (qtd. in Hope 9). The
examination, Macaulay declared, can abstract from the person his mental cal-
iber regardless of the task and can, thereby, predict the person’s future success
(or failure) in a profession. As Adrian Wooldridge explains, “Macaulay felt
that examinations could accurately predict ‘what men will prove to be in life,’
since the qualities required for professional success were precisely those test-
ed in the examination room” (167). Like the discourse of speculation finding
numerous converts at the same moment—“what distinguished the specula-
tive frenzy of the middle and late forties from all that had gone before, apart
from its sheer intensity,” writes Richard Altick, “was the number of people
involved” (“Speculation and Bankruptcy” 647)—the examination’s disclosure
of mental capital makes a promise on the future, attempting to disclose his-
tory in advance of itself.
I will return to time’s relationship to mental and finance capital below, but
here what I want to note about Macaulay’s distinction—one enthusiastically
echoed by others like Sir Charles Trevelyan, Sir Stafford Northcote, and
William E. Gladstone—is the line it draws between the laborious acquisition
of knowledge (most often symbolized by “cramming” but also called simply
“learning”) and a quantifiable intelligence.9 Intelligence is a latent but meas-
urable property, not an activity. Not called upon to demonstrate itself
through any sustained effort, it can be abstracted from mental performance
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on a range of subjects. Through examinations, “the superiority of the best
would become evident,” Trevelyan and Northcote wrote in an 1854 report to
parliament (Parliamentary Papers 14). In their formulation, intelligence, a
passive object that “become[s] evident” through outside evaluation, seems to
cancel labor. It is not enacted or even experienced by the person so much as
harbored within him—possessed. According to Hope, the “decisive moves”
enabling this view of the mind unfolded in the history of statistics:
[These moves were] first, [a move] from treating deviations about a mean
as errors, to an appreciation that those deviations are the reality that
requires explanation, and, second, from mathematical transformations
which are no more than restatements of the data . . . to statistical models
that treat observed variables as “indicators” of underlying, unobserved,
“latent” variables or factors. (12)
The differing mental capabilities of individuals, Hope suggests, came to rep-
resent themselves as “underlying, ‘latent’ variables or factors.” Intelligence
thus emerged as the latent factor distinguishing a mental from a manual class.
Indeed, specific labor or skills come to seem opposed to intelligence: “the
superiority in technical skill,” Macaulay wrote, “is often more than compen-
sated for by the inferiority in general intelligence” (qtd. in Hope 9). Opposed to
labor (“cramming,” “technical skill”), intelligence was more akin to capital,
with capital’s peculiar combination of passivity and productivity. “Capital,”
Marx wrote, “appears as a mysteriously self-creating source of interest—the
source of its own increase” (Capital 1: 384). Both capital and intelligence might
be understood as nouns paradoxically possessing the properties of verbs; that is,
while capital and intelligence simply “are”—they are effortless in and of
themselves—they nonetheless, if properly invested and cultivated, “mysterious-
ly” generate profit and knowledge respectively. While the worker’s body is a
kind of conduit or vehicle through which profit might accrue, the professional’s
mind generates out of itself its own profitable knowledge. This is precisely the
difference between “cramming” and “ability,” the distinction that was so cru-
cial for Macaulay. When one crams, one takes information in and moves it out;
when one has ability, one constructs knowledge independently.
David Copperfield associates cramming with the scheming Murdstones.
Upon taking over the Copperfield household, this pair institutes a regime of
lessons in which David must recite the knowledge he was to have acquired
the previous day. Such a system of knowledge consumption—a kind of
planned obsolescence in which knowledge has a twenty-four-hour shelf-
life—fails miserably:
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I begin to feel the words that I have been at infinite pains to get into my
head, all sliding away. . . . I hand the first book to my mother. Perhaps it
is a grammar, perhaps a history or geography. I take a last drowning look
at the page as I give it into her hand, and start off aloud at a racing pace
while I have got it fresh. I trip over a word. (51)
The knowledge itself is incidental (“perhaps it is a grammar, perhaps a histo-
ry or geography”); what is crucial is David’s (in)capacity to use his mind less
as a productive force than as a way station, something to hold a commodity
only until it is time to ship it out. Knowledge is figured as outside—first, as
something to “get into” one’s head; and, second, as an object placed not only
outside but in opposition to oneself—hurdles one is more likely to trip over
than surmount.
David’s old friend Mr. Micawber offers an alternative approach to the
development of the young mind. When he learns that David no longer
works in a factory but instead has become a “pupil,” Mr. Micawber declares:
“‘A mind like my friend Copperfield’s, does not require that cultivation
which, without his knowledge of men and things, it would require, still it is
a soil teeming with latent vegetables—in short . . . it is an intellect capable
of getting up the classics’” (245). While we would hardly want to trust Mr.
Micawber’s assessment of his own mind, at this moment, his view of David’s
possesses the ring of truth. (Indeed, Mr. Micawber’s problem is not so much
that he is ever wrong but that he is profoundly unable to apply his knowl-
edge to himself: “‘My advice is so far worth taking,’” Mr. Micawber tells
David at one point, “‘that—in short, I have never taken it myself, and am
the . . . miserable wretch you behold’” [166].) In Mr. Micawber’s formula-
tion, a mind is “cultivated”; it nurtures and develops the seeds of knowledge
which are already there, “teeming” and “latent.” A person’s history is simply
the inevitable coming to fruition of what the mind originally contained.
Already having experienced so much of “men and things,” David’s mind, of
course, needs less cultivation than others. Still, Mr. Micawber says, if David
is already wise in the ways of the world, his is a mind capable of being wise
on an array of subjects. The quality of mind, its ability to take on a number
of studies, is more important than any specific quantity of information.
Here we have Macaulay’s general intelligence figured as a rich soil. The dif-
ference between the Murdstonian and the Micawberian (or Macaulayan)
approaches is the difference between intelligence understood as knowledge
taken in and spit out and intelligence understood as a far-ranging, inherent
capacity that transcends and also, insofar as the mind holds history in
advance, collapses time.
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This difference, the novel argues, may also be recognized through the dif-
ference between commodities, things bought and sold, and capital, some-
thing capable of magically extending itself to reap repeated profits. It is no
accident, for example, that while in Mr. Micawber’s scenario David’s mind
yields a crop of classics, with the Murdstones it begins to drown (“a last
drowning look at the page” [51]) only to surface with unwanted commodi-
ties: “I can’t think about the lesson. I think of the number of yards of net in
Miss Murdstone’s cap, or of the price of Mr. Murdstone’s dressing gown, or
any such ridiculous problem that I have no business with, and don’t want to
have anything at all to do with” (51). Such a commodifying approach to
knowledge, Dickens suggests here, is never profitable. It is, in fact, more
likely to generate debt, as “[mother] shuts the book, and lays it by as an
arrear to be worked out when my other tasks are done” (51). By contrast, it
is significant that when, as mentioned above, David distinguishes himself at
Salem House, becoming the “exception to the general body,” his distinction
emerges seamlessly from his power of invention. Claiming that he was “like
the Sultana Sheherazade” (88), a woman who pulls out of herself a lifetime
of stories, David entertains his peers with countless tales. A mind that can
generate something out of nothing or at least very little (in this case, the bits
and pieces David remembers from the books he read when he was little) is
the prerequisite for general intelligence:
Whatever I had within me that was romantic and dreamy, was encour-
aged by so much story-telling in the dark; and in that respect the pursuit
may not have been very profitable to me. But the being cherished as a
kind of plaything in my room, and the consciousness that this accom-
plishment of mine was bruited about among the boys, and attracted a
good deal of notice to me though I was the youngest there, stimulated me
to exertion. In a school carried on by sheer cruelty, whether it is presided
over by a dunce or not, there is not likely to be much learnt. I believe our
boys were, generally, as ignorant a set as any schoolboys in existence. . . .
But my little vanity . . . urged me on somehow . . . and made me, for the
time I was there, an exception to the general body. (90)
While his storytelling “may not have been very profitable” in that it encour-
aged a certain dreaminess, in respect to academic competition it appears to
have been very profitable indeed. Though the youngest pupil, David stands
out as the “exception” to the general ignorance among his classmates. David
links the approbation he receives from his midnight tales to his academic
“exertion” and consequent superiority, hardly a necessary link but one made
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here as if it follows naturally. What his peers mistake for a commodity, “a
kind of plaything,” we are meant to identify as mental capital, capable of
apparently endless returns.
That David’s power of invention, the richness of his soil, qualifies him for
a higher professional sphere than might be attainable otherwise becomes clear
through the opposition the novel creates between invention and copying.
Throughout the novel, those characters devoid of David’s intellectual
resources but too thoroughly middle class to perform physical work engage
in what is figured by the novel as a manual form of mental labor: copying.
When “simple” (621) Mr. Dick, for example, attempts to write a work of his
own, he can go only so far before ruining it with monomaniacal references to
the beheading of King Charles I. But when asked to copy documents that
“are already drawn up and finished,” documents “Mr. Dick has nothing to do
with,” he succeeds beautifully, copying in an “orderly, business-like manner”
(501). He makes an excellent copyist precisely because his mind is not called
upon to create anything. As with cramming, he simply moves words from
one spot to another.10 This depiction of copying is repeated later in the novel
with Dora. After David attempts to “form her mind” (660) but gives up
when he realizes that her mind is “already formed” (661) and that no amount
of knowledge will alter it, Dora chances upon her own way of being useful:
she holds his pencils while he writes, giving him a new one as needed. She is
literally a way station, a warehouse for pencils awaiting shipment. However,
her trafficking in the physical world of objects associates her too closely with
manual labor for David perhaps, because pencil-holding “suggest[s] to [him]
a new way of pleasing [his] child-wife” (616): having her copy pages from his
manuscripts. Yet if Dora upgrades from objects to words, her dearth of men-
tal capital—something one already has or doesn’t have, as David learns when
he cannot mold her—will keep her from ever being truly productive. Indeed,
her ability to reproduce in any meaningful or useful way is itself doubtful as
David tells us that he only “made a pretence” of needing pages copied (616).
More striking than with either Mr. Dick or Dora, though, is the associa-
tion of copying with Traddles, a character always to be found “hard at work
with his inkstand and papers” (500). Though similar to David in many
respects—his energy and discipline, his education, his professional
ambition—Traddles lacks David’s mental capital. After David has become a
successful parliamentary reporter, he tells us that “dear old Traddles has tried
the same pursuit but it is not in Traddles’s way” (596). Instead, Traddles finds
employment with the same newspaper as David in “getting up the facts of dry
subjects, to be written about and embellished by more fertile minds” (596).
As the novel sees it, research is a kind of rarefied copying, moving facts from
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textbooks onto the desks of men who can do something more with them.
Without the rich soil harbored by David, with a mind less “fertile” than his
writing counterparts, the researching Traddles is doomed to reproduce
knowledge but never produce it himself.11 “‘I am not a bad compiler,’”
Traddles tells David, “‘but I have no invention at all; not a particle’” (383).
Ends over Means: Credit and Speculation
Macaulay’s insistence that the exam is (or should be) a test of a mind’s capi-
tal rather than of its capacity to warehouse knowledge did not, of course, pre-
vent many critics of reform from viewing the examination precisely as the
commodification of intelligence. Defending the “Public School man” over an
imagined (most likely middle-class) beneficiary of the new system, one
Victorian wrote:
The Public School man is felt to have an undoubted superiority,—not
necessarily in learning or attainment,—but in qualities which are beyond
price, facility in using his powers, facility in his behavior to others, facil-
ity in ascertaining and keeping his own position, the element of com-
mand over other minds. These are qualities which no private system will
give, and no system of competitive examination will test. (my emphasis,
qtd. in Dyson and Lovelock 17).
In claiming that the “Public School man” possesses “qualities which are
beyond price,” Moberly implied what later became an explicit critique of the
examination system: that the rewarding of prizes, awards, or positions for top
examinations created a monetary relationship to knowledge and intelligence;
the student no longer appreciated knowledge and intelligence for their own
sake. To see this critique as incipient in Moberly’s comments, however, is per-
haps too generous. More plausibly, Moberly simply played off conventional
assumptions about class, locating the aristocrat outside the market and the
middle class, with whom the system was associated, squarely within it.12
It makes sense, then, that the most sympathetic character who is involved,
like David, in what might be called the field of knowledge production, Dr.
Strong with his dictionary, is constitutionally unable to finish his project and,
thus, never in a position to be paid for it. Dr. Strong’s absorption in his work,
along with his complete disregard for money (he is forever giving it away, to
the great satisfaction of his wife’s relatives), contrasts most dramatically with
Mr. Micawber, a man whose wife believes him a “genius” (397) but who is so
preoccupied with “pecuniary affairs” (398) that he never seems to find the
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time to work. Indeed, while Dr. Strong avoids the market, Mr. Micawber
markets himself, placing an advertisement in “all the papers” in hopes of find-
ing a professional position, selling himself as a man of “great talent,” pos-
sessing a “variety of qualifications,” and ending his advertisement with the
imperious injunction, “‘Now employ me on remunerative terms’” (397).
Without first proving himself in any way, Mr. Micawber expects to be hired.
Like the Copperfields’ servant who prefers stealing time to putting it in, Mr.
Micawber expects to receive a high salary without paying his dues.13 He
expects, in short, to be taken on credit. In fact, he takes the very advertise-
ment out on credit. Discussing her husband’s inability to pay for the adver-
tisement, Mrs. Micawber suggests that he “raise a certain sum of money—on
a bill.” “‘If no member of my family is possessed of sufficient natural feeling
to negotiate that bill . . . [Mr. Micawber] should take that bill into the Money
Market, and dispose of it for what he can get,’” she continues; “‘I view it,
steadily, as an investment . . . which is sure of return’” (398). The one thing
the Micawbers can do “steadily” is speculate on future profit.
“Credit creation and disbursement can never be separated from speculation,”
David Harvey writes; “Credit is, according to Marx, always to be accounted for
as ‘fictitious capital,’ as some kind of money bet on production that does not yet
exist” (Condition of Postmodernity 107). Harvey coins the phrase “fictitious cap-
ital” by drawing on Marx’s discussion of land value in The Eighteenth Brumaire
of Louis Bonaparte and elsewhere. For Marx, since labor could not be the source
of land’s value, its value emerged in capitalism as a kind of structurally necessary
fiction. “Fictitious capital,” then, is self-generating profit not “backed up” by any
immediate productive activity or “commodity transaction” (Limits to Capital
265). This is, in short, as Harvey himself points out, one and the same with what
Fredric Jameson and others have called “finance” or “speculative” capitalism, a
capitalism predicated on predictions about the future and powered by invest-
ment and the stock market rather than by industrial production. A speculative
economy might be understood as one characterized by a kind of collapsed tem-
porality in which ends are considered before, or without regard to, means. The
measurable economy of industrial capital, structured by the hourly wage, is
replaced by what appears to be “profit without production” (Cultural Turn 136).
Whatever else may be said about speculative capitalism, the important point for
my purposes is that in what Jameson calls “the asymmetries of a finance market”
(Cultural Turn 138) time loses the one-to-one correspondence with money that
characterizes it in wage labor. Instead, time is “future oriented.”14 It is put on
hold until some unspecified future moment, “until,” as Mr. Micawber repeat-
edly says, “something turns up (which I am, I may say, hourly expecting)” (166).
In David Copperfield, the loss of this correspondence registers as a 
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pathology of time. Sending letters to people not after days have passed since
he last saw them but seconds, sending out invitations to parties that, when
they arrive, “refer to the evening then wearing away” (503), Mr. Micawber
cannot match his movements to the appropriate moment. He is forever wait-
ing on time for some installment of money that doesn’t come, running from
time catching up to him in the form of overdue bills, or manipulating time
in order to make money by incurring more debt. Mr. Micawber is stuck in a
speculative limbo, imagining “if ” but never “when.” Upon leaving debtor’s
prison, he announces, “‘I have no doubt I shall, please Heaven, begin to be
beforehand with the world, and to live in a perfectly new manner if—in
short, anything turns up’” (160). He plans to live “beforehand,” facing time
rather than running ahead of or behind it, but our confidence in his claim is
undone by his “please Heaven,” suggesting as it does that his success relies
more on chance than on his own efforts, and of course by his ending caveat
with which he reverts to his old pattern of anticipation. Speculation, Dickens
tells us, is a disease of time.15 Or, as critic Humphry House put it, specula-
tion in Dickens’s novels “is a form of suicide rather than a way of getting on
in the world” (59). Thus, a premature (anticipatory) relationship to time has
the unintended effect of cutting time off prematurely. Finding himself once
again unable to fulfill his “pecuniary obligations,” Mr. Micawber reassures
David when our protagonist laments that he has no money to lend,
“‘Copperfield, you are a true friend; but when the worst comes to the worst,
no man is without a friend who is possessed of shaving materials’” (248).
In his newspaper advertisement, Mr. Micawber combines the anticipatory
temporality of finance capital with an objectification of intelligence in a way
that reverberates with the “examination mad”16 moment in which Dickens
writes. That is, just as the advertisement speaks for future labor, the quantifi-
cation of general intelligence espoused by Macaulay claims to predict accu-
rately a candidate’s future success in the civil service. The exam promises to
make available ends without recourse to means, disclosing, as Macaulay said,
“what men will prove to be in life” (qtd. in Wooldridge 167). To Macaulay,
before one actually trained a civil service employee (indeed, Macaulay went
so far as to argue that there was no point in having the exam cover informa-
tion relevant to civil service work), before one witnessed them at work, one
could foresee their capabilities. Like the “money bet on production that does
not yet exist” defining speculative capital, mental capital presents as a paper
bet on labor that does not yet exist. Mental capital—or the concept of gen-
eral intelligence—implies the exact same collapsed temporality, what Georges
Gurvitch calls “time in advance of itself ” (qtd. in Harvey 223), in which his-
tory does not promise change but the inexorable working out of what was
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already there in the first place.17 In this formulation, what is possessed by the
mind finds more or less expression (like vegetables with more or less cultiva-
tion) but the person cannot acquire more mental capital than that with which
he begins (as David finds out with Dora). In some palpable way, the time of
labor drops out of the equation, and one has the appearance of profit with-
out production—an appearance which, as Mr. Micawber proves time and
again, is more mirage than reality.
Making promises on which he cannot make good, the otherwise well-
intentioned Mr. Micawber, we begin to realize, is much like the pigeon-pie
David serves him one evening. “The pigeon-pie was not bad,” David says,
“but it was a delusive pie: the crust being like a disappointing head, phreno-
logically speaking: full of lumps and bumps, with nothing in particular
underneath” (391). A faulty phrenological reading—or a false advertisement
or, for that matter, a misleading test score—functions in the novel as the
mental variant of paper credit; it is fictitious capital artificially inflating a
speculative bubble, one bound to collapse just like David’s poor pigeon-pie.
Up to the moment he sets sail for Australia at the end of the novel, Mr.
Micawber is speculating on the future—in this case, on the voyage itself;
“‘The probability is, all will be found to be exciting, alow and aloft,’” he says;
and “with that,” David narrates, “he flourished off the contents of his little
tin pot, as if he had made the voyage, and had passed a first-class examina-
tion before the highest naval authorities” (770). Fittingly, Mr. Micawber
behaves as if he were a successful candidate in a civil service examination, and
in doing so, he seems to cancel time, believing himself finished with a jour-
ney that has only just begun.
At this point we can begin to see why Mr. Micawber’s assessment of
David’s mind—a mind “teeming” with “latent” “vegetables”—is both right
and wrong by the novel’s estimate. When Macaulay and others claimed that
the examination uncovered the “latent factors” of general intelligence, they
mobilized two meanings of “latent.” They meant that the exam plumbed the
candidate’s mental depths in order to ascertain his “true” intelligence rather
than staying upon the surface layer of knowledge acquired by cramming; and
they meant that the exam could reveal the seeds of the candidate’s future, the
latent qualities which would invariably manifest over time. David Copperfield
confirms the idea that “intelligence” somehow precedes and exceeds knowl-
edge, but it hesitates to endorse what we might consider the cancellation of
the time of labor implied by both meanings of “latent.” In the former, the
time-consuming labor of knowledge acquisition is canceled in favor of a mys-
tified concept of essential intelligence; and in the latter, the actual perform-
ance of work as the test of one’s capabilities is by-passed in favor of a literal
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test, which bets on the quality of labor before it exists. The examination can-
didate proceeds, we might say then, on credit. Like the many species of
finance capital (credit, promissory notes, debt, stocks, and “fictitious” capital
of all kinds), the examination places a claim on the future. It jumps ahead
and imagines an outcome (a successful or unsuccessful career) that has not yet
occurred. While Mr. Micawber is right to focus on David’s quality of mind
(the richness of his soil) rather than, as the Murdstones did, the quantity he
can cram, he is wrong to fixate on ends over means. In partially endorsing
Mr. Micawber, David Copperfield attempts to mobilize the cachet of mental
capital while simultaneously holding at bay its unsettling link to the antici-
patory temporality of speculation.
In sum, the novel must produce a professional who possesses mental cap-
ital but who does not speculate or “bank” on that capital, as does Mr.
Micawber with his advertisement. David must become a professional writer
who draws on his shares of mental capital—not on capital’s suspicious future-
oriented time but on the reliable clock time of industrial labor. Factory time
demands that one master oneself—one’s whims, impulses, idiosyncrasies—
and so, by an odd paradox, the professional drains the mind from the facto-
ry, rendering such labor mechanical work that betrays no sign of the partic-
ular self performing it, but then implicitly models himself on this same labor
in order to signal his disinterested distance from the self with its needs and
desires.18 However counterintuitive on the face of it, then, David Copperfield
ennobles David’s professional labor by aligning it with labor’s most degraded
form. “You came out nobly—persevering, self-reliant, self-denying,” Aunt
Betsy says to David at the novel’s end (612).
Means over Ends: Brain Work
Many critics have assumed that the professional (or, more accurately, profes-
sionalizing) writer at the mid-nineteenth century would want to distance
himself from any association with wage labor. Mary Poovey, for example,
argues that the Victorian writer tried to align himself with the “nonalienat-
ed” labor of domesticity (101). Another critic, T. W. Heyck, claims that the
writing professional sought to identify himself with the figure of the leisured
gentleman. Michael Lund, however, argues persuasively that there is one very
good reason why the mid-nineteenth-century writer would want to be asso-
ciated with wage labor: a widespread public perception of writers as “idle,”
the epithet associated with a leisured aristocracy, on the one hand, and an
older preindustrial workforce, on the other.19 An editorial in the Morning
Chronicle, to take one example among many, declared on January 3, 1850,
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“The love of notoriety inherent in mankind, combined with the common
distaste for continuous or unexciting labor, will always attract an undue num-
ber of recruits from other employments to literature” (qtd. in Lund 17).20 To
counteract such an attitude, writers needed to represent their work not as
sporadic bursts of productivity followed by periods of leisure and dissipation
but as relatively monotonous and highly laborious. Writers wanted to show
that they could work “laboriously and methodically,” as David does on his
shorthand (519). In other words, they were trying to dissociate themselves
from the image of the Romantic genius with his erratic spates of inspiration.
The Romantic writer made sense in an earlier economy, in what E. P.
Thompson called in his classic essay “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial
Capitalism” a piecework economy characterized by “alternate bouts of intense
labour and of idleness” (373). In a piecework economy, manufacturers essen-
tially outsourced their labor—that is, they relied upon individuals to make cer-
tain products within their homes rather than within a centralized workplace.
Such individuals, then, dictated their own methods and schedules—doing
things when and if they were inclined and interrupting their labor frequently.
With the rise of the modern factory, however, workers shifted from piecework
to wage labor, money paid not for a finished product but for time “spent”:
those who are employed experience a distinction between their employ-
er’s time and their ‘own’ time. And the employer must use the time of his
labour, and see that it is not wasted: not the task but the value of time
when reduced to money is dominant. Time is now currency: it is not
passed but spent. (359)
Time becomes something “objective,” something measurable and outside. It
is not experienced subjectively, with work driven by one’s personal and irreg-
ular inclinations, but is instead, in Georg Lukács’s words, “an objectively cal-
culable work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed and established reali-
ty” (88).
The new temporality ushered in by “changes in manufacturing technique
which demand . . . a greater exactitude in time-routines” (Thompson 382)
matched the needs of writers desiring to depict themselves as successful only
through, to use David’s phrase, “steady application” (632). By stressing the
time-disciplined labor of writing, writers could offset the public’s association
of writing with idleness. The goal, then, was to create an impression of them-
selves as prone not to the idleness enjoyed by the Romantic genius with his
hint of aristocratic leisure or by an undisciplined preindustrial workforce but
to the fatigue suffered by workers after prolonged and repetitive labor.
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During David’s stint as a parliamentary reporter, we see him leave for work
at the same time every evening regardless of his health (he is, for example,
“made quite unwell” by being “obliged” to leave for work “when dinner was
half over” [605]) and regardless of his boredom with the parliamentary dis-
cussions he must report upon (“dreary debates,” he sighs [656]). He perfect-
ly exemplifies the “literary man” described by Thackeray in The History of
Pendennis: “A literary man has often to work for his bread against time, or
against his will, or in spite of his health, or of his indolence, of his repugnance
on the subject to the subject on which he is called to exert himself, just like
any other daily toiler. When you want to make money by Pegasus, (as he
must, perhaps, who has no other saleable property), farewell poetry and aer-
ial flights” (380). The writer is equivalent to the manual laborer here: each
possesses “no other saleable property” than respectively a mind and a body. If
by comparing the writer’s mind or imagination with the manual laborer’s
body, Thackeray commodified what might still have carried Romantic and
“transcendent” associations—“poetry and aerial flights”—the important
thing to note is that it was a comparison that cut both ways. Though it dan-
gerously implicated the professional in market exchange, it also rescued him
by association with earnest, “honest” labor—labor in which the writer could
overcome his own subjective resistance (“against his will,” his “indolence,” his
“repugnance”) and submit to the discipline of “objective” time (not one’s own
time but another’s—“against time,” as Thackeray says). Rhetorically, then,
the new mental class must simultaneously oppose (brains versus hands) and
identify (“my fellow-labourer,” Dickens often hailed literary colleagues) with
the manual class. Presenting himself as a kind of mental laborer rather than
a spontaneous genius, the professional needed to be disciplined, following the
protocols of work in an industrial world where hours of leisure were sharply
divided from those of labor and one’s reliability was proven when one inter-
nalized this fact.
Bemoaning the tedium of his new job in one of the “learned professions,”
Mr. Micawber says, “‘To a man possessed of the higher imaginative powers,
the objection to legal studies is the amount of detail they involve. Even in our
professional correspondence . . . the mind is not at liberty to soar to any exalt-
ed form of expression’” (536). Romantic inspiration is rewritten as the self-
aggrandizing rationalization made by those who detest labor, those who
expect rewards without having to work for them—those who presume abili-
ty (“imaginative powers”) speaks for itself. In Mr. Micawber’s complaint, we
see the conflation of the Romantic writer and the speculator, both of whom,
after all, expect to be rewarded for “soar[ing].” Eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century writing, Kevin McLaughlin points out, everywhere produces a “figu-
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rative association of credit with flight” (176); “the commerce and industry of
this country,” Adam Smith wrote, for example, “cannot be altogether so
secure . . . suspended on the Daedalian wings of paper money” (qtd. in
McLaughlin 176). Rejecting both paper money’s “Daedalian wings” and the
Romantic’s “aerial flights,” Dickens argues in David Copperfield that genius
cannot be taken on credit. It is not possible, David tells us, for “natural or
improved ability [to] claim immunity from the companionship of the steady,
plain, hard-working qualities, and hope to gain its end” (576). The “fertile”
mind revealed by the examination must be coupled with the time-discipline
the mechanized factory exemplified.
In The Human Motor, Anson Rabinbach explains that around the mid-
nineteenth century a fascination with “fatigue” began to offset a preoccupa-
tion with workers’ “idleness.” This shift occurred, he argues, because
Victorian scientists and political economists began to understand the body as
a kind of machine; and in doing so, they moved the laborer from a moral-
religious framework into a biomechanical one in which he represented an
imperfect machine, one hampered by fatigue. “I never could have done what
I have done,” David tells us, “without the habits of punctuality, order, and
diligence” (576), habits that he learned early in life—presumably in part dur-
ing his time as a factory worker, as these “habits” reproduce the rhythms of
the industrial workplace. Habits are rituals that do not require one’s con-
scious attention; they are, in short, mechanical. “[Victorian] writers on
habit,” Athena Vrettos tells us, “routinely invoked the language of mecha-
nization and mass production to make their arguments, expressing concern
about the blurring boundaries of man, mind, and machine” (404). While this
“concern” certainly escalated as the century neared its end, as modernism
began to dismiss mass-produced cultural objects as mindless, at mid-century
the machine represented in fact a kind of ideal for the laborer, as Rabinbach
elucidates, but also for the professional mind, as Lorraine Daston and Peter
Galison inform us.
To be properly professional, Daston and Galison argued that the mid-
Victorian had to acquire what they call “mechanical objectivity.” Asserting
that this “form of scientific objectivity emerged only in the mid-nineteenth
century and is distinct from earlier [forms],” Daston and Galison explain that
“machines were [considered] paragons of certain human virtues”: “Chief
among these virtues were those associated with work: patient, indefatigable,
ever-alert machines would relieve human workers whose attention wandered.
. . . Instead of freedom of will, machines offered freedom from will—from
the willful interventions that had come to seem the most dangerous aspects
of subjectivity” (81–82). To be mechanically objective, one must, with
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Thackery, say “farewell to poetry and aerial flights,” because these things no
longer denote Romantic genius but instead signal an undisciplined mind
“whose attention wander[s],” a mind prone to “willful intervention.” They
must be replaced, as we saw at the start of this chapter, with the biomechan-
ical “punctual discharge” of writerly duties.21 Consequently, the professional,
however amply and necessarily endowed with mental capital, experienced not
the soaring of the leisured mind but, much more prosaically, the bouts of
fatigue brought on by sustained brain work. By the end of the novel, then,
when David happens upon the very doctor who attended his birth, bringing
us full circle, we understand Mr. Chillup entirely when inquiring about
David’s work, one professional to another, he says: “‘And this action of the
brain now, sir? Don’t you find it fatigue you?’” (794)
Means over Ends II: Outmoded vs. Modern Models
With his easy natural ability and varied expertise (“I could not help observ-
ing how much Steerforth knew, on an infinite variety of subjects, and of how
little account he seemed to make his knowledge” [276]), the aristocratic
Steerforth might, according to David, “take a high degree” (276) in his col-
lege examinations, but, significantly, he has no intention of taking them.
Refusing to participate in the reformed system of open competition,
Steerforth belongs to the Romantic version of piecework time. Unlike David
who always consults clocks and watches, Steerforth has “nothing to consult
but his own humour” (301). And unlike David, who works the long hours of
a “carthorse” (519), Steerforth is content with only “fitful uses of [his] pow-
ers” (306). Without the self-denying qualities of the objective professional,
Steerforth gives rein to precisely “the most dangerous aspects of subjectivity,”
his willfulness leading, of course, to the downfall of the Peggotty family. If
Dickens rather graphically uses Steerforth to rewrite outbursts of inspiration
from the signs of genius into the disturbing symptoms of a man unable to
control his impulses, it uses Dora similarly, pressing her into service in order
to expose the naïveté of the mid-Victorian nostalgia for a piecework
economy.
Toward the end of his article, Thompson suggested that a piecework
economy is one and the same with a gendered domestic one: in both, work
stops and starts according to its own “irregular” rhythms rather than the
rhythm of the countinghouse clock. Dora, whose attention constantly wan-
ders (“Dora would pay profound attention, perhaps for five minutes, when
she would begin to be dreadfully tired, and would lighten the subject by
curling my hair” [614]) and who is nothing if not willful exemplifies an
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outmoded domestic model, one that will be replaced by the focused and
self-denying Agnes. In the home Dora attempts to keep for David, for
example, nothing is ever on time. The cook serves dinner after five when
they were to have eaten at four; “‘Do you think she has any idea of time?’”
David asks (604). Upon consulting a cookbook, David finds that joints
should be roasted “a quarter of an hour to every pound,” but, nonetheless,
“the principle always failed us . . . and we never could hit any medium
between redness and cinders” (609). As David’s professional life progresses
like clockwork—“for my success,” he informs us, “had steadily increased
with my steady application” (632)—the household’s very clock regresses:
“Dora glanced wistfully at the clock, and hinted that she thought it was too
fast. ‘On the contrary, my love,’ said I, referring to my watch, ‘it’s a few
minutes too slow’” (604). That this temporal chaos is not David’s fault is
clear. Dora is childishly indifferent to the hour (“glanc[ing] wistfully”) or
is, when made aware of it, behind it (she thinks it is earlier than it actually
is), but David is acutely attuned to precise measurements of time (“a quar-
ter of an hour to every pound,” “a few minutes too slow”). The most sig-
nificant symbol of the couple’s incompatibility is, it is fair to say, their vast-
ly different relationships to time, a difference underscored here by the fact
that David wears a watch while Dora resorts to the communal clock.
Indeed, the very manner in which they consult their respective timekeepers
enacts their alienating distance from one another: while David “refer[s],”
Dora “glanc[es].”
Dora wants time to slow down (she hopes the clock is “too fast”) while Mr.
Micawber wants it to speed up (waiting for “something to turn up” which he
is “hourly expecting”), but the result is the same. Neither the childish Dora—
“‘think of me as [your] child-wife’” (613), she begs David—nor the specu-
lating Mr. Micawber can go “before-hand with the world,” because neither
the child nor the speculator understands real time. “Real time,” Jameson tells
us, “is . . . objective time; that is to say, the time of objects, a time subject to
the measurements to which objects are subject.” “Clock time,” he continues,
“presupposes a peculiar spatial machine—it is the time of a machine, or bet-
ter still, the time of the machine itself ” (Postmodernism 76). If the child lives
in suspended time—a period before he must begin “on his own account”
(145), as Murdstone says before sentencing David to factory work—and the
speculator occupies future-oriented time, the laborer aligns himself with
clock time. And so, of course, does David, a fact we are assured of as early as
the novel’s first paragraph: “I record that I was born . . . on a Friday at twelve
o’clock at night. It was remarked that the clock began to strike, and I began
to cry, simultaneously” (1).
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But Dora, for all her “make-belief of housekeeping” (617), does not really
live outside of time as a child does. Instead, as the novel makes clear, she lives
in a preindustrial past. The manner in which she performs the one work she
succeeds in doing, copying pages of David’s manuscripts, tells us that she
moves in the irregular and subjective time of piecework rather than the sys-
tematic, objective time in which the novel places the professional: “The
preparations she made for this great work, the aprons she put on, the bibs
borrowed from the kitchen to keep off the ink, the time she took, the innu-
merable stoppages she made to have a laugh with Jip . . . are touching recol-
lections to me, simple as they may appear to other men,” David tells us
(616–17). Dora takes her time getting ready to work and certainly takes her
time doing the work itself, mixing labor and leisure freely. She follows, that
is, her own subjective time without worrying about the objective time of oth-
ers (though predictably David worries, self-consciously commenting on how
her behavior “may appear to other men”). It is important that this descrip-
tion of Dora at work is explicitly placed in the past (“touching recollections”),
because with her “want of system and management” (659), she is herself an
anachronism, exhibiting a mode endearing when looked back upon but
patently unsustainable in the present. Literally and figuratively behind time,
she is unequipped to survive in a modern domestic economy.
If, as I said above, an industrial world sharply divided hours of leisure from
those of labor, those hours nonetheless looked a lot alike. That is, while the
domestic and public spheres were distinctly removed from one another in
space and time, their ordering of space and time followed the same logic. As
Monica Feinberg Cohen argues in her discussion of another Dickens novel,
“home starts to look professional” with “customs and rituals [that] are no less
structured and require no less work than those at the office” (82–83). Treated
as a “pet” (574) by her family, Dora fatally mistakes the home for a yard with-
in which to frolic. By contrast, raised as her father’s housekeeper, Agnes
understands that for women the home is a place of work. While David qual-
ifies for his professional pursuits through education and examinations, Agnes
never attends school, because, as she says, “‘[My father’s] housekeeper must
be in his house, you know’” (218). But, as it turns out, keeping her father’s
home is precisely the kind of schooling Agnes needs to qualify as David’s
wife. But it is not just training that she requires; she also needs a certain
species of capital, an ability to produce something out of virtually nothing.
Whereas David’s hopes for a “baby-smile upon [Dora’s] breast” are “not to
be” (664), Agnes populates the end of the novel with a pack of children
named after David Copperfield ’s many characters. If Dora is only able to copy
the pages of David’s fiction, just as Traddles is only able to research while
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“more fertile minds” like David’s “embellish,” Agnes is capable of embellish-
ing fiction (in this case, Dickens’s) with some characters of her own.
Thriving in a professional world that combines capital and labor, Agnes
represents the endpoint of the novel.22 She is figured as the final piece of the
puzzle which, once attained, completes David’s professionalizing trajectory.
She also signals the final piece in my argument here, because it is by way of
getting to Agnes that David demonstrates most dramatically Dickens’s desire
to construct a professional who knows something yet still, paradoxically, must
undergo the labor of learning it—a mind that, in essence, must earn (rather
than bank on) the capital already “latent” and “teeming” within it.
The novel articulates Dora’s and Agnes’s fundamental difference from one
another not only through the two characters’ differing management of time
but also through the difference in David’s relationship to time during the
period before he marries each of them. When David loses his inheritance and
cannot expect to marry Dora until he has independently acquired enough
money, he attempts to speed up time. He tries to get through the means of
earning her as quickly as possible. After telling us that “Dora was the reward,
and Dora must be won,” David tells us that in focusing on this end, he works
himself into “a state of transport”:
I stimulated myself into such a heat, and got so out of breath, that I felt
as if I had been earning I don’t know how much. In this state, I went into
a cottage that I saw was to let. . . . It would do for me and Dora
admirably; with a little front garden for Jip to run around in, and bark at
the tradespeople through the railings, and a capital room upstairs for my
aunt. I came out again, hotter and faster than ever, and dashed up to
Highgate at such a rate that I was there an hour too early. (493)
Time and labor are out of sync. Trying to speed up time, the work is no
longer commensurate with the wage—though “so out of breath,” he has
nothing to show for it. This state is only exacerbated by his then dwelling
(metaphorically figured by his inspecting a potential dwelling) on a future
time when he and Dora will be together. Each detail in his speculative fanta-
sy (Jip barking at tradespeople, for example) ratcheting up David’s “state of
transport,” he emerges from the cottage more out of step with time “than
ever” and arrives at his destination “an hour early.” In trying to “transport”
himself to the future, David only finds himself in conflict with the time of
others, the objective time by which Highgate appointments are scheduled.
The period before he marries Agnes follows a quite different temporal
logic, one of self-renouncing means rather than self-aggrandizing ends.
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Indeed, David explicitly defers uniting with Agnes. Leaving England with
what he calls his “undisciplined heart” (776), David refuses to return for a
long period of time. “Some blind reasons,” he tells us, “that I had for not
returning home—reasons then struggling within me, vainly, for more distinct
expression—kept me on my pilgrimage” (777). Whereas David consciously
subordinates everything to the end reward of Dora in the earlier section of
the novel, here David cannot even articulate the reasons for his pilgrimage.
While the reader knows by this time that Agnes represents the “end” of his
journey, David himself is not allowed to know that which is nonetheless fig-
ured as already “within” him. Settling in a small Switzerland town, he resolves
to make no decisions “for three months.” He “work[s] early and late, patient-
ly and hard,” and when the three months expire, he “resolve[s] to remain
away some time longer” (779). During this period, he “beg[ins] to think that
I might have set [my heart’s] earliest and brightest hopes on Agnes” (780). He
refuses, however, to return home, because he knows that “if, at that time, I
had been much with her,” he would tell her this secret prematurely. Indeed,
exercising the same discipline with time in his narrative as he does in his life,
he waits even to tell us, his readers, this secret: “I have now recalled all that I
think it needful to recall here, of this term of absence—with one reservation.
. . . I have desired to keep the most secret current of my mind apart, to the
last” (779).
As he continues to ponder his life during this retreat, David decides that
he has, in fact, lost Agnes:
In the beginning of the change that gradually worked in me, when I tried
to get a better understanding of myself and be a better man, I did glance,
through some indefinite probation to a period when I might possibly hope
to cancel the mistaken past, and to be so blessed as to marry her. But, as
time wore on, this shadowy prospect faded, and departed from me. (780)
Because the past cannot be retrieved and “correct[ed]” (781), David must live
in the present, giving up the “end,” Agnes. “The older traditional forms of
human activity are,” Jameson writes of industrial capitalism, “essentially
restructured along the lines of a differentiation between means and ends”
(“Reification and Utopia” 130). The laborer concentrates only on the former,
his moment on the assembly line, forever deferring the latter, the finished
product. “I endeavored,” David tells us, “to convert what might have been
between myself and Agnes, into a means of making me more self-denying,
more resolved, more conscious of myself, and my defects and errors” (781).
But, again, the means-ends logic of modern labor cuts both ways. If the
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separation of means and ends is precisely what makes us trust that David is
“self-denying,” that he can deny his own self-interests and work in the inter-
ests of others, this same distance between the self and its work is also trou-
blesome. As Jameson describes:
Surely the emergence of the modern dichotomous view of action [as sep-
arable into means and ends] is related to the secularization of action in
the modern world in general. . . . Now in the new middle-class culture
for the first time people weigh the various activities against each other;
what we call private life or individualistic subjectivity, indeed, is precise-
ly the distance that permits them to do so and to hold their professional
enterprises at arm’s length. (“Vanishing Mediator” 9)
Such holding at arm’s length might indicate indifference rather than passion-
ate self-denial. And, so, the logic of self-renunciation must be reconciled with
the charismatic logic of the unique self. Therefore, the novel cannot end here.
Instead, by realizing that his “earliest” desire was for Agnes, David derives “a
better understanding of himself ”—a better understanding, significantly, not
of who he has become but of who he has been all along. And just as mental
capital is harbored within oneself and invariably expressed in time, the “ear-
liest and brightest hopes” lying latent in David’s heart are precisely what find
cultivation by the end of the novel.
Mirroring the collapsed temporality of the mind whose history is foretold
by the outside examination, the “mistaken past” is “cancel[led]” after all, and
the story of the novel is rewritten as something that was on some level known
in advance—as, indeed, it is on another, more literal, level as well, being an
“autobiography.”23 But just as one’s “general intelligence” cannot be capital-
ized on—indeed, it cannot be, because, in the act, it converts from mental
capital into a false commodity, as when Mr. Micawber markets his faculties—
but must be expressed over time in disciplined labor, the intelligence of
David’s heart, the wise love it has possessed all along in latent form, cannot
be experienced by him consciously until it manifests itself in a disciplined
heart, a heart that no longer races toward ends but resigns itself to means.
Paradoxically, then, David earns what he already possesses. He becomes the
modern professional, a figure who possesses natural capital but who nonethe-
less rejects capital’s greedily accelerated temporality in order to perform his
services in the trustworthy time of industrial labor. Dickens granted his pro-
fessional (David) disinterestedness not by denying his relationship to the
market, as some critics would have it, but by having him adopt an industrial
relationship to the market rather than a speculative one.
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Just before David marries the “light-headed” Dora, his aunt Betsey
exclaims, “‘Poor little couple! And so you think you were formed for one
another, and are to go through a party-supper table kind of life, like two pret-
ty pieces of confectionery, do you?’” (477). David’s near-fatal mistake is in
speculating that he knows how he is formed (“you think you were formed for
one another?”) when, in fact, he cannot know his own mind prematurely,
even though it might be known by something outside him—history, external
examination, Betsey herself (“‘Nobody knows what that man’s mind is except
myself,’” Betsey says of another character [196]). Later, before he marries
Agnes, David foregoes speculation. As a result, despite his claim that by mar-
rying Dora, he thereby “deservedly lost” Agnes (781), the novel permits him
to have both. David gets to have his cake—or “pretty piece of confec-
tionery”—and eat it too, and so does Dickens, who succeeded in combining
mental capital with the time-disciplined labor it otherwise threatened to can-
cel out. “Cultural capital,” Bourdieu wrote, “manages to combine the pres-
tige of innate property with the merits of acquisition” (“Forms of Capital”
245). One would be hard-pressed to find a better description of Dickens’s
strategy for inscribing modern professional identity.
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C H A P T E R T H R E E
The Professional Paradox:
Competitive Examinations and 
Anthony Trollope’s The Three Clerks
“Calling before us some of the illustrious of the former days, [let us] ask
them what they think of us and our doings? Of our astounding progress
of intellect? Our march of mind? Our higher tone of morality? Our vast
diffusion of education? Our art of choosing the most unfit man by com-
petitive examination?”
—Mr. Gryll, Gryll Grange (1861)
“If honest men did not squabble for money, in this wicked world of ours,
the dishonest men would get it all; and I do not see that the cause of
virtue would be much improved.”
—Archdeacon Grantly, Barchester Towers (1857)
In the previous two chapters, I discussed how Brontë and Dickens profes-
sionalized their protagonists without requiring them to deny the market of
economic exchange. In The Professor (1847), William Crimsworth demon-
strates his professional objectivity by eschewing the market of sexual
exchange, and in David Copperfield (1849–50), Copperfield proves his pro-
fessionalism by occupying the objective time of manual labor rather than the
accelerated time of speculation. Seven years later, when Anthony Trollope
went to professionalize his protagonist in The Three Clerks (1857), the para-
dox of the professional—that he must appear indifferent to the market upon
which he necessarily relied—had begun to take shape in the Victorian cul-
tural imagination. “Authors are taught that they should disregard payment
for their work, and be content to devote their unbought brains to the welfare
of the public,” reads an infamous passage of Trollope’s Autobiography; “Brains
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that are unbought will never serve the public much” (107). Trollope was, and
occasionally still is, reviled for comments like this, but his scandalous remarks
were not simple provocations. They made up a career-long struggle with the
double bind at the heart of professional identity, and The Three Clerks was
one of his most important attempts to disable that bind. The novel first
exposes the professional paradox and then attempts to reverse it by arguing
that only when the professional admits self-interest can his judgment be
trusted.
I begin this chapter by revisiting the competitive examination. In the last
chapter, I explained how mid-nineteenth-century exam culture represented
intelligence as a kind of mental capital. Dickens could hold at bay the dis-
turbing implications of this form of capital only by reintroducing the facto-
ry: by drawing on his mental capital in factory time, the professional holds
on to intelligence’s honest objectivity. Here, I consider the debate over com-
petitive examinations at greater length, because it provided Trollope with the
context for his intervention in the developing discourse of professionalism.
The first third of The Three Clerks is organized around a competitive exami-
nation, and in this portion of the novel, Trollope illuminates the contradic-
tion underwriting professional identity and simultaneously disqualifies two
of his three clerks from the tacit contest over which clerk gets to close the
novel as its lone professional. The plot of the remaining third clerk illustrates
Trollope’s “theory” that self-interest is the prerequisite to disinterest rather
than its seedy and denied underside. In conclusion, I show how Trollope’s
understanding of professional labor in The Three Clerks implicitly addresses
the conditions of the novel’s own production.
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CIVIL SERVICE:
THE DEBATE OVER THE NORTHCOTE-TREVELYAN PROPOSAL
“The professionalization of government,” Perkin writes, “was the greatest
political achievement of nineteenth-century Britain” (Origins of Modern
English Society 270). Perkin locates this achievement in the “great social and
administrative reforms”—more specifically, the Reform Acts, which extend-
ed the franchise and Civil Service reforms beginning in 1854 and culminat-
ed in 1870 in the implementation of open competitive examinations for all
Civil Service positions. While the former, social reform, has received exten-
sive treatment by a number of disciplines, the story of administrative reform
is relatively unknown outside the circles of governmental history. Yet the
changes experienced by the Civil Service in the mid-Victorian period are
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what ultimately enabled a professional ideology to differentiate itself from a
market one, a development that, in turn, made possible the rise of the wel-
fare state. “It was chiefly in the civil servants . . . that the professional ideal
began to diverge from the entrepreneurial,” Perkin writes (Origins of Modern
English Society 428). While the latter ideal “was satisfied by the minimal, reg-
ulatory, decentralized laissez-faire State of Victorian theory,” it was the pro-
fessional ideal that would “press on towards the expanding, centralized, inter-
ventionalist State of Victorian practice” (321).
I have argued elsewhere that Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities (1859), pub-
lished only two years after The Three Clerks, is the text which best etches the
requirement that the professional disavow self-interest onto the cultural
imagination (Ruth, “Self-Sacrificing Professional”). Sydney Carton proves his
disinterest—and reforms himself and his profession—only by refusing, in the
starkest of possible terms, to profit from his services. Watching the debate
over the competitive exam unfold in parliament and various periodicals, it is
as if we see this principle of professionalism in the act of forming. In arguing
over whether competitive examinations would identify the right or wrong
man, pundits simultaneously brought the professional into being by giving
him a unique and, in a sense, impossible position in the socioeconomic order.
The story of the competitive examination begins with the Northcote-
Trevelyan Report of 1854—the paper Noel Annan called the intellectual aris-
tocracy’s “Bill of Rights” (247). It proposed replacing a patronage-driven sys-
tem of recruiting young men into service with a system of selection and pro-
motion through open competitive examination.1 Sir Stafford Northcote and
Sir Charles Trevelyan wrote:
It would be natural to expect that so important a profession would attract
into its ranks the ablest and most ambitious of the youth of the country.
. . . Such, however, is by no means the case. Admission into the Civil
Service is indeed eagerly sought after, but it is for the unambitious, and
the indolent or incapable, that it is chiefly desired. Those whose abilities
do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed in the open profes-
sions, where they must encounter the competition of their contempo-
raries, and those whom indolence of temperament or physical infirmities
unfit for active exertions, are placed in the Civil Service, where they may
obtain an honourable livelihood with little labour, and with no risk.
(Parliamentary Papers 4)
Open competitive examinations would stock the service, they claimed, with
intelligent, capable men. Setting the terms with which Victorians would 
85Anthony Trollope’s The Three Clerks
Ruth_CH3_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:59 AM  Page 85
perceive the new knowledge class that increasingly managed them, the debate
triggered by the proposal facilitated “the growing domination in the gover-
nors and administrators themselves of the entrepreneurial by the profession-
al ideal” (Perkin, Origins of Modern English Society 325). Over the course of
the debate, a dialectic emerged: through the criticism of patronage and cor-
ruption from the vantage-point of the entrepreneurial ideal, and then
through the criticism of the market ideal from the more service-oriented
standpoint of the gentlemanly ideal, a new professional ideal came into
being.
The debate raged inside parliament and outside in the pages of such jour-
nals as Cornhill Magazine and Fortnightly Review. Even Queen Victoria
weighed in, at least in her private letters. On February 7, 1854, she wrote
Prime Minister Gladstone to confess “considerable misgivings” (27). The
Queen worried that the exam would draw a lower class of servant without the
“moral character” possessed by those admitted under the patronage system
(27). Her concern was echoed by many of the periodical writers. “The object
[of the reform] in point of fact,” one Quarterly Review author said, as if
exposing a conspiracy, “is to turn the 16,000 places in the civil service of this
empire into so many places and exhibitions for poor scholars” (qtd. in
Mueller 195). If there was a conspiracy, it was precisely the opposite of the
one imagined here. The exam may have given the appearance that the Civil
Service was throwing the doors open to an intellectually entrepreneurial con-
tingent of the lower bourgeoisie, but it was actually designed to favor those
who studied at Oxford and Cambridge.2 In fact, it is a bit of an oversimpli-
fication, but one that allows us to understand better the simultaneous prob-
lem and opportunity the exam posed, to say that the proposal’s opponents
and proponents alike wanted much the same thing—to redeem the increas-
ingly discredited Civil Service and develop for it an aura of modern profes-
sionalism. They fundamentally disagreed, however, about the exam’s ability
to deliver this.
Reformers wanted the exam to make intellectual labor visible as a kind of
mental capital so that it could be objectively assessed, but critics claimed, in
doing so, the exam risked devaluing the very thing whose value it was trying
to determine. Opponents quickly put proponents on the defensive by setting
up an opposition that proved irresistible. They opposed the disinterested,
thoughtful man who would refuse to treat knowledge like a commodity by
sitting for an exam but who would make, nonetheless, the most worthy civil
servant to the “crammer,” a hack who treats knowledge and his own brains
like commodities and who, cramming for the exam, might win the competi-
tion but would surely fail as a state servant. An 1861 Cornhill essay com-
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plained of this “second-rate” man who profits from cramming: “Any definite
test, measurable by marks, will be satisfied by a man of this kind infinitely
better than by a man who really thinks about what is told him, and even
about some things which are not told him. . . . In short, a useful hack is bet-
ter to drive than a thoroughbred horse” (697–98). Within a few lines, how-
ever, the hack indiscriminately laboring converts into the crammer indis-
criminately consuming: the candidate, we learn, “swallows pêle-mêle [a] het-
erogeneous mass of theories and extracts” (698).
Another Cornhill essay took this rhetorical tactic a step further, leaving the
inferior but successful exam-taker outside both mechanical production and
mindless consumption, an emblem of the pure act of exchange:
A man who beats everyone else hopelessly in examinations has almost
always the same set of qualities. He goes quietly through the routine pre-
scribed to him without turning to the right hand or the left, or allowing
his attention to be diverted to any collateral subject whatever. Any defi-
nite piece of knowledge can be put in his head as neatly as if it were a
bandbox, and he can always reproduce it in as perfect a state as a lady’s
bonnet when it comes out of the bandbox. (697)
We have first an image of rational labor—the student single-mindedly going
about his routine—the routine, though, is not of his making but has been
“prescribed to him.” He is more like a machine than a person, a member of
what another article called the “race of mechanically driven examinees”
(846). But, as soon as the image of mechanical production appears, it is can-
celed by one of feminine consumption: the candidate as a hatbox. In either
case, he is not an agent: the “definite piece of knowledge” is “put in his head”
and although he is briefly attributed agency, it is to reproduce not to produce
and even then it is immediately taken away again—the knowledge simply
“comes out of the bandbox.” Whereas Northcote and Trevelyan attempted to
gain support for their proposal by rhetorically opposing the servant’s idle
consumption—he is the “fool of the family” feeding off the state, in
Trevelyan’s opinion (qtd. in Hughes 72)—to his efficient production through
open competition, critics depicted the exam as soliciting a form of mechani-
cal labor that would return the Service to the realm of frivolous consumption.
“Civil Service Examinations,” sneered the Financial Reformer, “are the pretti-
est things of this kind that we have seen for some time” (qtd. in Mueller 119).
“The school system,” Bourdieu wrote, “present[ed] the ‘moment of truth’
of the examination as its own objective reality” (Reproduction in Education
159). The exam is a highly unstable signifier of objectivity, however, because
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its condensation of time into one moment seemingly vulnerable to “the evils
of cramming” (Sayce 697) makes it prey to charges that it is an unreliable
instrument at best and one that corrupts what it claims to measure at worst.
A distance must be traveled and time must pass for cultural capital to convert
into economic capital. Seeming to collapse this distance in its immediacy, the
exam commodifies what it aims to consecrate, buying the man who, retroac-
tively, becomes the kind of man who can be bought. As Bourdieu speculated
of the professional’s cultural capital, “How can this capital so closely linked
to the person be bought without buying the person and so losing the very
effect of legitimation which presupposes the dissimulation of dependence?”
(“Forms of Capital” 248)
In contrast to the crammer, critics posed the “disinterested student” who
“occup[ies] his leisure with other subjects than those required by the
examination-statute, and follow[s] up some bent of [his] own” (Sayce 836).
Disinterest is, in a sense, made possible only through leisure—“the free play
of the mind on all subjects which it touches,” as Matthew Arnold would
write a few years later (1057). Unlike the consumption of the crammer, this
is a good form of consumption that enables, in turn, real production, real
learning. But it is production and consumption that resemble neither because
the two take place simultaneously, foregoing the moment of exchange. The
good student’s intellectual labor is figured as work that is not really work: it
is a kind of occupation—learning occupies his leisure—but one structurally
removed from production destined for the market—learning occupies his
leisure.
In representing the work of the intellect as simultaneous work and play,
production and consumption, opponents implicitly drew on the aesthetic
tradition. To distinguish the artwork from the commodity, Kant removed
artistic labor from the appearance of material necessity by changing it into
play. And just as Kant found himself relying on nature to represent this seem-
ingly impossible entity, the thing produced without labor, so too critics of the
exam analogized intellectual labor to nature. “The more important qualities,”
wrote one opponent, “are in their very nature incapable of being brought to
a definite test. It would be absurd to try to express in marks the difference
between a good judge and a bad one, as to try to measure a mountain with a
two-foot rule” (Anonymous 707). Constructing an analogy that demanded
intellectual labor be represented as a visible object, something placing it in
the realm of the potentially commodifiable, the writer avoided this possibil-
ity by retreating from the man-made world into the sublime. The same rea-
soning that moved Kant to ground aesthetic value in nature operated to
underwrite intellectual value here. Because “[natural] beauty never passes
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through the market, and can never be assigned a value in exchange,” it could
appear to ground an extra-economic model of value (Guillory, Cultural
Capital 319).
Like opponents, supporters of the proposal also assumed that “the quality
of the mind” is something entirely different from “the quantity of the stores
with which it [is] furnished” (Morison 538), but they claimed the exam
would not reward those who crammed for it but rather those in whom it
detected something preexistent, something independent of the exam itself.
Through examinations, Northcote and Trevelyan wrote, “the superiority of
the best would become evident” (14). Intelligence, a passive object that
“become[s] evident” through outside evaluation, seems to cancel labor. It is
not enacted or even experienced by the person so much as harbored within
him—possessed. If conducted correctly, one writer opined, the exam
“place[s] the [examinee] on a standard table in such a position that if it were
possible from a physical examination of his brain to judge of his brain capac-
ity, the results of the two methods would coincide” (“Competitive
Examinations” 417). The proponents defended the exam, then, by creating a
figurative candidate who could hardly be accused of self-interested cram-
ming, because he is bypassed as his capacity is illuminated like an x-rayed
bone. By 1875, such a distinction between innate capacity and mere learning
would apparently acquire enough cultural purchase that Fortnightly Review
deemed it necessary to devote an entire article to challenging the “antithesis
between genius and learning, as if the one almost necessarily excluded the
other” (Morison 538).
It might be argued, though, that the exam’s champions resurrected the
problem when they thought they were laying it to rest. That is, in depicting
the examination candidate as a disinterested spectator in order to repel the
charge of craven cramming, defenders of the exam reified the candidate’s
capacities, characterizing them as if they were discrete and external to the
candidate himself. “The problems of consciousness arising from wage-labour
were repeated in the ruling class,” Lukács wrote in History and Class
Consciousness; “The specialized ‘virtuoso,’ the vendor of his objectified and
reified faculties, does not just become the [passive] observer of society; he also
lapses into a contemplative attitude vis-à-vis the workings of his own objec-
tified and reified faculties” (100). When the “workings” of one’s mind
become “objectified” in the form of “faculties,” one becomes a “vendor,” and
thus, presumably, not fundamentally different from the laborer selling labor-
power. The problem for mental capital, then, is that what is the primary
mechanism to attribute and restrict it—the exam—also potentially denatures
it. Regulating the professional monopoly of intelligence, the exam places
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intelligence within a grid of equivalencies, assigning it an exchange value. At
the moment of its convertibility into a relative value, the threat arises that
such property will not turn into a kind of capital but will commodify its
owner.
The professional class is a class whose intelligence ideally resembles capital
more than it does labor but whose extra-economic rationale disallows its easy
assimilation into the capitalist class. “Cultural capital,” John Guillory writes,
“is certainly a species of symbolic capital generally, but it is a form of sym-
bolic capital certifiable by objective mechanisms” (“Bourdieu’s Refusal” 15).
The professional’s cultural capital accrues through examination or other
forms of external recognition, but it is a form of symbolic capital, and sym-
bolic capital cannot accrue unless it refuses any externally derived recognition
(money, awards, etc.). The professional paradox derives from the profession-
al’s reliance on a form of capital that must be simultaneously visible (objec-
tive) and invisible (subjective), valuable and invaluable. It must be visible not
in the form of labor but rather in the form of quantified property so that it
may freely circulate on the market and so that, in the case of the Civil Service,
it may provide an ostensibly objective counterpoint to patronage. Yet at the
same time, to avoid the degradation of commodification, it must be
invisible—defined negatively rather than positively, by its resistance to meas-
urement and its distance from the market. The debate outlined the contra-
diction that sustains the professional class even as it renders professional iden-
tity particularly precarious—the contradiction of a class functionally inside
but symbolically outside the market.
Perhaps nothing demonstrated Trollope’s desire to inhabit the identity of
the professional seamlessly more than his speech at a Royal Literary Fund
function in 1861. “I have risen on behalf of Writers of Fiction to thank you
for the honour which you have done them in drinking their health, and in
drinking this toast to them as a distinct and established branch of a distinct
and established profession,” he said, adding in the next sentence, “I cannot
sit down without professing my belief that the branch of the profession of lit-
erature is distinct, and is established, and is useful and is ornamental”; and,
then, only a few sentences later: “I say that branch of the profession to which
I belong is a useful as well as an ornamental branch” (qtd. in Super 320). It
is as if saying it could make it so. Yet, however much Trollope wished to
belong to a profession and to identify as a professional, he could never rec-
oncile himself to the constitutive contradiction of professional identity, the
contradiction that called upon him to disavow the one thing he perhaps 
coveted even more than a professional persona—a thriving market for his
“services.”
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THE THREE CLERKS: SOCIOLOGY IN DISGUISE
As Pierre Bourdieu has argued of Sentimental Education (1869), The Three
Clerks can be read as sociology-in-disguise, so accurate is its illustration of
social reproduction. Flaubert’s Sentimental Education isolates a group of stu-
dents and unfolds the trajectory each takes as he transitions to adulthood and
becomes a relative success or failure in life. From a position of apparent
equality, these characters are launched, Bourdieu says, “like particles into a
force-field” and “the dispositions, that is to say, the ensemble of incorporat-
ed properties, including elegance, facility of expression or even beauty, and
capital in its diverse forms—economic, cultural, social—constitute the
trumps which will dictate both the manner of playing and success in the
game” (Rules of Art 10). The main character Frederic has all the trumps he
needs but in fatally equivalent portions. He is not determined in one career
path or another by his set of embodied and economic capital but rather is bal-
anced between the disinterested world of art and the acquisitive world of pol-
itics and business. Waffling between the two, he is destined to fail in both—
a poster-child for what Bourdieu calls “determined indeterminacy” (Rules of
Art 4). The Three Clerks also launches its characters from a position of virtu-
al equality. Harry, Alaric, and Charley have all begun careers in the Civil
Service and all socialize with the same family, a clergyman’s widow and her
three daughters. The tale follows these three men as they graduate to adult-
hood, each establishing, or failing to establish, a vocation and each courting
and then marrying one of the daughters (Gertrude, Linda, or Katie).
Flaubert created a novel that manages to illustrate the determination of
indeterminacy while recapitulating this indeterminacy—a kind of neutrality
among, or equidistance from, established positions—at the level of the sen-
tence, exuding aesthetic disinterest. According to Bourdieu, by occupying
“that neutral place where one can soar above groups and their conflicts” (Rules
of Art 26), Flaubert mapped the logic of symbolic capital. To explain briefly,
for Bourdieu, a general economy of practices extends from the economic field
at one end to the field of cultural production at the other. Those figures with
primarily economic capital, like industrial or finance-capitalists, cluster at one
end while those relying largely on what Bourdieu calls cultural and symbolic
capital, like the professional and a step further, the artist, occupy the other.
These latter must do what they do without regard for the market (“Field of
Cultural Production” 321). The professional must repress his own interests in
his attendance on others while the artist must subordinate personal desires in
his commitment to art for art’s sake. “‘Symbolic capital’ is to be understood,”
he writes, “as economic or political capital that is disavowed, mis-recognized,
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and thereby recognized, hence legitimate, a ‘credit’ which is, under certain
conditions, and always in the long run, capable of assuring ‘economic profits’”
(Rules of Art 142). The field of cultural production reproduces this dynamic
within itself by commercial art that satisfies extrinsic expectations and garners
immediate profit, on one end, and avante-garde art that strives to satisfy only
the intrinsic demands of the art itself and collects its profit either not at all or
only after considerable delay, on the other.
However similar their sociological experiments, Sentimental Education and
The Three Clerks occupy opposite ends of the field of cultural production.
Whereas Flaubert’s avant-garde Sentimental Education everywhere implies
that the only readers qualified to judge it are Flaubert’s own peers, if not
Flaubert alone—that, in Bourdieu’s terms, the novel belongs to the field of
restricted production—Trollope’s resolutely bourgeois The Three Clerks tar-
gets a larger readership, taking up a position in the field of general produc-
tion. While Flaubert flaunted his refusal to cater to the market requirements
of a realist novel, thereby enacting the modern principle of aesthetic autono-
my by his formal exactitude, Trollope flaunted his submission to preexisting
expectations, thereby creating an ironic distance of his own. This difference
in form between the two novels finds its reflection in the kind of sociology
each might be said to practice. Flaubert’s dissection of mid-century France
makes any participation in its culture appear invariably contaminated and
contemptible, while Trollope’s novels seem to forgive their characters’
inevitable complicity, suggesting that there is more potential for virtue in
doing as others do around you than there is in high-minded abstention.
Bourdieu, the son of a postman, and Trollope, a postman himself, pay par-
ticular attention to spatial coordinates—where individuals originate and
where they end up. Indeed, the very first paragraphs of The Three Clerks con-
sist of a fairly elaborate mapping of the social geography of the Civil Service.
Trollope details the location, facades, and relative prestige of various offices,
beginning with what is “popularly called the Weights and Measures” (8). This
“well-conducted” office with its “handsome edifice” is clearly the most
important branch of the service. “All material intercourse between man and
man must be regulated, either justly or unjustly, by weights and measures,”
Trollope explains, “and as we of all people depend most on such material
intercourse, our weights and measures should to us be a source of never-
ending concern” (8). Trollope grows facetious as he continues—“And then
the question of the decimal coinage! is it not in these days of paramount
importance?”—but that does not change the fact that this one sentence in the
novel’s third paragraph establishes the logic that will govern the text as a
whole. Having arranged a set of equivalents—three young men all starting
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careers in the same field and wooing sisters—the novel will proceed to dif-
ferentiate them, explaining how various “weights and measures” determine
whether they succeed or fail.
Harry Norman and Alaric Tudor are clerks in the Office of Weights and
Measures. Issuing from a landed family, Harry Norman has all the obvious
advantages—money, manners, looks, intelligence, a proper education, access
to society—but he lacks the will to succeed (his “fault,” according to the nar-
rator, is that he is “somewhat shy and reserved . . . among men” [5]). The son
of a deceased, bankrupted cavalry officer, Alaric Tudor has no economic cap-
ital, dubious cultural capital (“his education had been very miscella-
neous”[7]), but boasts a hypertrophied will to succeed (“He was ambitious;
and lived with the steady aim of making the most of such advantages as fate
and fortune had put in his way” [7]). Alaric’s cousin Charley Tudor clerks in
the Office of Internal Navigation, a lowly and soon-to-be-obsolete office.
The son of a clergyman, Charley has no economic capital, a little cultural
capital, and a moderate will to succeed. He is the third term placed between
Harry’s disinterest and Alaric’s overweening ambition. Not so different from
Flaubert’s Frederic, Charley has a little bit of everything but not a lot of any-
thing. He is not clearly determined in one direction or another but rather is
“easily malleable, . . . tak[ing] at once the full impression of the stamp to
which he [i]s subjected” (55). But where Frederic’s blankness, the relative
openness of his undetermined trajectory, is his downfall, Charley’s malleabil-
ity is his trump card. According to Trollope, only by doing as others do—
internalizing their protocols and norms, accepting their weights and
measures—will one succeed.
The critical turning point in the plot takes the form of a competitive
examination between Harry and Alaric. Presided over by examination-mad
Mr. Hardlines (based on Sir Charles Trevelyan), Weights and Measures con-
ducts a competitive examination for an important promotion. At first, it
appears that Harry and Alaric each embody one side of the opposition
sketched by the anti-exam pundits. We have a “free, generous intelligence”
(Parliamentary Papers 19) set against a mind that acquires knowledge “for
what it will fetch” (Sayce 836). “True” Harry withdraws from the competi-
tion, and “schem[ing]” Alaric emerges the victor (5, 19). We are not to be
surprised by this outcome, considering what we already know about Alaric—
that he “was perhaps not superior to Norman in point of intellect; but he was
infinitely superior in having early acquired a knowledge of how best to use
such intellect as he had” (7–8) and that he “got the best of [every] bargain”
(8). Alaric hardly stops to enjoy his success. Instead, calling to mind one par-
liamentary member’s concern that the examination would produce men “too
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conceited for the duties required of them” (Parliamentary Papers 61), he is
“already beginning to think that this Weights and Measures should only be a
stepping-stone to him” (131). What one contemporary reviewer called
Alaric’s “ill-regulated ambition” (Review in Spectator 59) will later lead him
to use government information for private gain, setting off a series of deceits
which land him not in the parliamentary office he imagines for himself but
in prison. Having commodified one’s brains, the examination proceeds to
turn one, the novel suggests, into a market agent rather than the loyal Crown
servant the exam was meant to identify. “He knew his own value,” Trollope
writes of Alaric, “and did not fear but that he should find a price for it in
some of the world’s markets” (381).
The exam does not reward the superior man but the man who knows how
to use his brain as a marketable commodity. In this, Trollope appears to agree
with the opponents of the proposal—the exam, as the Fortnightly Review
piece put it, “traffics in brains” (Sayce 844). But Alaric is not the mechani-
cally driven, cramming candidate. (Another unfortunate fills that role: “[Mr.
A. Minusex] had so crammed himself with knowledge that his mind—like
the gourmand’s stomach—had broken down under the effort, and he was
now sobbing out algebraic positions under his counterpane” (126–27).)
Alaric does not prepare for the exam. He does not treat his brain like a ware-
house to be stocked for the exam but rather like stock itself, something to be
speculated upon. According to Trollope, the problem with the exam is not
that it defiles professionalism by assigning it an exchange value. The problem
is rather that the exchange value applies not to professional labor already per-
formed but to labor that has yet to exist. Allegedly gauging one’s general
capacity and, thus, predicting the worth of one’s future labors, the exam acts
as a form of speculation. Embodying this logic, Alaric says to himself in
anticipation of the exam, “Education is nothing—mind, mind is everything”
(76). Appropriately enough, then, Trollope turns Alaric into an obsessive
stock-jobber, constantly trading with his insider knowledge. (Indeed, the
novel portrays Alaric as so consistently compulsive in his speculations that he
speculates in his personal as well as his professional life; at one point, for
instance, he considers it useful to “raise an interest in Linda’s heart” [55]).
If we were dealing with anyone but Trollope, the novel would have ended
there, consigning Alaric to prison while catapulting the deserving Harry
Norman to great heights in another, perhaps more prestigious profession.
But, in fact, the novel shuts the door on Harry as firmly as it does on Alaric,
retiring him to his family estate where he occupies a place literally rather than
symbolically outside the market. Trollope reproduces the anti-exam logic, but
in part so that he can expose its illogic—its mystification of the fact that only
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those originally possessing economic capital can claim uncommodified men-
tal capital. Harry can afford to be high-minded because he has an independ-
ent income. Criticism has tended to take Trollope to task for his romanticized
view of the gentleman, but this novel emphatically denies that figure hero sta-
tus. Harry’s withdrawal from the competition is depicted as an unmanly act
of cowardice, one that should not surprise the reader, considering that the
narrator damned Harry early in the novel by noting that he “prefer[s] the
society of ladies to any of the bachelor gaieties of his unmarried acquain-
tance” (5). The exam, then, shakes out two identities: the businessman and
the gentleman—the former claiming autonomy from patronage, the latter
enjoying autonomy from the market—neither of whom approximated the
professional the Civil Service sought.
TROLLOPE’S UNHEROIC HERO
The Three Clerks’ remaining clerk proves his aptness for civil service by being
just what the pundits despised: a hack. The advocates of the Northcote-
Trevelyan Report wanted a man whose intelligence was detectable by the
exam, the critics wanted a man whose disinterested play led him to reject the
exam, but neither group wanted a man who was essentially a mental laborer.
Proponents and opponents alike heaped scorn upon the man who labors
unimaginatively through his routine but this is the very man Trollope makes
his hero. Where the anti-exam essayists turned the hack into a consumer, The
Three Clerks turns its frivolous consumer into a productive, if uninspired,
mental laborer who writes bad fiction published serially in cheap papers.
“Gay, thoughtless, rollicking” Charley’s primary flaw is that he ingests too
much of modern life—“A short pilot-coat, and a pipe of tobacco, were soon
familiar to him, and he had not been six months in London before he had a
house-of-call in a cross lane running between Essex Street and Norfolk
Street” (15). The remainder of the novel charts his progress from a slacker
civil servant and immoderate man-about-town into a writer with enough dis-
cipline to produce rather than consume petty commodities.
Charley starts off the tale at a disadvantage. Without either Alaric’s clever-
ness or Harry’s moral superiority, Charley, as one contemporary reviewer
noted, “begins in the wildest ways—haunts taverns, consults Jews, and kiss-
es pretty barmaids, utterly regardless of consequences” (Dallas 108). But
Trollope turns Charley’s bad behavior into the sign of his potential. About the
readiness with which Charley picks up the bad habits of his fellow clerks in
the Office of Internal Navigation, for example, the narrator says:
95Anthony Trollope’s The Three Clerks
Ruth_CH3_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:59 AM  Page 95
How should it have been otherwise? How can any youth of nineteen or
twenty do other than consort himself with the daily companions of his
usual avocations? Once and again, in one case among ten thousand, a lad
may be found formed of such stuff, that he receives neither the good nor
bad impulses of those around him. But such a one is a lapsus naturae. He
has been born without the proper attributes of youth. (17)
Almost because he is so resolutely average in comparison with the other clerks
who are either too noble or too ignoble, Charley is the one most likely to suc-
ceed. He has no attribute in any impressive degree but he is also “deficient in
no proportion of mind necessary to make an estimable man” (17). Like
Frederic, there is nothing particularly noteworthy about him, and if he did
not get “boisterous” from time to time, we would hardly remember he was
there (17). He is, in fact, perfectly suited to prove that professions do not find
the right man, as Northcote and Trevelyan expected to do with the examina-
tion, but must make him.
According to Trollope, men act professionally in a system that expects
them to do so and that rewards them accordingly, not out of any innate
capacity for professionalism. “Assigning someone to a group of superior
essence (noblemen as opposed to commoners, men as opposed to women,
educated as opposed to uneducated, etc.),” Bourdieu wrote, “causes that per-
son to undergo a subjective transformation that brings about a real transfor-
mation likely to bring him closer to the assigned definition” (State Nobility
112). Or, as Friedson comments, “the producers themselves have to be pro-
duced” (32). Trollope writes, “Had [Charley] gone into the Weights and
Measures . . . he would have worked without a groan from ten till five, and
have become as good a model as the best of them” (18). This hypothesis is
duly proven, as are all the narrator’s hypotheses in this novel of “almost ritu-
alistic predictability” (Shuman, Pedagogical 89). Charley does manage to
make it into Weights and Measures, though he escapes examination. Instead,
what the narrator sarcastically calls his “heart-rending tales” make his ascen-
dance of the Civil Service’s ranks possible (534).
Soon after Charley’s first story appears in the penny paper Daily Delight,
the Office of Internal Navigation is dissolved. “Mr. Oldeschole began to set
his house in order, hopelessly,” writes the narrator of Charley’s old boss, “for
any such effort the time was gone by” (527). Harry recommends that Charley
be given his now-vacated post. Charley is admitted and given a position
“equal in seniority and standing as that which he had held at the Navigation,
and much higher, of course, in pay” (536). Meddling reformers protest that
Charley was “admitted without examination” (536). At a parliament session,
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they compare Charley to one of the Internal Navigation clerks who was cut
adrift altogether. Why, they ask, are the two treated so differently? Passing
around a badly scrawled note written by the fired clerk alongside a literary
review offering “some half-dozen lines, highly eulogistic” of Charley’s first
story, one member calls for everyone to compare the two and “‘then the
House would see whether or no the produce of the Civil Service field had
been properly winnowed’” (538). But even if the House endorses Charley,
our narrator does not: “Poor Screwy was the goose, and certainly got the
sauce best suited to him when he was turned adrift out of the Civil Service.
Charley was the gander and fond as I am of him for his many excellent qual-
ities, I am fain to own that justice might fairly have demanded that he be
cooked after the same receipt” (536).
At the transition between adolescence and manhood, Bourdieu writes,
young men “must enter into one or another of the social games which are
socially recognized, and engag[e] in an inaugural investment, both econom-
ic and psychological” (Rules of Art 13). Charley has a bad track record as a
civil servant and his fiction does not indicate any great talent in that sphere
either. It is rather the industriousness he exhibits as he writes that matters—
the investment he makes is determined not by the aesthetic value of his fic-
tion but by the labor he commits to it. Charley does not need to produce
anything remarkable but rather must demonstrate his capacity for disciplined
mental labor. Telling in this respect is that the novel’s highest praise refers to
what Charley is not rather than what he is when he writes: “At this time
Charley was not idle” (533). “Entering a career in Trollope means the for-
mation of a ‘disposition’ for that very career,” Nicholas Dames writes
(“Trollope and the Career” 255), and Charley prepares himself for Weights
and Measures by developing a disposition for prosaic brainwork.3
Demonstrating that he has “what the bourgeois call a serious side” (Bourdieu,
Rules of Art 11)—that he does not suffer from Alaric’s conceitedness nor from
Harry’s impractical loftiness—Charley buckles down to inherit the profes-
sional status bequeathed him as the son of a professional. “The vocational
process in Trollope,” Dames explains, “might be best expressed as the narra-
tive of learning to want what you are in the way of getting” (“Trollope and
the Career” 255).
While some Victorian novels blithely reproduced the ideological chiasmus
whereby the professional or artistic protagonist cultivates the disinterest that
then implicitly earns him those material conditions that in reality make dis-
interest possible (inheritance, market success, tenure), Charley achieves the
relative autonomy of the tenured bureaucrat not through any act of disinter-
ested devotion to the state but instead through the hack’s refusal to disregard
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payment and the success he subsequently enjoys. As his editor holds forth on
possible literary topics for the young author, we learn that “the author him-
self, with base mind, was thinking how much he should be paid for his past
labours” (535). When Charley does ask his editor about payment, saying that
“he understood that there was so much per sheet, or something of that sort”
(535), the editor explains that, at the moment, payment is out of the
question—Charley must “have the courage . . . to work through with the
Daily Delight till it had achieved its promised popularity” (535). Refusing to
defer payment, refusing the logic by which cultural capital converts to eco-
nomic form only after a distance is traveled and time passed, Charley decides
to peddle his wares elsewhere. “‘You will find it very difficult to fly if you tie
the whole weight of the Daily Delight under your wings,’” a friend tells him;
“So Charley prepared himself for solitary soaring” (535). If Frederic in
Sentimental Education fails because he cannot commit to one game, then
Charley succeeds in part because he refuses to be played.
If Flaubert mapped the field of cultural production, then he also submit-
ted to its implicit rules. Conversely, Trollope attempted to escape those rules
by making them explicit, specifically the rule requiring one to disavow mate-
rial interest in favor of a heroic commitment to art or, in the professional’s
case, to “service.” By acting out of honest self-interest rather than pretending
to some higher nobility of purpose, Charley succeeds.4 According to Trollope,
it was unreasonable and naïve to expect one to work disinterestedly, without
rewards, and, so long as one did an honest day’s work, no shame needed to
attach to professional or artistic self-interest. “No work can be fairly done but
by routine,” Trollope writes, and Charley signals his submission to bureau-
cratic routine by submitting to the mechanics of serial publication, a form in
which his writing comes out “bit by bit” (534). In the sphere of arts and let-
ters where one most expects to find disinterested play or flights of self-
aggrandizing fancy, Trollope places the kind of dutiful, plodding labor the
civil servant must prove himself capable of performing. “Fortunately,”
Secretary of the Board of Trade James Booth wrote in response to the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report, “commanding talents, or extensive acquire-
ments in any great number are not required.” He continued:
They would, in fact, be misplaced in almost every department of the
Government. It is rather steady and persevering devotion to the every day
business of the department that is to be desired: and it is one of the chief
objections to your system of competition that from the over-education of
clerks, accompanied probably by a corresponding amount of self-
estimation, there would, looking at the character of the work to be done,
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and the slow rate of promotion, be much disappointment and dissatis-
faction with their work, attended probably as a general consequence,
with listlessness and indolence. (Parliamentary Papers 134)
Implying much the same thing, Lord Ellenborough admonished reformers,
“Recollect that the civil servant in England is a clerk” (qtd. in Reader 95).
As for the reformers, there is no danger in their having abandoned their
examination system when they promoted Charley, because, again, the Civil
Service does not so much identify as it does produce the right man.
Disinterest, Trollope suggests, is a function of institutional circumstances and
expectations, not moral character. He shifts the emphasis from individual
motivation to the structure of the field, much like sociologist Talcott Parsons
a half-century later and Bourdieu a half-century after Parsons. “The conflict
is not generally a simple one between the actor’s self-interest and his altruis-
tic regard for others or for ideals,” Parsons wrote of the paradox of the pro-
fessional, “but between different components of the normally unified goal of
‘success’” (58). What are the steps—the norms and values one must internal-
ize, the dispositions one must cultivate—to succeed in any given field? Being
a man who naturally desires the esteem of those around him, Charley quick-
ly internalizes the values of the Weights and Measures and behaves accord-
ingly. If he was a very bad servant when relegated to the idle and useless
Internal Navigation Office, he is a splendid one once he is placed “among the
stern morals and hard work of the Weights and Measures” (118), if only
because “Charley led a busy life; and as men who have really something to do
have seldom time to get into much mischief, he had been peculiarly moral
and respectable” (496).
If Harry’s attenuated will to succeed leads him to abandon his career and
Alaric’s swollen one makes him mismanage his, this is only to be expected.
Both the under- and overdeveloped will stem from the characters’ stock of
capital, embodied and economic, which cause them to inherit seamlessly the
positions of their fathers—Harry reproducing the gentility of his father’s life,
Alaric reproducing the disreputable vicissitudes of his father’s. Charley’s father
is a clergyman, a man belonging to one of the ancient, gentlemanly profes-
sions, and the professional too begets a professional. Charley, however, is a
modern professional, and if he looks more like a manual laborer than he does
like the genteel professional man of the past, it is because Trollope refuses to
define the professional by his devotion to disinterested service. Attempting to
escape the ideological double bind stipulating that the professional be mate-
rially within but symbolically removed from the market, Trollope reduces
intellectual labor to labor’s simplest form. Pure labor pretends to be nothing
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other than what it is. It is as if only by adopting the most transparent system
of “weights and measures”—the simplest, and, thus, most reliable unit of
value—can one act with integrity and also, to borrow a phrase from the
novel, “get on in the world” (42).
In his essay “The Civil Service as a Profession,” first given as a presenta-
tion to his own (postal) branch of the service, then published in Cornhill in
1861, Trollope claimed that his goal was to “prove that the Civil Service may
be made as noble, as independent, and as free a profession as the bar or
church; as arms or medicine” (214). For Trollope, that independence is con-
ferred when one imagines oneself within the apparently straightforward space
of the market:
For every half-crown that they receive, let [civil servants] be careful to
give work to the value of three and sixpence, and then let them not care
a straw for any man. He who so arranges his weights and measures, never
does care a straw for any man. There is no difficulty in so arranging them,
in so fixing his pennyworths of work. That he may attain his object—that
manly independence without which no profession can be pleasant—it is
not necessary that all the world should know the amount of return he
make. It is only necessary that one person should know it;—and that one
man will always know it. (219)
This understanding of professional work as something that could be effort-
lessly translated into exchange value did not address the complexity of intel-
lectual labor, with its stored knowledge and developed expertise, nor did it
address the awkward, indirect status of professional services within the mode
of commodity production. As a theory of professional labor, in short, it was
woefully inadequate. As a rhetorical strategy for Trollope’s own career, how-
ever, one is tempted to say it was a triumph.
SELF-INTERESTED LABOR AS AUTHORIAL STRATEGY
The Three Clerks is not a novel of suspense. Trollope might simulate move-
ment from time to time—making comments like, “What were the faults in
[Harry’s] character it must be the business of the tale to show” (5)—but, in
fact, we always know where the novel is headed before we get there—even the
above comment is hardly suspenseful, considering that the narrator says we
must wait to learn Harry’s faults right after he has finished describing them
(namely, Harry’s priggish sense of reserve). “It is not very pleasant,” E. S.
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Dallas wrote in his review of The Three Clerks for The Times, “to follow the
windings of such a story, in which we see the end from the beginning” (108).
In the only important criticism on the novel to date, Cathy Shuman makes
an ingenious argument about this feature of the novel—what she calls its
“static, fairytale quality” (92).5 Realism and the exam, Shuman observes, both
claim to read interiors, realism by “rel[ying] on a narrative surface encrusted
with material objects that metonymically contain and define the penetrable
depths within” and the exam by “reveal[ing] inner talent” (“Laborer and
Hire” 88). Unlike both realism and the exam, Trollope’s fiction refuses this
illusion of depth, wherein things turn out to be other than what they first
appear. Shuman argues that Trollope held empty labor or routine work in
such high regard, because it is what it is without aspiring to be anything else.
While Marx and others saw labor as vulnerable to alienation and abstraction,
Trollope privileged labor, because it is, in another sense, inalienable—one
must be present when one performs it—and immediately identifiable—one
is either doing it or one is not. For Trollope, Shuman writes, “identity and
value are metonymically rather than metaphorically related: a man may pro-
duce or possess value but he may not represent it” (“Laborer and Hire” 97).
Shuman does not consider, however, the way this theory of value relates to
Trollope’s own heteronomous position in the literary marketplace. Placed
within that context, Trollope’s “theory” comes into view as an astute move
within the literary game.
The Three Clerks was the first novel Trollope sold outright. With all five of
his previous novels, he entered into half-profit share agreements with pub-
lishers. Novelists forced to enter into such contracts were “morbidly suspi-
cious of how their profit share was calculated” (Sutherland 90). First shop-
ping The Three Clerks at Longman’s before selling it to Bentley’s “out and
out,” as Trollope put it in his notes, he was told that Longman’s would accept
the novel only on half-profit terms. He wrote in his autobiography:
When I went to Mr. Longman with my next novel The Three Clerks . . .
I wished him to buy it from me at a price which he might think to be a
fair value, and I argued with him that as soon as an author has put him-
self into a position which insures a sufficient sale of his works to give a
profit, the publisher is not entitled to expect the half of such proceeds.
. . . I thought that I had now reached that point, but Mr. Longman did
not agree with me. And he endeavored to convince me that I might lose
more than I gained, even though I should get more money elsewhere. ‘It
is for you,’ said he, ‘to think whether our names on your title-page are
not worth more to you than the increased payment.’ This seemed to me
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to savour of that high-flown doctrine of the contempt of money which I
have never admired. I did think much of Messrs. Longman’s name, but I
liked it best at the bottom of a cheque. (108–9)
Mr. Longman asked Trollope to trade one form of capital for another, to
exchange economic for cultural capital (the prestige of the imprint). In
Trollope’s view, the publisher attempted to invoke the artist’s supposed disin-
terest, or distaste for money, so that he himself could laugh all the way to the
bank.
“By depreciating his work through understatement, Trollope rhetorically
enhances its value,” Christina Crosby writes (295). Trollope’s supposed deval-
uation of his work—repeatedly referring to his novels as mere commodities,
for example—might have been strategic self-deprecation but it was also his
way of refusing to be duped. Only the open market, in which even the most
incommensurable objects—novel and cheque—could be rendered commen-
surable, ensured the fairness of a transaction. With the half-profits system by
contrast, “the author was entirely dependent on the integrity of the publish-
er in rendering his accounts; it put an intolerable strain on the relationship”
(Hamer 21). An arena of competing agents who do not pretend to be other
than self-interested, the market provided a degree of transparency that, in
turn, underwrote the value of professional labor. “Such a demand [of half-
profits],” Trollope continued to sputter, “is monstrous as soon as the article
produced is known to be a marketable commodity” (Autobiography 108).
Of course, by the rules Bourdieu outlines, Trollope might not have been
seeing through the game of cultural capital so much as playing it badly.
Perhaps he did not realize that a particularly impressive imprint might mean
less profit now but more later. Certainly, in the short term, Trollope’s choic-
es, particularly his rhetorical presentation of those choices, hurt his reputa-
tion. The standard view is that his star fell precipitously after the publication
of the Autobiography. If, as Paul Danahy writes in his study of Victorian auto-
biographies, “male authors represent themselves as autonomous and implic-
itly repress the social context of their labor” (3), Trollope’s Autobiography in
which he “unblushingly paraded sums, dates and details of contracts” must
be the great exception (Sutherland 240).6 Trollope famously focused on the
material details of the context in which he wrote at the expense of the texts
themselves. Margot Stafford writes of the Autobiography, “Trollope’s bid to
win respect for the profession only resulted in a loss of respect for himself ”
(7). “Of course all artistic work is done, to a great extent, mechanically,”
George Gissing admitted in The Commonplace Book, but Trollope “talked
about it in a wrong and vulgar tone” (qtd. in Stafford 7).
102 Chapter 3
Ruth_CH3_3rd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:59 AM  Page 102
But was Trollope any less read during this period in which critics looked
askance at him for his seeming vulgarity? Is it possible, furthermore, that in
the long run that very vulgarity was part of why he continued to survive—
and, today, thrives—in the annals of criticism? If, as John Sutherland argued,
artistic autonomy “was harder to come by and hold on to” for Trollope than
for Dickens or George Eliot, then is it any surprise that given the choice
between bought and unbought brains, Trollope chose to claim the image of
the former (78)? By preemptively claiming it, Trollope could suggest that
“true daring belongs to those who have the courage to defy the conformity of
anti-conformity, even though they run the risk thereby of winning bourgeois
applause,” to quote Bourdieu on “bourgeois intellectuals” (Rules of Art 163).7
Anticipating the highbrow reviewer’s critique before he could make it,
Trollope “turn[ed] his adversary’s weapons against him by resolutely assum-
ing the image instead of simply enduring it” (Bourdieu, Rules of Art 163).
Choosing to represent himself in his Autobiography—and his hero in The
Three Clerks—as a hack, but doing so in such a way that he appeared to have
a choice, that it was something he ironically and self-reflexively embraced
rather than simply endured, Trollope managed to escape being reduced to a
hack by posterity. “Although he accepted the conditions that produced the
hack novelist,” Sutherland concluded, “Trollope was not a hack” (81).
What if we see Trollope’s avowed and self-conscious predictability not as
an “ostentatious subversion of realist conventions,” as Shuman sees it, but as
an ostentatious submission to those conventions (my emphasis, “Laborer and
Hire” 89)? Slyly summing up one of The Three Clerks’ central plots, Trollope’s
narrator says, “It need hardly be told in so many words to an habitual novel-
reader that Charley did get his bride at last” (540–41). Yes, Trollope says here,
I am playing by the rules, but I am no fool; I know what I’m doing. Winking
at his readers, Trollope satisfied the average reader’s expectations while also
anticipating the elite reader’s antipathy toward the formulaic. “React[ing] to
the reaction of the intellectual critique which he is prepared to anticipate
even before it has been formulated,” Trollope wrote for a commercial market
but attempted to arm himself against the critical consequences (Bourdieu,
Rules of Art 163).
The Three Clerks ends with a scene in which Charley’s mother-in-law reads
aloud a review savagely critical of his latest novel, a review in fact playfully
fabricated by Charley’s wife Katie but one that apparently repeats criticisms
now familiar to Charley in his lusterless career. The review reads: “No moral
purpose can be served by the volumes before us. The hero acts wrongly
throughout but nevertheless he is rewarded at last” (553). And it adds regard-
ing Charley himself, that there is something about the novelist that “gives us
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the idea of a boy who is being rewarded for having duly learnt by rote his
daily lesson” (552). This is, of course, an apt description of The Three Clerks.
One unprincipled man overshoots himself and gets thrown back to the start-
ing line, one overly principled man never goes anywhere, and a third man
who is neither excessively ambitious nor unnecessarily self-denying behaves
badly for awhile and, then, once he shows a little rote effort, gets what he was,
in any event, most likely to get. The clergyman’s son becomes a moderately
successful professional and marries a clergyman’s daughter. The Three Clerks
is the story of a lack of distinct progress or maybe, more accurately, the story
of predictable progress—a bildungsroman with an unheroic hero who devel-
ops only “the aptitude to be what [he] is” (Bourdieu, Rules of Art 11). One
imagines that other unheroic hero Arthur Pendennis encountering these final
pages of The Three Clerks in which Trollope preemptively reviewed the book
he has just written. Skimming The Three Clerks as he struggles to finish his
umpteenth book review that month, and having already jotted down the out-
line of his review, Pendennis reaches these last pages, curses Trollope, and
starts from scratch—just the first in a long line of critics to be foiled by the
position Trollope plotted for himself in the field of cultural production, bril-
liantly poised on the border between the canonical and the disposable.
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C H A P T E R F O U R
Deprofessionalized Critics 
in the Twenty-First Century
Matters would be easy if we could merely say—naïvely—that the beau-
ties of art must be subtracted from any politicization, or—knowingly—
that the alleged autonomy of art disguises its dependence upon
domination.
—Jacques Rancière
A key condition of any institutional politics . . . is that intellectuals do
not denegate their own status as possessors of cultural capital; that they
accept and struggle with the contradictions that this entails; and that
their cultural politics should be openly and without embarrassment pre-
sented as their politics, not someone else’s.
—John Frow
When we study “the relation of the social structure to individual action,”
Talcott Parsons wrote of the professions in 1939, we find “that the dominant
importance of the problem of self-interest has been exaggerated” (56). I have
argued that by setting aside our critical fascination with the problem of self-
interest—or with the hypocrisy of disinterest—we can see that the mid-
nineteenth-century novel did not fashion professional identity primarily by
flourishing the ideal of disinterestedness but rather by rhetorically negotiat-
ing their professionalizing protagonists’ relationships to the market. By illu-
minating the labor involved in polishing the marriageable woman, The
Professor assigns its professional the exchange value he needs at the same time
as it grants him professional objectivity. William Crimsworth’s
disinterested—rather than lascivious—relations with his students result from
the fact that he must view clearly the faults he renders invisible to future suit-
ors. David Copperfield gives David professional disinterestedness not by
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denying his relationship to the market but by adopting one particular rela-
tionship to it rather than another—an industrial rather than speculative one.
Born around the same time as the finance capitalist and also engaged in
manipulating knowledge and symbols, the professional had to be distin-
guished from that suspicious figure, something Dickens accomplished by
running his professional in the reliable time of the factory clock rather than
the future-oriented time of speculation. Finally, in The Three Clerks, far from
compromising professional integrity, the market ensures it. Refusing an ide-
ology that mystifies the economics of art, Trollope’s professional admits his
self-interest and is rewarded with the kind of success that is, in fact, the best
guarantee of good behavior. Trollope did not expect someone like Charley to
behave well when placed in a disreputable office, but a good, well-run office
like Weights and Measures called forth the qualities it both required and
instilled. In this final chapter, I extend the insight discussed in the preceding
chapter—that disinterest is a function more of circumstance than
character—to an analysis of the debate over the state of the profession.
In the introductory chapter, I argued that Foucauldian criticism attained
its dramatic influence in Victorian studies at least in part because it
expressed—by displacing—the larger sociological reality of the profession.
The relative helplessness and overdetermination of the Foucauldian subject
rhymed with critics’ experience of their own circumscribed agency. At the
same time, with professional competition intensifying, producing a two-
tiered system of stars and adjuncts, Foucault’s account of a power-hungry
expert class also made good common sense. Perhaps critics’ eager mistrust of
their nineteenth-century counterparts implied a self-indictment, as if outing
the expert class absolved critics of their own troublingly redoubled will to
power. Or perhaps, more simply, Foucault’s description of experts planting in
the populace what they then discover and cure—thereby generating their
own careers in a sleight of hand—seemed accurate to critics working in a
vocation that paid homage to the principle of disinterestedness but increas-
ingly organized itself according to market logic. As with fantasy in general,
there was nothing particularly rational about this dynamic wherein we expe-
rienced ourselves as at once powerless (in the face of the market) and mega-
lomaniacal (in our pursuit of academic celebrity). Only yet inchoately grasp-
ing the dynamic downsizing the profession, how were we to know that both
experiences of the professional self were related by-products of what Marc
Bousquet (“Rhetoric of ‘Job Market’” 212) calls “the structural transforma-
tion of the university”?
The structural transformation of higher education is a shift of power from
faculty to administrators, who are reorganizing the conditions of academic
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labor. As a result, unless one’s prolific publications catapult one to academic
celebrity, one now faces “increased teaching loads, fewer funds for research,
pressure to match research with the interests of corporate donors, higher stan-
dards for promotion and tenure, greater competition for fewer tenure lines,
and, at some schools, the elimination of tenure altogether” (K. Newman 30).
As the explicitness of this list suggests, the changes squeezing our profession
are now in sharp focus. Today, most of us are clear that the problem lies not
with careerist professionals who have forsaken—or never subscribed to—the
ideal of disinterestedness but rather with the last three decades’ steady erosion
of professional autonomy and authority. Even as we loathed ourselves for our
“expertness,” that status was being taken away from us, and we were fast
becoming “academic labor” or, in Gary Rhoades’s intentionally oxymoronic
phrase, “managed professionals.”1
Mimicking industry’s shift in the last thirty years from stable mass-scale
production to flexible accumulation, universities and colleges are actively
replacing salaried, tenure-line professors with waged adjunct labor bereft of
benefits, security, or autonomy. The latest data show that 65 percent of col-
lege teaching is done by contingent faculty (AAUP). The number is undoubt-
edly higher in the humanities, whose required English, history, and other
general studies classes generate plenty of work for non-tenured faculty and
graduate students but whose faculty members, unlike their colleagues in sci-
ence, business, or engineering colleges, are often unable to draw large
amounts of funding to the colleges in which they work. Lacking directly
apparent instrumental value, the humanities struggle to defend themselves as
the market model consumes administrators’ thinking. Situated at the point
of greatest ideological tension is perhaps the English department and its fac-
ulty who “mak[e] a self-referential claim to authority which is not derived
from the economic usefulness of their skills” (Martin 19). Not only is the
scholarship of literature without obvious exchange value, but the notion of
aesthetic value that historically justified the study of literature—and, thus,
English departments—developed in direct opposition to exchange value.
From roughly Kant forward, art became that which is not commodity, an
opposition that generates the double discourse of value. This discourse,
referred to throughout Novel Professions, distinguishes between “money, com-
merce, technology, industry, production and consumption, workers and con-
sumers” and “culture, art, genius, creation and appreciation, artists and con-
noisseurs” (Smith 127). “In the first discourse,” Smith writes, “events are
explained in terms of calculation, preferences, costs, benefits, profits, prices,
and utility. In the second, events are explained—or, rather (and this distinc-
tion/opposition is as crucial as any of the others), ‘justified’—in terms of
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inspiration, discrimination, taste (good taste, bad taste, no taste), the test of
time, intrinsic value and transcendent value” (127). The double discourse of
value remained relatively intact, with some refinements and mutations, from
the late eighteenth century until about the last quarter-century. It sought to
keep its terms pure and separate, not only incommensurable but opposed:
where economics is quantitative, aesthetics is qualitative; whereas commodi-
ties possess utility, art objects embody intrinsic value; and while one
exchanges labor for wages, one participates in disinterested free play in art
and literature. As it becomes clear that the profession needs to develop a strat-
egy if it is to offer its practitioners a decent living, the question is: What do
you do when the very terms with which you have traditionally defined your-
self are in direct opposition to the only terms that now enjoy, well, purchase?
In the last five years, a handful of literary critics have tried to answer this
question, and their answers typically take one of two positions. They either
argue that we must revive the principle of disinterested service despite its mar-
ginality, hoping that whatever authority such a principle once enjoyed is not
irrevocably lost, or they argue that we must unionize and fight the university
in economic terms. The one strategy attempts to recuperate the discourse that
asserts its incommensurability with the economic while the other appears to
abandon that discourse by arguing for the value of literature not in the aes-
thetic language of transcendence but in the economic language of labor.
These two strategies reflect a long-standing tendency within literary criti-
cism to oscillate between one discourse of value and the other, a pendulum
effect that, as John Guillory’s historical account of the double discourse of
value in Cultural Capital makes clear, is built into criticism by the binary
opposing aesthetics and political economy. Political economy and aesthetics’s
“separat[ion] at birth” dooms aesthetic criticism to an oscillation between
exposing aesthetics’s concealed exchange value and reasserting aesthetic dis-
interest (Guillory, Cultural Capital 303). (See chapter 1 for a more extended
treatment of Guillory’s account.) I sketch this oscillation’s most recent mani-
festation here by juxtaposing a work paradigmatic of criticism in the 1990s,
Martha Woodmansee’s The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History
of Aesthetics (1994), to a recently published work in Victorian studies that is
in some important respects its mirror other, Amanda Anderson’s The Powers
of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment (2001).
Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, I then argue that once we
widen the frame of analysis to include the sociological conditions in which
these representative works were produced, we catch a glimpse of how and
why the oscillation within criticism is reproducing itself within the debate
over the profession.
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In her influential study The Author, Art, and the Market, Martha
Woodmansee argues that “the momentous shift from the instrumentalist theo-
ry of art to the modern theory of art as an autonomous object that is to be con-
templated disinterestedly” occurred in reaction to the eighteenth-century devel-
opment of a middle-class market for literature (32). The older instrumentalist
theory of art which held that a work’s purpose was to move its reader “was
found to justify the wrong works,” precisely because it justified those works the
market rewarded. The aesthetic principle of disinterested autonomy, converse-
ly, provided writers neglected by the market with a “set of concepts with which
to address the predicament in which they found themselves—concepts by
which (difficult, or ‘fine’) art’s de facto loss of direct instrumentality could be
recuperated as a (supreme) virtue” (32). For example, in her opening chapter
“The Interests in Disinterestedness”—a title that, though he’s never cited,
seems taken from Bourdieu2—Woodmansee attributes Karl Philip Moritz’s
abandonment of his mentor’s instrumental theory and his adoption of the prin-
ciple of aesthetic autonomy to his mounting “financial worries” (29). He and
the literary elite of which he formed a part found themselves to have been
“betrayed by the profit motive and by the laws of supply and demand,” she
explains (28). “In the claim,” continues Woodmansee, “that the ‘true’ work of
art is the locus of intrinsic value—a perfectly self-sufficient totality that exists
to be contemplated disinterestedly, for its own sake—Moritz makes a triumph
of defeat and ‘rescues’ art from determination by the market” (32–33).
While much of Woodmansee’s research—especially on the obscure Moritz
who, it seems, articulated the logic of aesthetic autonomy a decade before
Kant—is original, her point is not. In Culture and Society (1958), for exam-
ple, Raymond Williams made the similar point that “there are some obvious
elements of compensation” in the theory of aesthetic value (36). But unlike
Woodmansee, Williams did not leave it at that. “Yet, undoubtedly,” he con-
tinued, “this is to simplify the matter, for the response [of artists to postin-
dustrial market forces] is not merely a professional one. It is also (and this has
been of the greatest subsequent importance) an emphasis on the embodiment
in art of certain human values, capacities, energies, which the development
of society towards an industrial civilization was felt to be threatening or even
destroying” (36). Woodmansee calls the principle of aesthetic value “conven-
ient and very powerful,” but it is its convenience for the professional egos
involved that she explores and, other than as a vague reference to the princi-
ple’s durability, what she means by “very powerful” is left unclear. As one
reviewer complained, “her focus on the personal motivations of Moritz and
Schiller seems to reduce the origin of modern aesthetics to a case of sour
grapes on the part of individual writers” (Kaiser 104).3
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Woodmansee’s suspicion of the notion of disinterested aesthetic value per-
vades her text, evident even in the scare quotes in the sentence above: “Moritz
‘rescues’ art from determination by the market” (32–33). Was some kind of
rescue not necessary? Should aesthetic value be determined solely, or even pri-
marily, by exchange value? What separates her self-described “materialist”
account from Raymond Williams’s is its lack of dialectical reason. Exposing
Kantian (or Moritzian) aesthetics’ ideological side, Woodmansee seems to
assume that she must then reject such aesthetics wholesale rather than seeing
it as at once regressive and progressive.
In place of the high aesthetic tradition, Woodmansee champions an early-
nineteenth-century form of reception theory that she finds in Francis Jeffrey,
a follower of the associationist theory of aesthetics, which “privileg[ed] the
recipient in a model of appreciation” (133). Jeffrey, she writes, was “con-
vinced that aesthetic disagreement is not rationally resolvable, and [he was]
entirely comfortable with diversity” (135). “Refreshingly current,” as
Woodmansee says, Jeffrey argued that there need not be a standard of taste.
While this certainly reads more happily than any aesthetic that strives to
adjudicate taste from above, it is, in the final analysis, indistinguishable from
the market populism best loved by classical political economy wherein the
consumer “cannot be wrong—except by consuming too little,” as
Woodmansee herself acknowledges (136). Rejecting an aesthetics of disinter-
est, Woodmansee reverts to an aesthetics uncritical of the market.
Such an aesthetic is the symmetrical counterpoint to Kantian aesthetics,
then, but not necessarily in the way Woodmansee imagines. She conceives of
Jeffrey’s aesthetics as Kant’s counterpoint because it privileged the spectator
of art rather than the (difficult, self-sufficient) art itself, but as any reading of
Kant or Schiller makes clear, the spectator was the privileged site of that ver-
sion of aesthetics as well. The difference between the two versions, though, is
that whereas Jeffrey assumed immediate (abstract) equality among spectators,
Kant recognized that people are not all given equivalent access and potential
as spectators—only those with full bellies, literally and figuratively, are capa-
ble of disinterested judgment. Although Jeffrey rightly eschewed snobbery, he
might well be accused of a certain amount of bourgeois bad faith in his ver-
sion of the spectator, a version that does not consider the inequality of the
material conditions in which tastes develop. The aesthetic tradition may well
have authorized a high culture in which only the leisured enjoyed aesthetic
authority, but in its desire for a mode of perception liberated from econom-
ic necessity, the aesthetic tradition also acknowledged the material conditions
inhibiting and distorting free judgment.
Amanda Anderson’s The Powers of Distance attends to precisely the “dis-
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tinctive virtues” of disinterest or “enabling detachment,” in order to “enlarge
and reframe current understandings of aesthetic and intellectual practice in
nineteenth-century Britain” (5). (Anderson’s use of the term “detachment,”
she tells us in her introduction, is meant to include the aesthetic notion of
disinterestedness as well as scientific concepts such as critical reason.) Calling
her book “polemical,” she characterizes her approach as “go[ing] against the
grain of much recent work in literary and cultural studies, which follows the
critique of Enlightenment in its insistence that cultural ideals of rationality
or critical distance are inevitably erected as the exclusive province of elite
groups” (5). Anderson explores the ways in which various Victorians distin-
guished between forms of detachment. In “Disinterestedness as Vocation:
Revisiting Matthew Arnold,” for example, Anderson recovers “another line of
thinking in Arnold’s work” that emphasizes “the successful subjective enact-
ment or embodiment of forms of universality, as distinguished from other
moments where he seems to valorize impersonal or objective standards” (97).
Rather than appealing to some fundamental, elitist standard of taste, then, as
Anderson claims critics assume, Arnold focused on articulating “an ideal of
temperament or character, whose key attributes bespeak a kind of value-laden
value-neutrality: impartiality, tact, moderation, measure, balance, flexibility,
detachment, objectivity, composure” (115).
Where Woodmansee did not acknowledge the critical force of disinterest-
edness, Anderson professes herself “devoted” to precisely this ideal (32). But
if economic details appeared to hold too much weight in Woodmansee’s
analysis, they seem to carry no weight in Anderson’s. Woodmansee simulta-
neously reduces aesthetics to the market (a lack of exchange value motivates
the articulation of aesthetic value) and champions an aesthetic itself reducible
to the market (consumer choice), but what marks Anderson’s study is how lit-
tle a mark the market leaves. Anderson cites Bourdieu in her introduction,
quoting his statement that “the most effective reflection is one that consists
in objectifying the subject of objectification” (30). However, she attempts to
follow through on this advice not by analyzing the material conditions shap-
ing her own perceptions but by remaining attentive to the ways in which the
articulations of detachment she explicates in Arnold and others fall short. Yet,
in turn, these figures do not fall short because of any disposition shaped by
their material and social positions. Arnold, for example, is taken to task for
his “inability to imagine reciprocal social relations as a site where one’s prin-
ciples might be enacted,” but “the limits of his social and political vision” are
presented as just that—limits of a vision, inadequacies of an individual. They
are not understood as a consequence of Arnold’s habitus or the logic of the
field in which he moves. Anderson pays little attention to the economic and
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social conditions that predispose Arnold’s thinking to expand in certain ways
and contract in others.
When Anderson’s approach throughout the book is held up to Bourdieu’s
actual methodology, it appears to fall into the very trap of idealist reflection
Bourdieu criticizes. “One cannot avoid having to objectify the objectifying
subject,” Bourdieu writes; “It is by turning to study the historical conditions
of his own production, rather than by some form or other of transcendental
reflection, that the scientific subject can gain a theoretical control over his
own structures and limitations” (Rules of Art xii). Consider Bourdieu’s
approach to “objectification” more generally. In The Rules of Art, for example,
he submits the literary world of mid-nineteenth-century France to an inten-
sive objectification by mapping each figure’s position on the continuum of
heteronomy (insertion in the market) and autonomy (distance from the mar-
ket and economic necessity). By not analyzing the conditions in which her
figures produce and are themselves produced, Anderson remains in the realm
of transcendental reflection, unable to account for her figures’ limitations or,
for that matter, their achievements except as individual failures or feats of will
and imagination.
Anderson wishes to reject what she calls the “all or nothing” form of crit-
icism, arguing:
Current critiques of detachment . . . [come to the] immediate and unwar-
ranted assumption that any and all practices of cultivated distance claim
a kind of pure or absolute objectivity for themselves. Countering with the
view that no such objectivity exists, critics show themselves unable to
imagine critical distance as a temporary vantage, an unstable achieve-
ment, or regulative ideal: it’s all or nothing. (32)
Yet she inadvertently fosters just such a mode. First, by neglecting the mate-
rial context in which such vantages and achievements become possible,
Anderson fails to develop a discourse that can treat the (impure) material
world and the (pure) ideal world in the same register, thereby implicitly and
inadvertently reinforcing their dichotomous relationship. Secondly, the lan-
guage that she does use, particularly such phrases as “temporary vantage” and
“unstable achievement,” suggests that disinterest is in itself pure but simply
fleeting. Bourdieu’s sociology of culture illuminates the logic by which “dis-
interest” is simultaneously self-interested and disinterested. 
An engaged treatment of Bourdieu’s work on aesthetic autonomy might
have enabled both Woodmansee and Anderson to move beyond the either/or
framework they establish wherein disinterest is either really disinterested or
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some masked form of self-interest. As I discussed in the introductory chap-
ter, Bourdieu demonstrates in Rules of Art that the disinterested disposition is
a function of the field—the habitus simultaneously selected and called into
being. Viewing “disinterest” this way and not as evidence of certain individ-
uals’ extraordinary capacity for self-renunciation, we are more, rather than
less, likely to believe in its authenticity.
Bourdieu’s reframing of aesthetics constitutes a dialectical advance, taking
us beyond the materialism/idealism opposition within which we have been
stuck, shuttling between the two discourses. In fact, Bourdieu argues, this
tendency to shuttle is built into the study of aesthetics:
The science of art and literature is threatened by two opposite errors,
which, being complementary, are particularly likely to occur since, in
reacting diametrically against one of them, one necessarily falls into the
other. The work of art is an object which exists as such only by virtue of
the (collective) belief which knows and acknowledges it as a work of art.
Consequently, in order to escape from the usual choice between celebra-
tory effusions and the reductive analysis which, failing to take account of
the fact of belief in the work of art and of the social conditions which
produce that belief, destroys the work of art as such, a rigorous science of
art must, pace both the unbelievers and the iconoclasts and also the
believers, assert the possibility and necessity of understanding the work
in its reality as a fetish; it has to take into account everything which helps
to constitute the work as such, not least the discourses of direct or dis-
guised celebration which are among the social conditions of production
of the work of art qua object of belief. (“Field” 35)
While the “believers” uncritically assert the ideology of disinterest, the unbe-
lievers disregard the collective belief in art’s structural removal from the mar-
ket and, in doing so, they distort their analyses while imagining that they dis-
pel illusions. We must understand art “in its reality as a fetish,” Bourdieu
says—that is, as something that both is unaccounted for when accounted for
by the deus ex machina of the “gift” or “genius” and yet also is a kind of deus
ex machina because the traces of its production and the source of its origins
have been obscured. Recognizing the effaced labor producing the “work of
art qua object of belief ” is to realize that art’s transcendent position outside
the market is itself a product of history. Historicizing the aesthetic ideal of
autonomy is, then, not the same thing as reducing it to its compensatory and
ideological functions, but nor is it to retrieve it from the ash heap in order to
revalorize it. Historicizing the aesthetic ideal may lead to the realization,
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however, that it is changing now that the historical conditions that created
it—the development of technologies of, and a market for, mass production—
have themselves undergone substantial alteration.
Interestingly, the current debate over how to handle the profession’s “cri-
sis” reveals something about the ideal’s transformation, if only symptomati-
cally. To get at what it reveals, I return to Bourdieu’s injunction to objectify
the objectifying subjects by making room for the sociological conditions in
which Woodmansee and Anderson produced their work. Why, that is, did an
analysis of aesthetic autonomy that implicated it in the market logic it
claimed to disavow make sense in the larger context of literary criticism in the
1990s? And why is a book rescuing aesthetic autonomy not from the market
but from literary critics themselves necessary today?
The Author, Art, and the Market fit broadly within 1980s and 1990s post-
structuralist work as part of the larger trend referred to in the introductory
chapter as a hermeneutics of suspicion. It also fit with the development of
cultural studies and the relatively new academic interest in popular culture.
Helping to collapse the boundary between high and mass culture,
Woodmansee’s book suggests that the concepts of difficulty and self-
sufficiency that authorize the privileging of high art are themselves in some
sense unauthorized insofar as those that authored them did so for reasons
other than the ones they gave. Anderson positions her study of the Victorians
within the context of developments in literary criticism, and though she
never mentions the larger sociological context of the English departments
that house such criticism, her project might be viewed nonetheless as an
implicit response to the increasing visibility of higher education’s commer-
cialization. It is no accident that as the humanities lose ground in the uni-
versity, literary critics like Anderson find themselves wishing to reassert the
possibility and integrity of disinterestedness. It is as if, after years of demysti-
fication and suspicion, critics find themselves in the ironic position of need-
ing to reconstruct what they have just deconstructed. Indeed, exemplifying
the oscillation of criticism within their own careers, some of the very critics
who most effectively exposed the power dynamics underwriting apparently
disinterested works during the “culture wars” of the 1980s and early 1990s
are the ones now calling for a reassertion of disinterest. For example, Mary
Poovey, whose demystification of “disinterest” in Uneven Developments I dis-
cussed in the introduction, has responded to the corporatization of the uni-
versity by attempting to invigorate the discourse of aesthetic value.
In her essay “The Twenty-First-Century University and the Market: What
Price Viability?” Poovey writes:
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We have to suspend the market model entirely in favor of an alternate
system that defines value differently. The only way we can do this, in
turn, is to identify, a priori, goods that are goods in themselves—that
defy market evaluation because they are not quantifiable, thus not sub-
ject to commodification. In order to identify these goods—or more prop-
erly to assert they exist—I have to risk something that poststructuralism
has taught me to abhor: I have to essentialize the ‘human.’ (6)
Acknowledging that her strategy requires her to unlearn the poststructural-
ism that shaped her scholarly work, Poovey articulates a rhetorical strategy
that is, finally, the same one that English departments conventionally used
until around 1970, when poststructuralism arrived: the assertion that aes-
thetics or, as Poovey puts its, “human creativity, is an end in itself, an autotel-
ic, self-sufficient totality nonreferrable to market value. What is implied in
this argument is that poststructuralism (and maybe cultural studies—all
those literary critical modes governed largely or in part by a hermeneutics of
suspicion) has inadvertently conspired with market ideology to destabilize
the humanities. “I fear,” Poovey writes, “that we have allowed our postmod-
ern skepticism to neutralize the very criticism it initially fostered. By turning
critique against the possibility of critique, I worry that we are helping the
market render the very category of value meaningless” (7).4 If we, at least in
our “public” selves, get back to our old line—the aesthetic line that until a
few years ago we excoriated as elitist, colonialist, and patriarchal but that we
now see might have, as Anderson says, “distinctive virtues”—we might stem
the tide of corporatization. “Ironically,” Poovey writes, “the humanities’ lack
of economic potential may be the only asset capable of insulating us from
market logic” (7). The very thing, then, that makes literary study so
vulnerable—its inutility—might turn out to be its best defense.
Poovey is hardly alone. A growing number of literary critics worry that
poststructuralism has destroyed a belief in the mission of literary studies at
the very moment critics most need the power of their convictions. Director
of the Association of Departments of English David Laurence worries that
the hermeneutics of suspicion has led to “the erosion of conviction about the
educational formation called literary studies and institutional formation
called the English department” (17). David Bell complains that “Foucault’s
view of the literary as a field defined through exclusions and prohibitions . . .
stoked the fires of suspicion toward literature” (488) and that a suspicious
mode continues to prevail in literary studies: “The ‘end of the age of high the-
ory’ . . . has not fundamentally changed the suspicion toward literature”
(487). He writes:
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If we are to argue persuasively to undergraduates that a major in
literature—or any study of literature, for that matter—is a worthwhile
pursuit, then we need to explain why literature cannot simply be charac-
terized as a field given over to power and its ruses. Unfortunately, the
necessity for this explanation comes at a historical moment of suspicion
when such an explanation is perhaps harder to provide than it has been
before. (488)
Having argued that this is a “historical moment” and, thus, presumably, not
something we can simply refuse when we think better of it, Bell nonetheless
gives his essay the voluntaristic title “Moratorium on Suspicion?”—as if crit-
ics could agree to collectively shed a critical disposition that was two decades
in the making now that it has become a professional liability.5
It is not hard to see why a rhetorical mobilization of “disinterest” is an
appealing strategy at this point—it champions disinterest against profit as a
vital human principle at a time when acting disinterestedly appears strange or
self-defeating rather than noble. But there are at least three interrelated rea-
sons why it is not a useful path to pursue.
First, from a certain perspective, it looks like an act of bad faith. Ruthlessly
deconstructing the political and economic subtexts driving rhetoric else-
where, the critic shies away from publicly disclosing the material reality, the
struggle over class position and power within the university, that is the sub-
text of her own writing. While Poovey places her call for the rhetoric of aes-
thetic autonomy within this material context, she does not call for that con-
text itself to be made publicly visible. Whereas the culture wars centered on
the politics of race, sexuality, and gender, the crisis facing humanities depart-
ments now is clearly about class and economics (this economic crisis was
already underway then, too, but was less visible). Asserting disinterest in this
context is not an invocation of the “work of art qua object of belief” but a
particular strategy for combating the market takeover of higher learning and
for shoring up an eroding professorial class. It is the critic’s subject position
as critic (not as female, black, queer, and so on) that is at stake. In this case,
rather than agitating for others or for her social group and, thus, enacting
“disinterest” even as she exposes it as myth or alibi in texts, the critic must
agitate for her own economic welfare. In this scenario, she cannot escape
acknowledging explicitly that she is acting, in part, out of self-interest.
Recuperating the old model is, then, an unintentionally disingenuous
strategy, but second, and more important, it will not do what these critics
want it to. Though it may provide a rationale for what we do, a rationale will
not defend English departments from retrenchment. As Michael Bérubé
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notes, “the market works by variables that have nothing to do with the pro-
fession’s intellectual interests” (Employment of English 101). In other words,
the hermeneutics of suspicion cannot be blamed for our alleged decline in
enrollments—surely, students got as great a charge from interrogating as
from revering literature—nor can it be blamed for administrators’ penchant
for phasing out tenure lines in the humanities. Administrators do not reduce
English departments’ tenure lines because they do not understand what
humanities faculty do or how important they are—indeed, many adminis-
trators came straight out of humanities departments. They do it because they
are under enormous budget pressures, and it is cheaper to hire adjuncts.
Furthermore, administrators can hire adjuncts without experiencing much, if
any, immediate loss of value. That is, it is certainly not the case that hiring
literature adjuncts is “like staffing a hospital all with orderlies,” as one pun-
dit has claimed (Businessweek). Adjuncts are often just as qualified as, and
sometimes more qualified than, their tenure-line counterparts. (Of course,
over the long term, there is a very real loss in value—the loss in committee
service, institutional loyalty and memory, and the like.) Under these circum-
stances, shared governance will continue to unravel and the gulf between fac-
ulty and administration will grow wider until it becomes unavoidably obvi-
ous that faculty can no longer count on the university as a whole to act as a
profession but must defend their profession against a university increasingly
dominated by the business model.
Lastly, even if a rationale could save us, it would not be disinterestedness.
As commodity production shifts from mass-scale to elaborate and flexible
niche marketing, aesthetic categories are necessarily destabilized. During the
past century and a half or so, high art was never truly independent of the
market, as its principle of autonomy proclaimed. Rather, as I discussed in the
last chapter, it was independent of a particular market (the mass market)
while it circulated upon what Bourdieu calls an antimimetic market, a field
of restricted production in which producers’ implicit audience is not the
masses but other producers (see The Field of Cultural Production). High art
relies conceptually upon the field of mass production by defining itself
against it. As William Paulson explains, “The conjunction of mass literacy
and the fully reproducible text made print the most advanced medium of
marketed and marketable culture and thus made literature a leading early
instance of an autonomous aesthetic field whose construction was both
opposed to and facilitated by that impersonal and heteronomous cultural
market” (“Market of Printed Goods” 403). With the structure of the imper-
sonal, mass market fading, the categories “high” and “low” have been par-
tially evacuated of meaning and force. This is part of a complex historical
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evolution that cannot be fully explored here.6 For my purposes, it is enough
to recognize that in this altered cultural and economic mode of production,
the discourse of pure disinterest collapses into contradiction. We can capital-
ize on our “lack of economic potential” as our greatest “asset,” Poovey writes,
contradictorily adopting market vocabulary to champion market transcen-
dence. Of course, Poovey knows very well what she’s doing—this is the irony
she alludes to—but precisely in knowing what she is doing, she reminds us
that the double discourse of value no longer pretends to keep its terms sepa-
rate and pure. It never could keep them separate and pure, but this fact was
not acknowledged or, if so, only fleetingly and relatively incoherently. Such
“innocence” was embodied in the two discourses’ various practitioners. That
what used to be an embodied strategy has become a self-conscious one indi-
cates that the double discourse of value no longer functions the way it used
to. Perhaps nothing underscores this change more than the recent media
attention given Jonathan Franzen’s reluctance to have Oprah Winfrey’s Book
Club stamped on his novel. Of the incident, David Kirkpatrick wrote in the
New York Times, “After disparaging Oprah Winfrey’s literary taste . . .
[Franzen] was full of abashed apologies.” This shows, Kirkpatrick continues,
“that if there was ever a time in the book business when authors wrote to
impress critics and their peers without regard to book sales, getting caught in
that posture is now almost embarrassing.”
In an analysis of the contemporary literary prize scene which beautifully
illustrates the fact that the once-repressed logic opposing economic and aes-
thetic value has become conscious, fundamentally altering the “game,” James
English writes that “without disappearing, the modern discourse of autono-
my has become a tactical fiction, or at least an imperfectly sincere one” (124).
Paulson, too, sees this new self-consciousness as reflective of a fundamental
reorganization of cultural and economic logic: “It hardly seems possible any-
more to base a theory and defense of intellectual autonomy on the institu-
tions and practices of print, at least not without recognizing that such a the-
ory and defense are calculated exercises in the strategic maintenance of resid-
ual formations” (“Market of Printed Goods” 405). And, indeed, calculation
and strategy are everywhere apparent in the tone of Poovey’s essay. “In order
to identify these goods [in themselves]—or more properly to assert they
exist,” Poovey begins one sentence, highlighting her argument’s strategic
essentialism by switching from a register of naive empirical belief to an iron-
ic register that underlines its rhetorical status. Simultaneously full-throated
and self-ironizing, Poovey juggles agency as if it were a hot potato, embrac-
ing a position and signaling her distance from it in the same moment. “I have
to risk something that poststructuralism has taught me to abhor,” she writes:
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“I have to”—I am forced against my will or perhaps better judgment to—
“risk something”—take a position I’m not sure I can defend.
Poovey’s essay represents a new twist in literary criticism’s oscillation
between exposing the exchange value concealed in aesthetic value and assert-
ing the disinterest of aesthetic value. She side-steps what might be called the
double bind of the double discourse, that bind whereby embracing the one
discourse inexorably means disavowing the other. Instead, she signals some
solidarity with both discourses by managing a tone at once sincere and iron-
ic. Such an argument strangely echoes Bourdieu’s own, as he describes the lit-
erary and artistic field as a field that operates in bad faith but that does so in
all sincerity. (More specifically, in “The Production of Belief,” Bourdieu calls
the literary and artistic field a “bad faith economy” while elsewhere, particu-
larly in Rules of Art, insisting on the sincerity of those who maneuver within
it—a contradiction that yields a dialectical truth.) Of course, the difference
is that Bourdieu aims to explain the (receding) logic of symbolic capital while
Poovey wishes to reanimate it, placing herself not among the sociologists of
culture but its defenders. Thus, what Bourdieu’s sociology seeks to disclose is
precisely what Poovey’s strategy is necessarily predisposed to repress: labor.
For Poovey, the emphasis falls on the “goods in themselves”—the artifacts
that, to recall Smith’s distinction, can be justified in terms of creativity and
uniqueness but cannot be explained or quantified as products of labor. For
Bourdieu, the sociology of culture entails unearthing the enormous rhetori-
cal, institutional, and individual labor that produces the “work of art” both
as a material or linguistic object and as an “object of belief ” and which, in
order to succeed, was repressed as labor. Tracing the construction of the aes-
thetic discourse of disinterestedness, Rules of Art shows that the discourse is
hardly universal or essential but rather developed to do necessary cultural
work—specifically, the work of autonomization.
If the discourse of disinterest authorized the historical autonomization of
literary study, then it makes sense that critics would come to see poststruc-
tural, politically informed work as complicit with the devaluation of the pro-
fession. But scrambling to reverse course by defending aesthetic value will
only perpetuate what Jeffrey J. Williams calls “the ideological gap, between
the imaginary projection of motivation and goals in the humanities (fun,
spiritual improvement) and the actual conditions of employment in univer-
sities” (“Life of the Mind” 209). Instead of reversing course, what if we were
to see the rise of political criticism not as an inadvertent accomplice in the
marginalization of literature but as a useful, if unrecognized, response to it?
Guillory has made a less hopeful version of this argument in a widely read
piece on the profession in the ADE Bulletin. Guillory suggests that rather
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than having exacerbated the current crisis, the hermeneutics of suspicion was
an ill-fated, only half-conscious attempt to forestall it. Sensing their obsoles-
cence, literary critics responded by increasing their volume, in both senses—
by producing more words and by being louder (in other words, more politi-
cally strident and attention-seeking). Hyperprofessionalized, hyperpoliticized
graduate students, on Guillory’s reading of this behavior, act this out in exag-
gerated fashion, embodying the bid of an “increasingly irrelevant” discipline
for political and professional power (4). “What I call preprofessionalism is
nothing other than the realm in which the profession’s fantasies, both pro-
fessional and political, are acted out,” he writes (“Preprofessionalism” 6).7 As
I discussed in the introduction, Guillory views this political criticism as
almost grandiosely deluded in its sense of its own potential impact. Instead,
economic forces out of our control doom us to deprofessionalization.8
I want to end Novel Professions by asking whether a less defeatist narrative
than Guillory’s might be constructed, one in which his own work stands as
evidence of what the last twenty years has made possible. Perhaps he articu-
lates so clearly what the rest of us express as garbled symptom precisely
because the profession has become increasingly political. Is it such a great
leap, after all, from doing work in the name of a number of constituencies—
feminist, queer, minority, postcolonial, and the like—to doing work in the
name of our own constituency—the professional class? This heightened self-
reflexivity—the objectification of the self, in the positive Marxist sense—
might be possible now only because of feminist awareness of situated episte-
mologies, Foucauldian suspicion of liberal individualism, and, for that mat-
ter, Bourdieuian sociology, which has uncovered the material production of
“disinterest.” However paradoxical at first glance, political criticism’s expo-
sure of the material underpinnings of the liberal or aesthetic ideology of
autonomy may be seen as precisely the precondition for our present recogni-
tion that our (relative) autonomy is endangered as well as the precondition
for our willingness to adopt a political disposition earlier generations of gen-
tlemen scholars were trained to abhor.
At the very least, the existence of these modes of critical thought (feminist,
Foucauldian, queer, postcolonial, Bourdieuian, and so on) signals the
improbability of recovering the ideal of disinterestedness as an unconscious
component of our habitus.9 And this may be a good thing, if it leads us to
abandon an ideal that encourages us to work, if not for free, then at a sub-
stantial discount. (Andrew Ross uses the phrase “cultural discount” to refer to
the principle whereby certain kinds of “workers accept nonmonetary
rewards—such as the gratification of producing art [or of teaching litera-
ture]—as compensation for their work, thereby discounting the cash price of
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their labor” [“Mental Labor Problem” 6]). Whereas Guillory views political
criticism as essentially superstructural—“The politicization of the humanities
is an effect of the latter’s marginalization and not the other way around,” he
writes (“Literary Critics” 115)—the case might be made that political criti-
cism responds in turn by making possible new resistance to the managerial
marginalization of literary studies.10 The self-reflexivity it engenders might
motivate us to advocate “openly and without embarrassment,” as John Frow
writes, for ourselves as professionals with the right to organize our own labor.
Rather than a highly sophisticated blind alley, then, the last two decades’
deconstruction of disinterest might have cleared the way for a dialectical
advance. At his best, for example, Foucault did not condemn experts but
rather shifted the epistemological terrain they inhabit by calling upon us to
“abandon the opposition between what is ‘interested’ and what is ‘disinter-
ested’” (Discipline and Punish 28). Bourdieu—not to mention the Victorian
novel itself—has already begun this post-Kantian work. Identifying the self-
interest central to the historical production of “disinterest,” Bourdieu identi-
fies the conditions in which disinterest becomes possible. Whereas others
have also spotlighted the material context of disinterest, they have tended to
assume that such illumination necessarily damns disinterestedness, exposing
the naked emperor. Instead of continuing to exaggerate the problem of dis-
interestedness, whether by damning its hypocrisy or defending its nobility,
critics need to focus on work autonomy, because autonomy is simultaneous-
ly a self-interested luxury and the material condition for genuine service. In
our English departments, in public forums, and at the bargaining table, we
need to fight to preserve intellectual autonomy by fighting to preserve the
tenure-line appointments that make it possible, because, as Bourdieu warns,
“durable virtues cannot be established on a pure decision of conscience. If
disinterestedness is sociologically possible, it can be so only through the
encounter between habitus predisposed to disinterestedness and the univers-
es in which disinterestedness is rewarded” (Practical Reason 88).
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Notes
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. For an insightful discussion of the way the word “smart” operates in academic cir-
cles, see Jeffrey J. Williams. As Bourdieu writes, “Nothing classifies somebody more than
the way he or she classifies” (“Social Space” 132).
2. See Dweck and Nicholls. See also Malcolm Gladwell’s essay “The Talent Myth” in
which he discusses Dweck’s work.
3. See Wooldridge for a fascinating history of the IQ test. Wooldridge is uncritically
liberal, however; for more critical accounts, see Gould, Kamin, and Gillian Sutherland.
See Lemann for a discussion of the IQ test in America.
4. This tendency to turn “doing” into “being” annoys Punch as early as 1853 when
the editors write, “We are continually hearing of some individual or other who is remark-
able for what is called an ‘Enlarged Benevolence.’ We wish MR. DONOVAN would
explain to us the meaning of this phrase, for though we sometimes hear of an enlargement
of the heart, or of a newspaper having been permanently enlarged, we are puzzled to
understand how there can be an enlargement of an individual’s benevolence.” “A
Phrenological Puzzle.” 
5. “The challenge posed to class analysis by the group in question,” Guillory has writ-
ten, “is precisely that of a class in which the cultural constituent appears to be definitive,
and in which its mode of cultural or ‘knowledge’ production is uniquely related to the sys-
tem of production” (“Literary Critics as Intellectuals” 124).
6. Because, as Harold Perkin wrote, “it was chiefly in the civil servants . . . that the
professional ideal began to diverge from the entrepreneurial,” I focus in Novel Professions
on the civil service rather than the Oxbridge examinations, but the former were modeled
upon the latter (Rise of Professional Society 428).
7. “To a much greater degree than is usually credited,” Hack writes, “authors . . .
accept market exchange as one—if not the only—source of income that does not com-
promise one’s independence, and even to highlight their participation in the marketplace”
(“Literary Paupers” 693).
8. Adams is referring specifically to the way Foucauldian critics have written about
domesticity in Victorian culture. “Many recent accounts of Victorian domesticity,” he
writes in his extremely useful 2001 review of work in the nineteenth century, “have
restaged versions of what one might call Foucauldian melodrama: the familiar story of the
many-headed Hydra of ‘surveillance’ violating the sanctity of domestic privacy” (“Recent
Studies in the Nineteenth Century” 858–59).
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9. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault writes, “The question I would like to pose is
not, Why are we repressed? but rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much
resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that
we are repressed?” (8–9).
10. See Guillory’s “Preprofessionalism” and also Lambert on Guillory’s essay.
11. In his critique of this narrative of decline, Bruce Robbins contrasts this perception
of professionalization to “vocation”: “Vocation demands public-ness and progress [while]
professionalization means privacy and regress,” he writes (Secular Vocations 121). For a fas-
cinating analysis of how the “common tale of a Fall into Professionalism” haunts numer-
ous disciplines in addition to literature, see Robbins’s “Less Disciplinary Than Thou” (11).
12. In Literary Culture in a World Transformed, William Paulson makes a similar (and
similarly bleak) argument. “Literature’s overt value as cultural capital for the upper-middle
class,” he writes, “has been declining for generations, to the point that it is futile either to
try to prop up its archaic function as the font of refined, genteel discourse or to claim that
one is striking a blow for democratic culture by debunking it” (14).
13. For examples in which Guillory is explicitly cited as an influence in the authors’
thinking, see David Laurence’s “The Latest Forecast,” Mary Poovey’s “Beyond the Literary
Critical Impasse,” and George Levine’s “Two Nations.”
14. As John McGowan explains, the assault on professorial autonomy is “connected
with the contemporary economy’s maximizing of productivity through use of a modified
piecework system. Workers are only hired for the specific time and the specific tasks for
which they are needed, and are not carried by the employer during slack times” (43).
15. The American Association of Higher Education is arguably one of the major play-
ers in the move to abolish tenure. Their “New Pathways” series is devoted to developing
new ways to organize higher education, and, repeatedly, articles in this series recommend
the abolishment of tenure. “The view espoused in this paper is that tenure may have made
some sense in the 1920s, or in the 1960s,” begins one article, “but may not make sense as
the dominant employment relationship in the 1990s or the decade beyond” (Breneman
2).
16. Since 1975, the number of non-tenure-track faculty has increased by 88 percent
(Harris 27). At my own university, something like 70 percent of the English department’s
student-credit hours are taught by non-tenure-line faculty. Not only are literature students
taught by “casual labor” but much of our departmental service is performed by non-
tenure-line faculty. For example, our assistant chair is not tenure-line.
17. Tellingly, the implications of the very phrase “job market” have changed. Once,
applying the phrase to the annual shuffle between departments and job seekers seemed to
operate as mere analogy. After all, literary critics chose their profession in part to escape
the market logic that presides over other employment sectors. In a second phase, the “mar-
ket” is invoked ruefully and ironically—“look we’re just like everybody else after all, a big
cut-throat game.” Now, little trace of irony remains as the phrase “job market” saturates
our conversations, no longer as trope but as apparent reality. Marc Bousquet has argued
persuasively, however, that the rhetoric of the “market” does not describe but rather
obscures our current dilemma (“Rhetoric of ‘Job Market,’” “Waste Product”). The sense
that large market forces are behind the job crisis leaves us less likely to resist the structur-
al transformation of higher education, and the focus on the job market “diverts attention
from the real problems of ‘demand’ (the willingness of administration to utilize nonde-
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greed flexible labor instead of degreed persons in jobs)” (“Rhetoric of ‘Job Market’” 215).
18. For an early articulation of the same logic by an Americanist, see Seltzer, who wrote
in Henry James and the Art of Power, “Modern power arrangements of discipline and nor-
malization aspire to a ‘double discourse’ of disavowal and reinscription. From this point
of view, the assertion of literary autonomy or subversiveness appears not as an escape from
power but rather as part of that power’s deployment” (174).
19. Poovey’s suspicion extends even to points incidental to her argument. She describes
book reviewing, for example, as if professionals—notoriously unlikely to identify as a class
because of professionalism’s emphasis on individual merit—were conspiring to guarantee
one another’s value. Mentioning one review of David Copperfield in Fraser’s Magazine (a
journal without any obvious stake in the novel’s success), she places “review” in scare
quotes and claims, “like many other mid-nineteenth-century ‘reviews,’ this piece func-
tions as an advertisement for the novel, but because it is presented as a critical evaluation,
it generates the effect of describing the value it actually helped create” (108). Of course,
there is some truth to this, and one could imagine an argument that illustrates all the
diverse kinds of labor, some invisible, that go into the production of “value.” Poovey’s
comment, however, reflects a thoroughgoing cynicism about the nature of professional
practices.
20. With his usual clarity on the topic, Robbins makes the point that the “logic of self-
constitution by means of exclusion cannot be taken for granted. It is true, of course, that
credentials are only meaningful if someone else does not possess them. Yet there is a very
long step from this truth to the more questionable notion that the unequal possession of
credentials is necessarily unjust. There is another long step to the more dubious assump-
tion that unequal credentialing is the central principle of injustice in our unjust society”
(Secular Vocations 200).
21. In an essay on aesthetics and modernity, Harpham drew up a list of “norms and
notions” central to aesthetics that chimes remarkably well with professionalism: “the priv-
ilege of disinterested assessment; the autonomy of the artifact from historical, social, or
economic forces; the uncoerced liberty of the judging subject; the universability of sub-
jective responses; the human capacity to imagine and create objects” (“Aesthetics and the
Fundamentals of Modernity” 124).
22. For an example of a work written in the heyday of suspicion but which brilliantly
kept art’s double position front and center, see Psomiades.
23. I should note that in her recent essay “Beyond the Current Impasse in Literary
Studies” Poovey admits that she has been one of those critics who, among other things,
“assum[ed] that neither literary texts nor other kinds of cultural artifacts belong to sepa-
rate or autonomous domains” (368). As indicated here and in a handful of other places,
Poovey might agree with some of the criticisms I forward here.
24. For an excellent explanation of why Bourdieu has been read this way, see Moi. Moi
argues that critics accustomed to the poststructural seesaw of oppositions—“subject or
object, activity or passivity, voluntarism or determinism” (503)—find it difficult to do
what Bourdieu requires, which is to “grasp and hold both sides of the formulation ‘to
make something of what the world makes of us’—our freedom as well as the necessity that
constrains it” (503). As a result, poststructural critics tend to reduce Bourdieu’s work to
mere determinism, absorbing it as “just another poststructuralist ‘theory’” (506).
25. James Chandler has recently suggested that literary critics need to “work toward a
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better understanding of how the scheme of disciplines might be said to compose a system”
(359). Pointing to Bourdieu’s work as a resource for such a project, Chandler continues,
“my sense is that the totality of the disciplines at any given time should be articulated not
as a set of territories, or even as a set of parallel functions, or box of tools, but as a net-
work of relatively autonomous practices in asymmetrical relation to each other” (360).
26. A more detailed exploration of the differences between the French and English
nineteenth centuries would help clarify the limitations of Bourdieu’s project for
Victorianists, but here I am primarily concerned to use him to inspire a new line of
inquiry. In a fascinating discussion of Victorian poetry and modernity, Ivan Kreilkamp
asks a question relevant to my own project on the novel. Invoking the figure in Rules of
Art second only to Flaubert, Baudelaire, he asks, “Why do we have no English Charles
Baudelaire, no mid-nineteenth-century poet whose work participates, explicitly and con-
sciously, in the early theorization of modernity occurring at the time in France and
Germany and America? Is it possible that this lack is at least in part a by-product of the
questions we ask of Victorian poetry?” (605). I suggest that our sacrifice of the Victorian
professional has been a major factor prohibiting an analysis of the Victorian novel in rela-
tionship to aesthetic modernity.
27. Rather, he continues, “it is by increasing [intellectuals’] autonomy (and, thereby,
among other things, their freedom to criticize the prevailing powers) that intellectuals can
increase the effectiveness of political action whose ends and means have their origin in the
specific logic of the fields of cultural production” (340).
28. There is perhaps a little self-loathing to Jameson’s sacrifice of the pompous-humble
intellectual, a bizarre moment in which Jameson and Winston Churchill converge in
Churchhill’s remark that “the intelligentsia are the glittering scum on the deep river of
production” (qtd. in Lubenow 8).
29. As David F. Noble explains, “With the commoditization of instruction, teachers as
labor are drawn into a production process designed for the efficient creation of instruc-
tional commodities, and hence become subject to all the pressures that have befallen pro-
duction workers in other industries undergoing rapid technological transformation from
above” (Steal This University 39). Long before the University of Phoenix was even an idea
much less a reality, Marx said, “A schoolmaster is a productive labourer, when, in addition
to belabouring the heads of his scholars, he works like a horse to enrich the school pro-
prietors. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage
factory, does not alter the relation” (Capital 1: 16,509).
30. Here, and throughout Novel Professions, I tend to use Marxist vocabulary and con-
cepts, but this image of creative labor that returns to its producer might just as easily be
put in psychoanalytic terms as work that augments and integrates the ego rather than
diminishes it. In D. W. Winnicott’s terms, it is the difference between “creative appercep-
tion” and “compliance.”
31. Paul Delany also criticizes “the predominant influence of Foucault” (5). “England
and France,” he writes, “have such fundamental differences as to make it implausible that
the Foucauldian model would have equal explanatory power on both sides of the
Channel” (5–6).
32. As Mintz discussed at much greater length, “George Eliot examines both how far
the conditions of the age made it possible for the impulse toward self-aggrandizing ambi-
tion and the impulse toward selfless contribution to society to be united in a single life,
126 Notes to Introduction
Ruth_Notes_2nd.qxp  12/15/2005  11:59 AM  Page 126
and, in addition, how that union is supported by secularized versions of older Protestant
ideas about a man’s calling in the world” (2).
33. This self-loathing is not the same as that identified by Stanley Fish in his notori-
ous 1994 essay “The Unbearable Ugliness of Volvos.” The implicit self-glorification Fish
identifies in academic martyrdom has largely evaporated, I would argue, now that we have
become increasingly reliant upon exploiting adjunct labor.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1. For key examples of the first argument, see Larson, Heyck, and Wiener. For what
is perhaps the key example of the second, see Poovey’s “The Man-of-Letters Hero.”
2. The apparently contradictory position of the professional between labor and capi-
tal has been widely acknowledged since Barbara and John Ehrenreich’s seminal essay “The
Professional-Managerial Class” in which they examined the professional’s ambivalent rela-
tionship to the capitalist interests he or she serves. I take the title of this chapter from
Between Labor and Capital, a 1979 essay collection focused on the Ehrenreichs’ argument.
For an important reworking of their premise, see Robbins’s “The Village of the Liberal-
Managerial Class.”
3. One reason Brontë felt The Professor possessed more “substance” than Jane Eyre
might have been that she perceived the former male-narrated novel to be primarily about
work and only secondarily about romance while she saw the later novel to reverse these
priorities. In other words, she may have been betraying her participation in her culture’s
common sense that work is serious, substantive, and intrinsically masculine while
romance is silly, ephemeral, and feminine. Nonetheless, one by-product of this novel’s
production of a male professional is, as I will argue later, a rather rigorous refusal of the
logic that assigns women to the play or non-work side of the labor/play divide.
4. For a more developed account than Guillory’s of the origins of aesthetic disinter-
estedness in eighteenth-century philosophy, see Stolnitz. For an excellent and fascinating
discussion that places the origins of aesthetics in relationship to the rise of bourgeois state
structures, see Lloyd. “My fundamental argument,” wrote Lloyd, “is that the discourse on
the aesthetic supplies theoretical resolution to the antinomies of bourgeois politics, reso-
lutions which inform not only subsequent ideological discourse but also its material insti-
tutions” (109).
5. For a discussion of Burke’s definitions, see Poovey’s “Aesthetics and Political
Economy in the Eighteenth Century.”
6. See Armstrong and Tennenhouse for a discussion of Marx’s inability to account for
intellectual labor.
7. The initial framing of the novel might be understood in this context not as a false
start, as has often been argued, but as a reproduction of this structure. Beginning as a let-
ter to an old school friend, the novel abandons this device as if the epistolary form were
too tied to an older, obsolete economy of patronage. William tells us that the “time . . .
which I intended to employ for his [friend’s] benefit, I shall now dedicate to that of the
public at large” (47). But the modern mass-marketed commodity turns out to be an unac-
ceptable form as well. While Crimsworth dedicates his story to the “public at large,” he
quickly rules out a large public by adding: “My narrative is not exciting, and above all, not
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marvelous [sic]; but it may interest some individuals, who, having toiled in the same voca-
tion as myself, will find in my experience frequent reflections of their own” (47). The story
is dedicated not to an undifferentiated, impersonal market, but to “individuals” on the
same career path. The book’s relationship to the market is much like the modern profes-
sional’s: both circulated on the market, they nonetheless attempt to protect themselves
from its universalizing and homogenizing effects.
8. Making a similar point, the Newcastle Commission reported in 1861, “Trained
teachers do not dislike their work; there is no reason why they should; it is honourable,
intellectual, and benevolent; but society has not yet learned how to value them. This they
feel with all the sensitiveness that belongs to educated and professional men” (qtd. in Sturt
159).
9. A great deal of work has explored phrenology in its political and scientific contexts.
As well as Cooter, see Shapin, Richards, Harrington, and Clarke and Jacyna. For discus-
sions of Brontë and phrenology, see Shuttleworth and Dames (“The Clinical Novel”). For
a discussion of professionalization and phrenology, see my “The Case of The Zooist.”
10. Critics have seen Crimsworth as a class hybrid but nobody has noticed that he is
in fact a protoprofessional. Terry Eagleton has argued that the novel enacts “a marriage of
identifiably bourgeois values with the values of the gentry or aristocracy” but his marriage
metaphor obscures the hard work the novel performs as it rewrites the aesthetic and aris-
tocratic versions of independence into a middle-class notion of professional autonomy
(54).
11. If, as Dierdre D’Albertis has argued, “the principles of duty and self-denial intrin-
sic to professional identity on the one hand, and to gender classification on the other,
undercut one another,” then it might be worth hypothesizing that Brontë’s refusal of the
tie between disinterest and femininity is a strategy to make room for a representation of
herself as a disinterested professional (4).
12. The tension between mental work and mental property that exists in the novel
reflects a tension that existed within phrenology itself. Phrenology was popularly under-
stood as a form of material determinism—one’s skull defined and delimited you—but, in
fact, the phrenological movement at mid-century thought that one might exercise and
improve one’s abilities. But the popular understanding was not simply a mistake but rather
an acknowledgment that by stressing the structure of seemingly unchangeable matter,
phrenology appeared to reduce one to one’s material property even as it argued for one’s
self-improvement through labor.
13. In a novel that is anything but playful, one that in fact redefines play as labor, eco-
nomic metaphors repeatedly miss their mark. Toward the end of the novel, Crimsworth
says to Frances after having agreed to a request of hers, “‘Now as a reward for such ready
consent, give me a voluntary kiss.’” “She brought her lips into very shy and gentle contact
with my forehead,” the novel continues; “I took the small gift as a loan, and repaid it
promptly, and with generous interest” (251). We are to feel that Crimsworth and Frances’s
relationship is governed by a logic so completely different from economics that econom-
ic terms are humorous when invoked between them. I would venture to say that for most
readers this passage does not achieve its desired effect. It is not so much that the dialogue
is cloying, though it is that, but that transforming a gift into a loan does not seem so play-
ful when performed by a protagonist who has consistently taken things that should be out-
side the logic of exchange and placed them within the tit-for-tat of commerce.
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14. Heather Glen wrote in her 1989 introduction to the novel, “Recent critics . . .
often trac[e] the novel’s ‘flaws’ to the fact that it is the only one of Charlotte Brontë’s pub-
lished works to adopt the point of view of the male narrator” (7). Glen herself argued that
the novel is a satire of Victorian masculinity. While an ingenious way of accounting for
the discomfort the novel provokes, this argument is not very persuasive, because, as Alan
Rauch has more recently explained, “The Crimsworth family embodies an ideal that
would have suited Brontë and many of her readers” (159). For his part, Rauch does not
then try to account for readers’ dissatisfaction with the text, merely suggesting that “The
Professor bears the mark of a first effort if only because it is optimistic and uncomplicated
in a way that Brontë’s later novels are not” (159). Optimistic, perhaps, but the novel is cer-
tainly not uncomplicated. My argument suggests, in fact, that the novel’s failure is in part
due to its quite complicated structure, one in which the two sides—labor and capital—
collapse in on one another.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1. Miller and Poovey “continue to set the terms for discussions of the interpellative
effects of Dickens’s fictions,” Rachel Ablow writes (40). Gareth Cordery’s 1998 essay
“Foucault, Dickens, and David Copperfield” might be a case in point. “David simply
exchanges one form of social discipline that is openly repressive and corporeal for anoth-
er that is covert and internal,” Cordery writes, going on to show how Miller’s argument
can account for even those parts of the novel Miller does not address (71).
2. Similarly, Amanda Anderson writes about Little Dorrit, “The suspicious approach
cannot do justice to Dickens, who . . . not only critically acknowledges the unholy alliance
between British nationalism and global capitalism, but conveys a highly complicated
understanding of the gains and losses of detachment cultivated in the service of systemic
critique” (66).
3. “Everything with him went as by clockwork,” Dickens’s housekeeper and sister-in-
law Georgina Hogarth recalled of Dickens (qtd. in Ackroyd 561). Echoing Copperfield’s
comment regarding his own timely “discharge” of literary duties, one of Dickens’s sons
claimed of his father, “no city clerk was ever more methodical or orderly than he: no hum-
drum, monotonous, conventional task could ever have been discharged with more punc-
tuality or more business-like regularity, than he gave to the work of his imagination and
fancy” (qtd. in Ackroyd 561).
4. For discussions of time in Dombey and Son, see Greenstein and Baumgarten. For a
fascinating survey of illustrations of watches and clocks in Victorian literature, with spe-
cial consideration of those in Dickens’s novels, see Dillon.
5. “They mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man,” Marx wrote; “they estrange
from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour-process in the same proportion as sci-
ence is incorporated in it as an independent power” (Capital 1: 604).
6. In addition to Roach, see R. J. Montgomery’s Examinations: An Account of Their
Evolution as Administrative Devices in England. Montgomery wrote, “1850 marked the
beginning of a decade in which examinations became really popular. Competitive exami-
nation, in particular, was held up as a panacea for many educational or social ills. So many
systems were started in this period that it appears as a sort of spring or source, the sub-
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stance of which comes rolling down in the years in the form of one famous public exam-
ination system after another” (41).
7. This “triumph” was so complete that J. G. Fitch could argue in a speech to the
Social Science Association as early as 1858: “No phenomena in the educational horizon at
all approach in importance the rapid extension of a system of examination hitherto almost
exclusively confined to the students in the Universities—first to candidates for appoint-
ments in the military, naval, and civil service of the Crown; then, to alumni of mechan-
ics’ institutions, by the Society of Arts; then, to the boys of middle-class schools, by the
College of Preceptors, and by the Universities; and, lastly, to the children of National
British and other elementary schools, in the form of prize and certificate schemes” (qtd.
in Roach 73).
8. For an excellent article on the role of the examination in Our Mutual Friend, see
Shuman (“Invigilating”). Like me, Shuman is interested in how the professional uses the
examination to shore up his authority and carefully negotiate a relationship to the market;
but, where I primarily address the problematic temporality of the examination, Shuman’s
emphasis lies with the specifically gendered ways Dickens puts the exam to use.
9. See chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion of this issue of distinguishing, as one
article put it, “the quality of the mind [from] the quantity of the stores with which it is
furnished” (Morison 538). Numerous articles on Civil Service and university examina-
tions in journals such as Chambers Journal, Fortnightly Review, Cornhill Magazine, and
Fraser’s Magazine discussed the “problem of cramming,” cramming being defined by one
article as “the accumulation of undigested facts and second-hand theories to be repro-
duced on paper” (Sayce 838).
10. For a different reading of Mr. Dick’s copying, see Welsh, “Writing and Copying in
the Age of Steam.” Welsh argued that at a time when mechanical reproduction was rap-
idly dissolving the difference between the original and the copy, the copy, in essence, rose
in value. David Copperfield participates, then, in the “relatively straightforward Victorian
celebration of writing and copying” (45). While this is an ingenious argument, it over-
looks the fact that copying is distinctly associated in the novel with those who are limited
in power, incapable of more imaginative pursuits.
11. We know a character in this novel by the way she or he treats time. Though he is
very industrious, Traddles is, we realize, somehow fundamentally inadequate when the
adult David see Traddles “looking at his plain old silver watch” and notes that it is “the
very watch he once took a wheel out of, at school, to make a water-mill” (598). On the
one hand, Traddles wears a watch, a good sign, but, on the other hand, he puts it to inap-
propriate uses, a telltale sign that something is wrong. Indeed, what ends up being wrong
with Traddles is precisely that he is still wearing the same “old” watch; that is, Traddles,
for the bulk of the novel, is very much stuck in time, a self-described “plodding kind of
fellow” (383) for whom everything happens “after rather a long delay” (382), particularly
his long-deferred marriage.
12. It is perhaps for this reason, this association with a grubbing middle class, that
Steerforth, the one “Public School Man” in the novel, refuses to undergo the examination
that will earn him a ranked degree. “‘You’ll take a high degree at college, Steerforth,’”
David says to him, “‘if you have not done so already; and they will have good reason to
be proud of you!’ ‘I take a degree!’ cried Steerforth. ‘Not I! my dear Daisy—will you mind
my calling you Daisy? . . . ‘I have not the least desire or intention to distinguish myself in
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that way . . . why should I trouble myself, that a parcel of heavy-headed fellows may gape
and hold up their hands?’” (276)
13. “’Procrastination is the thief of time’” (166), Mr. Micawber tells David. In always
focusing on ends (money) and never on means (work), Mr. Micawber is as much a thief
of time as the watch-stealing servant. More specifically, Mr. Micawber appropriates the
time of his friend Traddles. Because he must make a certain amount of money in order to
marry his sweetheart, Traddles thinks quite literally of his savings and investments in terms
of buying time, bringing him closer in time to his future wife. When Mr. Micawber
defaults on a loan he has asked Traddles to co-sign, forcing Traddles to forfeit his proper-
ty, Micawber causes Traddles to lose the time he had “made” in his journey to marriage.
14. “Temporally,” Patrick Brantlinger writes, “these new instruments of national debt
and middle-class commerce were all future oriented” (22).
15. See Altick for a discussion of both the increasing public visibility of speculative pursuits
in the mid-nineteenth century and Dickens’s representations of these pursuits in his novels.
16. Joseph Payne is reported in the College of Preceptors minutes as saying, “he could
not help thinking that many persons were going examination mad at the present moment”
(qtd in Roach 268).
17. One sees the same collapse of time into mental property or capital in the follow-
ing exchange between Francis Galton and his cousin Charles Darwin. After reading
Galton’s book Hereditary Genius (1872), Darwin wrote to him: “You have made a convert
of an opponent in one sense, for I have always maintained that, excepting fools, men did
not differ much in intellect, only in zeal and hard work.” Galton replied: “Character,
including the aptitude for hard work, is inheritable like every other faculty” (Memories).
18. In his essay “To Saunter, To Hurry: Dickens, Time, and Industrial Capitalism,” 
N. N. Feltes also investigated the role of “factory time” in Dickens. He argued that
Dickens attempted figuratively to resolve the conflict between laborers and the new time
discipline by, among other things, representing Mr. Toodles in Dombey and Son as a man
who “achieved equipoise” with mechanical labor. Feltes was not interested, however, in
either the issue of intelligence or the problem of the professional.
19. “Novelists fighting for economic bargaining power in 1850,” Lund wrote, “had
given up a romantic notion of the writer as unconscious, effortless creator for the image
of hard-working bourgeois businessman” (26). Lund provided a useful corrective to those
critics quick to assume that the mid-nineteenth-century writer was as averse to the con-
cept of waged or salaried labor as his earlier or later counterparts, but when he described
the process as a straightforward substitution of one imaginary identity for another, he sim-
plified what was in fact a complex, uneven, and contradictory process. Indeed, Lund sim-
plified his own argument with its hints that the writer must identify as much as a “labor-
er” as he does as a “businessman.” The Victorian writer did indeed reject the Romantic
version of himself but in its place he substituted neither a laborer nor a businessman but
an amalgam that rose above them both: the professional.
20. An author in the National Magazine wrote later in the decade, “Literary men . . .
if we may judge by the sneers and innuendos of the press . . . have not a very high appre-
ciation of total abstinence . . . [The literary men] will give to Bacchus the hours the mere
man of business is devoting to his it may be ignoble yet useful calling” (19).
21. See Bruce Robbins’s essay “Telescopic Philanthropy: Professionalism and Responsibility
in Bleak House” for another perspective on the objectivity of professionals in Dickens.
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22. See Anita Levy’s essay “Gendered Labor, the Woman Writer and Dorothy
Richardson” for what might be considered the evolution of this mid-nineteenth-century
logic of professional domesticity. Levy argues that around the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury both popular and modernist fiction depicted women who need to leave home and
enter the professional world precisely so that they might qualify to return home.
23. My argument intersects with Nicholas Dames’s on this point. Dames writes,
“David’s memory contains few seeds that fail to grow; very few events are without their
companions and repetitions. The effect of all this chainlike concordance and integrity is,
however, to reduce the capacity of experience to alter a life” (Amnesiac Selves 146).
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. For discussions focused solely on the history of the examination, see Roach and
Montgomery.
2. The Times’s interpretation exemplified this misunderstanding. On Feb. 9, 1854, it
declared: “Nothing less is proposed than the creation of a new liberal profession, as freely
open to all as the Church, the bar, of the hospital. From the time this measure receives the
royal assent, it will be the fault of the people if the public service do not become their
birthright, according to the talent, education, and industry of each, without any hin-
drance from those sinister influences which have hitherto, as a general rule, made access
dependent on a powerful connexion or a seared conscience” (qtd. in Evans 113).
3. Nicholas Dames’s “Trollope and the Career: Vocational Trajectories and the
Management of Ambition” was published as I was revising this chapter. While not on The
Three Clerks, in particular, Dames’s argument about Trollope overlaps with mine on a
number of points, though his tends to be framed in Foucauldian terms (“The figure of
‘career,’” he writes, “managed to create linear, ordered sequences out of the disruptive
energies unleashed by the spread of professionalism” (248)).
4. Charley’s lack of grand ambition, his acceptance of himself as a mere hack, helps
ensure his honesty. See Kucich for a discussion of the relationship between ambition and
dishonesty in Trollope (“Transgression”).
5. Since writing this, Lauren Goodlad’s Victorian Literature and the Victorian State has
appeared, which also offers an analysis of The Three Clerks, some of which overlaps with
points I make here.
6. Recognizing this as central to Trollope’s refusal of the logic of “unbought brains,”
Robert D. Aguirre writes in his excellent discussion of An Autobiography, “Trollope’s
accounting does not signal the failure of autobiography but the recognition of its insepa-
rability from the material conditions of authorship itself ” (569–70).
7. And Trollope has been called the “quintessential bourgeois” novelist (Praz 265).
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
1. In 1997, Andrew Ross could yet write, “it is still a novelty to speak of academic
labor” (“Labor behind the Cult of Work” 140), and, in 1998, Philip Altbach could still
declare that although “there is a vague sense of unease,” there is “little sense of crisis among
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academics, and most are unaware of the magnitude of the problems facing American high-
er education” (113). In the last five years, however, an outpouring of books, articles, and
even websites (see “workplace: a journal for academic labor” and “Invisible Adjunct”) has
polished our vague unease into hard concern.
2. “The literary and artistic world is so ordered that those who enter it have an inter-
est in disinterestedness,” he writes (“Field” 321).
3. I am indebted throughout my discussion of Woodmansee to Kaiser’s excellent
review.
4. George Levine makes a similar point when he comments at the beginning of Dying
to Know, “I have found myself wanting to argue . . . that the hermeneutics of suspicion
and the insistence on the primary values of localism and particularism have done what
good work they can, and are now—often destructively—playing into the obsessive indi-
vidualism of contemporary economic and social structures” (14).
5. In his introduction to Day Late, Dollar Short; The Next Generation and the New
Academy, Peter C. Herman addresses both the new self-consciousness as well as its implic-
it voluntarism by observing, “there is the further irony in how the arguments for the
importance (read continued funding) of the humanities often reiterate precisely the lan-
guage that the new historicism and its allied approaches made so unstylish. Whereas the
previous generation invented ‘strategic essentialism,’ the next generation might have to
adopt ‘strategic conservatism’ simply in order to survive” (10). Unlike some other critics
who have called for a reinvigorated formalism, Bell at least does admit that the solution is
not to “resacraliz[e] the literary text” (488).
6. “Defensive interventions into the discourse of value, and . . . attempts to reclaim
value by defining a new place for the aesthetic in contradistinction to the old conservative
definitions of high culture,” writes Isobel Armstrong, “would be regarded by Bourdieu as
made possible by a number of related shifts in the field, opened up by, to hypothesize,
mass education, global capital, post-modern repudiations of the grand narrative, and elec-
tronic media which have displaced the centrality of what we traditionally call the human-
ities” (Radical Aesthetic 155). See Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity for an account that
explains the economic changes thoroughly and see Jameson’s Postmodernism for one treat-
ing the cultural dynamic in more detail.
7. This move by which the politics of recent work is implicitly dismissed by linking
it to the pressure of productivity is becoming common. Speaking of “the next generation”
of literary critics, Jessie Swan claims that “for the sake of publishing . . . we are . . . pres-
sured into the sexy over the arduous since we all can deconstruct, expose the dynamics of
colonial power exploits, champion the subaltern, and reveal latent sexual desires in any
text—from coupons to Paradise Lost—in far less time than it takes to understand the vicis-
situdes of the textual histories of authors and their work” (116). Geoffrey Galt Harpham,
to take another example, follows a paragraph detailing recent criticism’s domination “by
sex, especially homosex; by race, especially minorities; by culture, especially material cul-
ture; by performance, especially the performance of identity” with one that makes the fol-
lowing statement: “literary scholars today don’t feel the need to read anything else in lit-
erary studies—they just need to write” (“The End of Theory” 195).
8. Guillory’s fatalism recalls Allen Dunn’s argument about Bourdieu’s sociology, the
primary intellectual influence on Guillory. Dunn writes, “if there is a scandal to be found
in Bourdieu’s sociology of art, it is in the implication that we can attain freedom only by
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assuming the position of spectators who witness the spectacle of human misery without
being able to intervene, without being able to translate sociological knowledge into social
practice” (“Who Needs a Sociology of the Aesthetic?” 90).
9. In yet another piece worrying about junior scholars who “reduce critical practice
to exercises in political positioning,” George Levine writes, “Literature remains a subject
worth studying ‘in its own right’ (however complicated that idea has become)”
(“Reclaiming the Aesthetic” 2,16). Levine distances himself from the very heart of his
argument by placing “in its own right” in both scare quotes and giving it a self-conscious
parenthetical. If, even as he argues for it, he is embarrassed by the idea that a critic could
divorce a text from its material circumstances—studying it “in its own right”—then what
chance do we as a profession have of recuperating this ideal in any sincere way?
10. Part of what I am trying to do is take seriously Kathleen McCormick’s recent com-
plaint that assessments of our “crisis” exhibit “a recurrent inability to engage dialectically
with the past.” She continues: “On the one hand there are those who seem to think that
everything will be all right if we just go back. On the other, there are those, rather on the
brink of despair, who seem quite sadly unable to find a way of redeeming the humanities.
. . . Both of these perspectives are unable to find productive ways to understand the past
in relation to the present” (137).
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music-related, gender/sexuality-related, science- or class-related, or even that
of Victorian studies itself.
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